South Australia Nuclear Prospects Q13-17

Subtitle: Nuclear Power For South Australia Not Justifiable

This is part 4 of my responses to the 17 questions.   South Australia's Royal Commission on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle requested written responses to 17 questions on the topic of nuclear power reactors.  see link The reactors are but one of four topic areas, with the others being 1) uranium mining, 2) uranium enrichment into civilian power fuel, and 3) nuclear waste management and storage.  I was unable to submit answers to the questions for formal consideration by the Royal Commission, however, the answers are below for the final 5 questions.  Answers to the previous questions appeared in separate posts.   The conclusion is that a nuclear power plant cannot be justified.  A small nuclear reactor would be required, which suffers from reverse economy of scale and is, therefore, very expensive for the amount of power produced.   The usual safety concerns also apply: operating upsets and radiation releases, population evacuation plans, spent fuel storage or reprocessing, and sabotage and terrorist attacks, to name a few.


The Commission's Questions and Responses  (13-17)

3.13 What risks for health and safety would be created by establishing facilities for the generation of electricity from nuclear fuels? What needs to be done to ensure that risks do not exceed safe levels?

As stated in the answer to question 3.8 above, the risk to health and safety from a radiation release is too high for insurance to accept. The liability from a radiation release can easily reach hundreds of billions of dollars, and no company would build a facility with that level of potential exposure.  Therefore, governments allocate a small part of the risk to the nuclear plant owner and accept the majority of the risk.  This is the case under the Price-Anderson Act in the US.   

The most serious risk is a loss-of-coolant-accident or LOCA.  The Fukushima Dai-ichi meltdowns of 3 reactors and reactor building explosions was directly caused by prolonged loss of cooling to the reactors.  The Three Mile Island meltdown was also caused by a loss of coolant to the reactor, although in that case it was operator error that cut the water flow.  

The IAEA and US NRC both have extensive publications on how to reduce radiation risks to safe levels.  These usually require multiple cooling sources that are independent, back-up on-site generators with adequate fuel for operation, and multiple links to the grid to power the plant and its cooling systems while the plant is down for any reason.  As stated above, the US requires regional centers with emergency generators that can be rapidly transported to a stricken nuclear plant. 

In addition, an emergency evacuation plan is required, with audible sirens to notify the affected population.  It is notable that Japan considered evacuating approximately 15 million people from Tokyo due to the Fukushima meltdowns.  

Ensuring safe levels of radiation exposure is typically done by several means, including multiple layers of containment, including an alloy metal tube or rod that contains the nuclear fuel pellets, a heavy alloy metal reactor that contains the fuel rods, and finally an air-tight containment building with thick walls in which the reactor and other equipment are placed.  Also, multiple and redundant reactor cooling systems are installed.  Finally, multiple and redundant grid connections are provided to ensure power for cooling when the reactor is off-line.  Plant design must account for earthquake shaking, flooding of any type, and all the other means by which a loss-of-coolant-accident could occur.  There are many, many other safety requirements listed in the various regulatory agency regulations. 

The safest means of producing power to ensure no radiation exposure to workers or the public is to not build nuclear plants.  

3.14 What safeguards issues are created by the establishment of a facility for the generation of electricity from nuclear fuels? Can those implications be addressed adequately? If so, by what means?

The question 3.14 asks about safeguards, but is vague as to what safeguards means in this context.  The answer below is for safety against security, direct attack, and sabotage. 

Nuclear power plants are targets for saboteurs and terrorists.  The US NRC requires that all new nuclear plants be built to sustain and continue normal operations after an impact from a large commercial aircraft.  The reactor, cooling systems, and spent fuel storage must all continue normal operation.  Design and operation must ensure these conditions are met. 

In addition, a robust security program must be established to deter and prevent unauthorized access to a nuclear power plant.  In the US, several security breaches occur annually.  However, details of the security breaches are not made public. 

If a nuclear power plant is computer-controlled, and if it has access to the worldwide web or internet, still more safeguards must be established to deter and prevent computer hacking, virus acquisition, and other cyber-sabotage.  

3.15 What impact might the establishment of a facility to generate electricity from nuclear fuels have on the electricity market and existing generation sources? What is the evidence from other existing markets internationally in which nuclear energy is generated? Would it complement other sources and in what circumstances? What sources might it be a substitute for, and in what circumstances?

Recent evidence in the US shows a baseload nuclear plant produces unwanted power at night, driving down the electricity prices at night.  This is especially true where wind energy is produced at night.   A baseload nuclear plant forces other forms of generation to reduce output during off-peak periods.  This forces those resources to incur operating expenses from load changes, and inefficiencies from operating at non-optimal output.  

Nuclear plants initially were expected to reduce high electric rates that occurred due to shortages of oil and natural gas.  Nuclear plants more recently are being built to reduce a country’s reliance on imported fuel, especially natural gas.  Where a resource-rich country exists, such as Australia, nuclear power cannot be justified. 

In the 1980s, France chose nuclear power rather than importing oil which had become expensive due to OPEC price increases.  In the US, nuclear power replaced oil-burning power plants in almost the identical fraction of total power produced, which was approximately 20 percent.  However, nuclear power could not compete with coal, natural gas, nor hydroelectric’s share of the power demand.   It is also noteworthy that opportunities for industry to co-generate power and heat are met with natural gas usually, and not by nuclear power.    


3.16 How might a comparison of the unit costs in generating electricity in South Australia from nuclear fuels as opposed to other sources be quantified, assessed or modelled? What information, including that drawn from relevant operational experience, should be used in that comparative assessment? What general considerations should be borne in mind in conducting those assessments or models?


An excellent comparison of levelized costs of generating technologies was published in 2010 by California’s Energy Commission.  The CEC conclusion is nuclear power is one of the most costly of all generating types.  

From Chapter 1 of the CEC 2010 study: “[t]he levelized cost of a resource represents a constant cost per unit of generation computed to compare one unit’s generation costs with other resources over similar periods. This is necessary because both the costs and generation capabilities differ dramatically from year to year between generation technologies, making spot comparisons using any year problematic.

“The levelized cost formula used in (the CEC) model first sums the net present value of the individual cost components, and then computes the annual payment with interest (or discount rate, r) required to pay off that present value over the specified period T.”

Figure 7 of the CEC 2010 study shows nuclear power at $340/MWh, coal using IGCC at $180/MWh, and advanced combined cycle natural gas at $160/MWh.   The nuclear technology in the CEC 2010 study is a Westinghouse AP-1000 PWR with 960 MWe. 

3.17 Would the establishment of such facilities give rise to impacts on other sectors of the economy? How should they be estimated and using what information? Have such impacts been demonstrated in other economies similar to Australia?

Electric power prices will increase to all customers, creating a drag on the economy.  The high capital cost and operating costs of a small nuclear power plant necessitate higher power prices.  This problem is more acute if a load-following nuclear power plant is installed. 

Subsidies that are required to install and operate a nuclear power plant will increase the tax burden on citizens, further depressing the economy.  The response to question 3.6 above listed eight types of subsidy to nuclear power plants. 

Bureaucracy will increase by establishing an effective nuclear regulatory agency and all of its employees, offices, travel and other expenses.  

Frequent nuclear-related lawsuits brought against various parties will require defending.  This will line the pockets of lawyers but will drain the coffers of the defendants. 

Delays in completion of nuclear power plants require utilities to purchase expensive spot-market power, or operate inefficient and perhaps unsafe facilities to provide power to the grid.  

A spent-fuel management industry will be required, with capital resources, utility consumption, labor and maintenance, security forces, and many other operating costs.  This industry will endure for decades at a minimum, and far longer depending on choices made in the spent fuel disposition.
  
Nuclear plant decommissioning costs will additionally burden the electricity consumers.  Where actual decommissioning costs exceed the estimate, the electricity consumers of the future will be billed for those costs.  

Since Australia must import nuclear plant parts and expertise, much of the capital cost for a nuclear plant will go overseas.  

Local workers could be employed during plant construction and operation.  However, a single nuclear power plant would employ a few hundred people at most.   


Questions 1-4 and answers, see link
Questions 5-8 and answers, see link
Questions 9-12 and answers, see link
Questions 13-17 and answers, this article


Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, Californiacopyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell 

South Australia Nuclear Prospects Q9-12

Subtitle: Nuclear Power For South Australia Not Justifiable

This is part 3 of my responses to the 17 questions.   South Australia's Royal Commission on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle requested written responses to 17 questions on the topic of nuclear power reactors.  see link The reactors are but one of four topic areas, with the others being 1) uranium mining, 2) uranium enrichment into civilian power fuel, and 3) nuclear waste management and storage.  I was unable to submit answers to the questions for formal consideration by the Royal Commission, however, the answers are below for the third set of 4 questions.  Answers to the remaining questions will appear in separate posts.   The conclusion is that a nuclear power plant cannot be justified.  A small nuclear reactor would be required, which suffers from reverse economy of scale and is, therefore, very expensive for the amount of power produced.   The usual safety concerns also apply: operating upsets and radiation releases, population evacuation plans, spent fuel storage or reprocessing, and sabotage and terrorist attacks, to name a few.

The Commission's Questions and Responses  (9-12)

3.9 What are the lessons to be learned from accidents, such as that at Fukushima, in relation to the possible establishment of any proposed nuclear facility to generate electricity in South Australia? Have those demonstrated risks and other known safety risks associated with the operation of nuclear plants been addressed? How and by what means? What are the processes that would need to be undertaken to build confidence in the community generally, or specific communities, in the design, establishment and operation of such facilities?

The primary lesson from Fukushima is that a loss of cooling accident, LOCA, is a serious event and should be the primary concern.  LOCA have two versions: short-term and long-term duration.  A short-term duration may be manageable with proper design and operating procedures, as happened by sheer luck at Three Mile Island in 1979.  LOCA of long-term duration is what happened at Fukushima where meltdowns, explosions, and extensive radiation releases occurred.  One lesson from Fukushima is that emergency generators, cooling pumps and motors, and associated electrical equipment must not be positioned where they will be inoperable after or during a grid failure.  This is true no matter what causes the grid failure, tsunami, flood, earthquake, wildfire, sabotage or terror attack, ice storm, cyclone, tornado, or any other cause.  At Fukushima, emergency generators were placed in basements that flooded during the tsunami.   

In Japan, nuclear reactors are shut down at present following Fukushima's 3 reactor meltdowns.  Detailed studies are being performed at each existing reactor to determine if the reactor can be restarted and operated safely.   In the US, the NRC required detailed study of each operating reactor to determine if changes must be made to ensure safety.  In addition, the NRC required several new facilities to be constructed that store emergency generation equipment that can be rapidly deployed to any nuclear reactor that cannot sustain its own emergency generating system during a grid outage or for any other reason. 

Even Germany, with little risk from tsunamis, recognized the high risk of multiple and simultaneous system failures in nuclear plants that endanger the public.  The government chose to shut down the entire reactor fleet in an orderly fashion while new non-nuclear generation facilities are built to supply the grid. 

The primary lesson to be learned from the Three Mile Island meltdown is that human operators are fallible and will make mistakes.  Even when the grid is operating normally, meltdowns can occur.  That meltdown incident began with the simple failure of a water pump.  Operator errors compounded the problems leading to intentional shutdown of a reactor cooling water pump. Only by sheer luck was the reactor cooling water pump started again, after approximately one-half of the reactor fuel had melted down. It is noteworthy that the Three Mile Island operators were supposedly some of the best in the world, being former US Navy atomic submarine operators.

Additionally, recent events in Japan related to the Fukushima meltdowns include criminal charges filed against utility executives.  The criminal charges include what would be termed involuntary manslaughter in the US, the loss of human life due to negligence.  In Japan, the charge is professional negligence resulting in death and injury.  The utility executives allegedly knew the seawall to protect against tsunamis was too low for the expected, foreseeable tsunami.  They also knew the nuclear plant designs had placed the emergency generators in the building basements where they would be inundated by flood or tsunami waters.  Then, when a foreseeable tsunami occurred, knocking out the grid for days, the emergency generators would not operate.

Other nuclear accidents of lesser harm occur regularly as documented by the Union of Concerned Scientists in their annual reports on US reactor safety.  An unplanned, emergency reactor shutdown, or a serious security breach, occurs approximately once every 3 weeks in the US reactor fleet over the past five years, 2010-2014 inclusive.  Some of these incidents resulted in radiation releases to the environment.  Also, leaks of water laced with tritium occur regularly.  Radioactive steam is also released, as occurred at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California. 

The Union of Concerned Scientists reports mentioned earlier have much to say about reactor safety, from operating procedures to replacement parts to operating training.  

Instilling public confidence in nuclear power plants is difficult, if not impossible, given the nuclear industry’s long and abysmal record of false information, cover-ups, and secrecy.  The internet information age now enables information sharing that was not possible before, so that industry falsehoods are more easily exposed.  One such area of critical information is the evacuation zone around nuclear power plants, and emergency preparedness. 

From the NRC’s backgrounder on emergency preparedness, “[b]efore a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have “reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.” The NRC’s decision of reasonable assurance is based on licensees complying with NRC regulations and guidance. In addition, licensees and area response organizations must “demonstrate they can effectively implement emergency plans and procedures during periodic evaluated exercises.”

Also, “[f]or planning purposes, the NRC defines two emergency planning zones (EPZs) around each nuclear power plant. The exact size and configuration of the zones vary from plant to plant due to local emergency response needs and capabilities, population, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The two types of EPZs are:

1) The plume exposure pathway EPZ extends about 10 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary concern is the exposure of the public to, and the inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination.

2) The ingestion pathway EPZ extends about 50 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary concern is the ingestion of food and liquid that is contaminated by radioactivity.”

For instilling public confidence and assurance that people will be safe near an operating nuclear power plant, the very fact that an evacuation plan is required is sobering, if not heart-stopping.  Children are particularly susceptible to nuclear radiation effects.  Property values near nuclear plants necessarily decline.  

The NRC uses the least-alarming measure by stating a 10-mile radius around the plant defines the plume exposure pathway EPZ.  The fact is, the smaller, plume exposure pathway EPZ is a circle 20 miles across, with an area of 314 square miles.  The larger, ingestion pathway EPZ is a circle 100 miles across with an area of more than 7,800 square miles.  Clearly, using the numbers 10 and 50 sound much more reassuring than 314 and 7,800.  

Yet another rather clever method of minimizing alarm and concern is the nuclear industry's use of acronyms for some phrases.  As seen just above, the acronym EPZ is used instead of 'emergency planning zone.'  

The facts of nuclear power, related to instilling public confidence, are illustrated by the following. Over the decades, the nuclear industry’s position on reactor safety has changed from “no one has ever been injured”, to “no member of the public has ever been injured”, to “no member of the public has died”, to “nuclear power is safer than coal or natural gas.”   That is an interesting progression, as it implies that non-industry people, the public, have been injured and have died from nuclear plant radiation.  

With legal settlements of one million US$ or more for deaths caused by a defendant’s actions, the deaths of 100,000 people from a nuclear plant radiation release amounts to US$ 100 billion.  It is also noteworthy that the US EPA uses US$ 6 million for the value of a statistical life saved.  Therefore, 100,000 deaths from a radiation release would require payment of US$ 600 billion.  If the event were to kill 200,000 people, the payment would be US$ 1.2 trillion. No nuclear plant owner can absorb such an amount. Even a national government, such as Australia, that absorbs any excess liability from nuclear radiation releases would find such an amount staggering.  

Finally, my own series of articles on nuclear power plants included 12 articles on nuclear plant safety, out of 30 total articles.  These 12 articles addressed the topics of: safety regulations are routinely relaxed, many serious near-misses occur (one every 3 weeks), safety issues with short term and long-term storage of spent fuel, reprocessing safety issues, radiation illness and deaths, Chernobyl explosion, Three Mile Island meltdown, Fukushima Dai-ichi meltdowns and explosions, the San Onofre Shutdown Saga, the St Lucie plant imminent tube rupture, the Price-Anderson Act details, and evacuating populations to escape radiation.  These articles are Truth About Nuclear Power, numbers 15 through 26, inclusive. See link.
  
The conclusion can be none other than instilling confidence in the public is essentially impossible.

3.10 If a facility to generate electricity from nuclear fuels was established in South Australia, what regulatory regime to address safety would need to be established? What are the best examples of those regimes? What can be drawn from them?

In the US, the NRC regulates safety for nuclear reactors.  The regulatory regime is extensive.  Australia is also a signatory to the International Atomic Energy Agency and must follow its requirements.  

The US NRC is criticized for not being sufficiently pro-active in its enforcement, in not requiring safety modifications in a timely manner, and for relaxing safety requirements instead of requiring reactors to comply.  

3.11 How might a comparison of the emission of greenhouse gases from generating electricity in South Australia from nuclear fuels as opposed to other sources be quantified, assessed or modelled? What information, including that drawn from relevant operational experience should be used in that comparative assessment? What general considerations are relevant in conducting those assessments or developing these models?

A greenhouse gas emissions inventory for nuclear reactors ordinarily concentrates only on Carbon Dioxide, of which little is emitted during normal operations.  However, a much more important greenhouse gas is water vapor, which is produced in far greater amounts from a nuclear plant due to the large cooling requirements. 

It must be noted that almost every form of renewable energy has near-zero emissions of carbon dioxide and water vapor.  The exceptions are those technologies that use renewable heat to produce steam to turn a turbine, and that exhaust steam is condensed against cooling water.  As noted above, a cooling tower produces water vapor into the atmosphere.  Three examples of renewable energy that produce power via a steam turbine are geothermal, concentrated solar power, and bio-gas. 

Typically, carbon dioxide emissions accounting from an operating nuclear power plant do not consider, nor count, the emissions from off-site manufacturing to support the nuclear power plant.  Examples include the oil refineries that produces the vast quantities of lubricants, oils and greases, that are used in the great number of pumps, motors, turbines, generators, transformers, and electrical switches.   Also, petrochemical and plastic plants that produce the myriad compounds that are formed into electronics and plastic parts used in maintenance and upgrades.  The same is true for every metal part replaced over the operating lifetime, because fossil-fuel combustion is almost certainly used to mine, refine, then fabricate the metal parts.  

3.12 What are the wastes (other than greenhouse gases) produced in generating electricity from nuclear and other fuels and technologies? What is the evidence of the impacts of those wastes on the community and the environment? Is there any accepted means by which those impacts can be compared? Have such assessments making those comparisons been undertaken, and if so, what are the results? Can those results be adapted so as to be relevant to an analysis of the generation of electricity in South Australia?

Nuclear wastes include long and short-lived radioactive products and the heat they produce.  Community and environmental impacts from long-term storage and cooling of the nuclear wastes include fear of radiation exposure, actual radiation exposure from loss of cooling to a spent fuel pool, and water vapor from cooling towers where those are the cooling source.   One must also consider transportation issues where spent nuclear fuel is moved from place to place, and the inevitable accidents and consequences. 

Coal-fired power plants produce waste as fly ash and sludge from the stack scrubber.  The amounts and relative composition depends on the coal, plus any pre-treatment. 

Renewables typically produce zero wastes, such as solar, wind, biogas, ocean current, waves and tides.  A renewable that does produce some wastes is geothermal, with various minerals brought to the surface in the hot water.  


Questions 1-4 and answers, see link
Questions 5-8 and answers, see link
Questions 9-12 and answers, this article
Questions 13-17 and answers, see link


Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell

South Australia Nuclear Prospects Q5-8

Subtitle: Nuclear Power For South Australia Not Justifiable

This is part 2 of my responses to the 17 questions.   South Australia's Royal Commission on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle requested written responses to 17 questions on the topic of nuclear power reactors.  see link The reactors are but one of four topic areas, with the others being 1) uranium mining, 2) uranium enrichment into civilian power fuel, and 3) nuclear waste management and storage.  I was unable to submit answers to the questions for formal consideration by the Royal Commission, however, the answers are below for the second 4 questions.  Answers to the remaining questions will appear in separate posts.   The conclusion is that a nuclear power plant cannot be justified.  A small nuclear reactor would be required, which suffers from reverse economy of scale and is, therefore, very expensive for the amount of power produced.   The usual safety concerns also apply: operating upsets and radiation releases, population evacuation plans, spent fuel storage or reprocessing, and sabotage and terrorist attacks, to name a few.

The Commission's Questions and Responses  (5-8)

3.5  What are the conditions that would be necessary for new nuclear generation capacity to be viable in the NEM? Would there be a need, for example, for new infrastructure such as transmission lines to be constructed, or changes to how the generator is scheduled or paid? How do those conditions differ between the NEM and an off-grid setting, and why? 

New nuclear generation capacity in the NEM would be no more than 300 MW and preferably 200 MW to avoid unnecessary idling of load-following generating capacity.  Such small nuclear reactors are not economically favored.   The small minimum load of 700 to 800 MW at night is very small for a power grid.  Grid operation stability normally requires that no single generator exceed approximately 40 percent of the load.  If that single generator trips off line, additional generating resources must be brought on line rapidly to avoid grid failure.  

The NEM setting would also require a nuclear plant to be located where a radiation release to the atmosphere would be blown away from populated areas by prevailing winds.  

An off-grid setting would be specific to the demands of the off-grid load, including load-following.  Also, with no grid to provide power during unplanned shutdowns and shutdowns for maintenance, the off-grid load likely will require a shutdown whenever the nuclear plant is stopped for breakdowns, maintenance, refueling, severe natural events, security threats, or safety violations.  

3.6  What are the specific models and case studies that demonstrate the best practice for the establishment and operation of new facilities for the generation of electricity from nuclear fuels? What are the less successful examples? Where have they been implemented in practice? What relevant lessons can be drawn from them if such facilities were established in South Australia? 

There are, at present (2015) approximately 438 operating nuclear power plants globally, with another 60 under construction.  Very few new nuclear plants have been started up recently.   The usual model for a nuclear plant is the government assumes almost the entire liability for a radiation release, and subsidizes the plant construction costs.   As noted in the US’ Price-Anderson Act, which provides for the government assumption of liability, no nuclear plants would be built absent the government assuming the liability.  Insurers would require far too much money in the form of insurance premiums for nuclear-based power to be cost-effective. 

Additional forms of nuclear power subsidy include:
1) huge construction loan guarantees from government, approximately $8.3 billion for the US’ Vogtle plant construction alone,
2) regulation that no lawsuits during construction will be allowed (with a minor exception),
3) a carbon tax on fossil-fuel based electric power generating plants, 
4) regulation to raise electricity prices during construction to avoid interest costs on construction loans,
5) operating regulations that are routinely relaxed to allow plants to avoid spending money to comply,
6) direct subsidy of typically 1.5 cents (US) per kWh sold for the first decade of a nuclear plant’s operation,
7) a large guaranteed power price that is far above competitors’ pricing, as at UK’s Hinkley Point C proposed plant.

The best practice at this time appears to be the EPR reactor system under construction at two locations, Flamanville in France and Olkiluoto in Finland.  Both reactors are large to attempt to capture economy of scale, at 1600 MWe output.  Both projects failed to meet target schedules by several years.  Both projects also failed to meet target budgets by billions of Euros.  The Finland project is involved in legal claims between the various stakeholders.  

Four new reactors are under construction in the US, two each at Vogtle in Georgia, and Sumner in South Carolina, with all four having the Westinghouse AP-1000 PWR reactors at 1,200 MWe output.  All four reactors are years behind schedule and substantially over budget.

There are claims that nuclear plants being built in China are much less costly and are completed in four years.  The lower costs may be attributed to the very low wages for labor.  
If nuclear plants are built in Australia, construction costs can be expected to be more in line with the US and Europe rather than the China experience.  With the small size required for the NEM, costs will be much greater as economy of scale will not exist for a 250 to 300 MW reactor.  

Less successful examples include the Three Mile Island reactor and its partial meltdown.  The Rancho Seco nuclear plant in California, USA was shut down after repeated radiation releases and safety issues.  

3.7  What place is there in the generation market, if any, for electricity generated from nuclear fuels to play in the medium or long term? Why? What is the basis for that prediction including the relevant demand scenarios?

There is no place for electricity that is generated from nuclear fuels in the medium term, or long term.  As stated above, a nuclear plant in South Australia would be small, and suffer from high capital cost due to economy of scale.  Electricity from such a small reactor would be, therefore, far more expensive even if fuel costs were small.  In the long term, electricity that is generated from renewable sources such as wind, solar, and ocean currents are expected to be far less expensive, more reliable, much safer, and have less environmental impact than nuclear-produced power.  It is noted that Australia has a tremendous ocean current off the East Coast, the East Australia Current.  In addition, for intermittent wind energy, grid-scale power storage or its functional equivalent is available with the MIT system of submerged hollow spheres offshore near the coast.

For a relevant demand scenario, it is advantageous to consider historic grid demand growth and extrapolate into the time period of interest.  Grid demand typically follows population growth, but must be adjusted for anticipated industry needs, cogeneration, and distributed generation.  It is noteworthy that mineral processing may be performed near the mine if low-cost electricity is available at the mine.  However, the mineral processing may also be performed at sites nearer the end-user where electricity costs at the mine are high and transportation costs are low. 

Given the above, a demand growth of only 2.5 percent per year results in demand more than triple in only 50 years, and approximately 10 times greater in only 94 years.  A three-fold increase in demand for South Australia would bring minimum demand to 2,100 MWe, which would still not support the 1,200 MWe nuclear plant that is presently considered the best available technology.  Considering time frames beyond 50 years is very likely too speculative.  


3.8 What issues should be considered in a comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the generation of electricity from nuclear fuels as opposed to other sources? What are the most important issues? Why? How should they be analysed?  

As noted above, substantial subsidies are required for any size nuclear reactor, else no reactor would be built.  Large size is required for economy of scale, but the grid must provide the load when the large nuclear plant is off-line for maintenance, refueling, breakdowns, emergencies, severe natural events, and security and safety violations.  Other considerations are radiation emissions, evacuation plans, spent fuel storage for a very long time, cost to decommission, and excessive water use in nuclear plants compared to other forms of generation. 

When a nuclear reactor is not generating, it is a substantial load on the grid to maintain core cooling.  Provision must be made to provide redundant and reliable grid power to the nuclear plant so that adequate cooling is maintained for the decay heat in the reactor and spent fuel pool.  

Other sources of power generation also should have their relative advantages and disadvantages quantified and compared.  The California Energy Commission's study, referenced in Q3.4 above, compared 21 technologies including various forms of coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, nuclear fission, and renewables.  The renewables included onshore and offshore wind but both without storage, solar PV and thermal, geothermal, biomass, and ocean waves.   It should be noted that the CEC study did not include grid-scale storage as described by MIT, which involves placing hollow spheres in moderately deep ocean water such that wind energy pumps seawater out of the spheres.  When power is required on the grid, seawater flows into the spheres through conventional hydroelectric turbine/generators.   Such grid-scale storage adds to the installed cost, but substantially increases the value of the intermittent power from wind, is load-following, and dispatchable.

Also from Q3.4 above, factors for installing any generating facility on a grid, including NEM, include infrastructure availability, capital cost, operating cost, safety, reliability, turn-down ratio, ramping rate, fuel availability, cooling requirements, transmission requirements, impact on the grid from planned and unplanned shutdowns, years required during construction before connecting to the grid, and environmental impacts from both ongoing operations and after the facility closes at the end of its useful life. 

The most important factors are safety, reliability, and unsubsidized-cost of power sold to obtain a modest return on investment.   Almost all of the other factors can be partially or entirely overcome with sufficient care in design and expenditure of capital, but that capital expenditure increases the final cost of power sold.    None of the non-nuclear alternatives pose the safety threat of serious radiation exposure, which places public safety at the top of the list of important factors.  

For the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) perspective on the safety considerations posed by a nuclear power plant on a grid, one should refer to "Safety of
Nuclear Power Plants: Design, No. SSR-2/1 Specific Safety Requirements (2012)" available online from www.iaea.org.  see link This is but one of 13 Safety Guides available from IAEA.   This Design document lists 82 specific design Requirements for nuclear power plants.   The conclusion to be drawn is that a nuclear power plant is a serious threat to public safety and must have expensive and elaborate design and operational safeguards.  Even with such design and operational safeguards, nuclear power plants have melted down with subsequent radiation exposure that impacts people and the environment (3 reactors melted down at Fukushima Dai-ichi, Japan). 

For the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) perspective on the reliability considerations posed by a nuclear power plant on a grid, one should refer to "Interfacing Nuclear Power Plants with the Electric Grid: the Need for Reliability amid Complexity," available online from www.iaea.org.  see link From page 7 of the IAEA Interfacing publication, 

"In addition to assuring that the electric grid will provide reliable off-site power to NPPs, (nuclear power plants), there are other important factors to consider when an NPP will be the first nuclear unit on the grid and, most likely, the largest unit. If an NPP is too large for a given grid, the operators of the NPP and the grid may face several problems. 

• Off-peak electricity demand might be too low for a large NPP to be operated in baseload mode, i.e. at constant full power.  (note, operating at other than full power requires a higher sales price for electricity - Sowell)

• There must be enough reserve generating capacity in the grid to ensure grid stability during the NPP’s planned outages for refuelling and maintenance.

• Any unexpected sudden disconnect of the NPP from an otherwise stable electric grid could trigger a severe imbalance between power generation and consumption causing a sudden reduction in grid frequency and voltage. This could even cascade into the collapse of the grid if additional power sources are not connected to the grid in time."

Questions 1-4 and answers, see link
Questions 5-8 and answers, this article
Questions 9-12 and answers, see link
Questions 13-17 and answers, see link


Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California

copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell

South Australia Nuclear Prospects Q1-4

Subtitle:  Nuclear Power For South Australia Not Justifiable

South Australia's Royal Commission on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle requested written responses to 17 questions on the topic of nuclear power reactors.  see link The reactors are but one of four topic areas, with the others being 1) uranium mining, 2) uranium enrichment into civilian power fuel, and 3) nuclear waste management and storage.  I was unable to submit answers to the questions for formal consideration by the Royal Commission, however, the answers are below for the first 4 questions.  Answers to the remaining questions will appear in separate posts.   The conclusion is that a nuclear power plant cannot be justified.  A small nuclear reactor would be required, which suffers from reverse economy of scale and is, therefore, very expensive for the amount of power produced.   The usual safety concerns also apply: operating upsets and radiation releases, population evacuation plans, spent fuel storage or reprocessing, and sabotage and terrorist attacks, to name a few.

The background parameters for the South Australian power grid, the NEM or National Electricity Market, are as follows. 

1. SA has peak demand of approximately 1400 MW, at times soaring to 2400+ MW in Winter; recently has hot summer peaks of 3000+ MW in January.  (Figure 4, Issues Paper 3)
2. Typical peak demand is 1400 MW, see Figure 4, Issues Paper 3.  
3. Typical minimum demand (nights) is 1000 MW, with lows in Spring of 700 to 800 MW. ( ibid, Figure 4) 
4. Generation total capacity is 5,000 MW on the NEM. 
5. Demand growth has slowed, and demand has decreased in the past few years.  The decrease is attributed to deliberate conservation measures, solar on rooftops, and demand removal via industry closures. 
6. Commission concludes that SA has 600 MW of excess, surplus, generation that could be removed from the grid without difficulties arising.  
7. There is some fraction of wind energy in the generation mix.  The balance is coal and natural gas. 
8. The grid is connected at high voltage to other Australian grids via the National Electricity Market, NEM.  A spot market exists on the NEM.  Export or import capacities are 650 MW and 220 MW, both to Victoria.
9. Some off-grid generation and demand exists, presumably in remote locations such as farming, mines, and desalination. 
10. Background information correctly identifies earthquakes as a concern, also requirement for adequate cooling water, and accessibility to power transmission lines. (No information yet on evacuation plans, tsunami threats, grid loss from other forces such as wildfires, storms, cyclones, sabotage, and large aircraft crash.)  

The Commission's Questions and Responses  (1-4)

3.1  Are there suitable areas in South Australia for the establishment of a nuclear reactor for generating electricity? What is the basis for that assessment?

Nuclear plants have been built on a variety of sites, including ocean coasts (e.g. Diablo Canyon and San Onofre in California, USA, Fukushima Dai-Ichi and Dai-ini in Japan), lake shores (Perry in Ohio, USA on the shore of Lake Erie), on islands in rivers (Three Mile Island on the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania, USA, and South Texas near the mouth of the Colorado River in Texas, USA), and in a desert (Palo Verdes near Phoenix, Arizona, USA).  Cooling for Palo Verdes is provided by treated waste water from the nearby city of Phoenix and other towns.  It is probable that suitable sites exist in South Australia, however many factors must be considered as discussed below. 

Factors that are required to provide a meaningful answer on site selection include the size and type of nuclear reactor.  This impacts several aspects for site selection including cooling water required, infrastructure for building the plant and ongoing work, reliability of the grid at that location, probability of natural forces that impact the reactor and other parts of the plant, such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, ice storms, droughts, heat waves, wildfires, any other site-specific natural events, and size of population downwind of the site that must be evacuated in and when a major radiation event occurs.  

3.2  Are there commercial reactor technologies (or emerging technologies which may be commercially available in the next two decades) that can be installed and connected to the NEM? If so, what are those technologies, and what are the characteristics that make them technically suitable? What are the characteristics of the NEM that determine the suitability of a reactor for connection? 

Demand on NEM for SA is small at 1400 MWe typical daily maximum, and 3,000 MWe annual maximum.  Population served is approximately 1.6 million.   Night minimum demand is approximately 700 MWe.   This places NEM on the small end of utility grids, and likely unsuitable for a nuclear reactor.  It is notable that zero islands with similar power demand have nuclear power for electricity.   There are, however, commercial reactor technologies that could be installed and connected to the NEM.  The grid’s operational stability, and economics of generation, would be severely compromised.  

Determining if nuclear technologies may be commercially available in the next two decades requires prudent speculation.  One such technology undergoing research is the PRISM, or Power Reactor Innovative Small Module.  (S-PRISM Fuel Cycle Study, For Session 3: Future Deployment Programs and Issues, A. Dubberley et. al. 2003, see link)  PRISM technology would require a spent fuel reprocessing plant to extract fissile and fertile material, then react the extracted material via fission to produce power.  The plants would consist of multiple 760 MWe power blocks.  It can be seen from the above that the PRISM technology is too big to suit the NEM and South Australia.   The costs would also be prohibitive. 

In addition, PRISM technology requires ready access to spent nuclear fuel, which must be imported into South Australia.  The safe transport of spent nuclear fuel from Japan, the US, Europe, and elsewhere presents very great problems.  A ship containing spent nuclear fuel would be a prime target for terrorists and pirates.  A spent nuclear fuel ship could be held for ransom.  Also, the environmental consequences of a sunk ship would be devastating.  
The safety of a PRISM, which is a Liquid Metal Fast Reactor, LMR, is dubious at best and catastrophic at worst.  If a LMR is located underground, one then has an atomic land mine.  The liquid metal is typically sodium, which reacts furiously with air or water to produce great quantities of heat or explosive gas.  Leaks are inevitable in a process system.  

Other small reactor technologies under research include thorium-based SMR, and high temperature gas reactors.   None of these have any advantages to recommend them. 

3.3  Are there commercial reactor technologies (or emerging technologies which may be commercially available in the next two decades) that can be installed and connected in an off-grid setting? If so, what are those technologies, and what are the characteristics that make them technically suitable? What are the characteristics of any particular off-grid setting that determine the suitability of a reactor for connection?

Other than military ship and submarine nuclear power plants, none are available, and none likely to become available and economic.   A nuclear reactor in an off-grid setting must compete successfully with two alternatives: the expense of bringing reliable grid power to the off-grid load, or the expense and variable reliability of on-site generation such as diesel-powered generators, and gas-turbine cogeneration systems.  For many off-grid applications, both electricity and steam for heat are required.  A gas-fired cogeneration system may have excellent economics in such a location.  A small nuclear reactor would have unfavorable economics.  

3.4  What factors affect the assessment of viability for installing any facility to generate electricity in the NEM? How might those factors be quantified and assessed? What are the factors in an off-grid setting exclusively? How might they be quantified and assessed? 

Factors for installing any generating facility on a grid, including NEM, include infrastructure availability, capital cost, operating cost, safety, reliability, turn-down ratio, ramping rate, fuel availability, cooling requirements, transmission requirements, impact on the grid from planned and unplanned shutdowns, years required during construction before connecting to the grid, and environmental impacts from both ongoing operations and after the facility closes at the end of its useful life.  Several comparisons of multiple sources of electricity have been performed, including e.g. California’s cost study from 2010. see link

Factors for an off-grid setting also include most of the above factors for NEM, noting that infrastructure additions are almost certainly required, e.g. roads for heavy components, and reduced efficiency where the off-grid setting is far from cooling water so that air cooling must be used.  One factor for the NEM that likely will not be present for off-grid consideration is the impact on the local grid from an unplanned shutdown.  However, the load that is serviced by the off-grid power plant will certainly be impacted by any shutdown of the power plant.  
  
Note that an off-grid setting would almost certainly require load-following capability from a nuclear power plant, which adds to the cost of the plant, decreases safety, decreases the operating lifetime, and increases the price that must be paid for the electricity produced.

Questions 5-8 and answers, see link.
Questions 9-12 and answers, see link
Questions 13-17 and answers, see link


Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell

Japanese Nuclear Utility Executives Face Criminal Charges

Subtitle: Fukushima Dai-ichi Disaster Was Alleged Crime 

From the Japanese on-line newspaper, English version, Mainichi Shimbun editorial of August 1, 2015, "Decision to indict ex-TEPCO executives in court over nuclear accident is meaningful."  see link   

From the editorial:  "The Tokyo No. 5 Committee for the Inquest of Prosecution recommended that former TEPCO Chairman Tsunehisa Katsumata and two former vice presidents, Sakae Muto and Ichiro Takekuro, be prosecuted on charges of professional negligence resulting in death and injury. This was the second recommendation by the

Fukushima Dai-ichi Plant before earthquake
source:  ORNL

prosecution inquest panel, whose eleven members were selected from among members of the general public.

In 2008, three years before the disaster, TEPCO released its estimate that the atomic power plant could be hit by a tsunami up to 15.7 meters in height. The inquest panel determined that the three former executives failed to take necessary measures, and neglected their duty to prevent a serious accident, even though they knew of this possibility."

This is significant because the Dai-ichi nuclear plant was designed for only a 6 meter tsunami (23 feet).  The 15.7 meter tsunami estimate from 2008 would be 51 feet.  The actual tsunami was approximately 50 feet high.  

If the TEPCO executives do stand trial and are convicted, a clear message will be sent to nuclear utility executives to modify their nuclear plants when new information becomes available, and not wait until a disaster occurs. 

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell

Arctic Sea Ice 2015

Subtitle: Not Shrinking Like Before

source: Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI) Centre for Ocean and Ice

In the endless debate over Global Warming, or Climate Change, one of the key indicators is the polar ice.  Warmists insist that the polar ice is melting away and will lead to all manner of havoc, such as seashores inundated by rising seas.  The implications are grim, for those who live within a few feet of sea level.  Warmists also insist that the addition of tiny amounts of carbon dioxide, CO2, to the atmosphere will increase the globe's average temperature and accelerate rate at which the polar ice melts.   The figure at the right, from Danish Meteorological Institute, shows millions of square kilometers of Arctic ice over a year's period, with different colors for each of the past few years.  The shaded gray area and darker gray line are the mean (roughly the average) over the 22 year period 1979-2000.    The bold black line shows the data for 2015.  (see link  for updated data) 

A few things can be observed from this figure.  First, the ice extent reaches a maximum in mid-February, and a minimum in early September.  The average maximum extent for the '79-2000 period was approximately 16 million km2.  The recent few years are only 1 million less, at approximately 15 million km2.  That is a decrease of only 6.2 percent over 35 years. 

The minimum extent has a much greater variation, with the '79-2000 average of approximately 7.5 million km2.  Recent years showed a minimum of 4 million km2 in 2012, and 6 million km2 in 2013 and 2014.   The extent in 2012 led to much press over the ice is melting and claims that we are all going to die from sea level rise, by the warmists.   

The extent for 2015, though, is only a bit past the mid-way from maximum to minimum, March to September.  That black line has several things to convey.  First, the other recent years (2011 - 2014) all had approximately the same rate of melting - the slope of the line - as does 2015 from approximately April 15 through June 1.  But, something is different starting in about June 1.  The recent years all began melting more rapidly starting June 1 (the slope of their lines increased downward), but the line for 2015 continued on its early slope.    One can speculate about the causes of the steady melting, and not the accelerated melting of the past few years.  Melting occurs from four sources: heat absorbed by the ice from seawater from below, heat absorbed from warmer air from above, heat absorbed from radiant heat from sunlight, and wind that breaks up the ice then pushes the ice into warmer water where melting takes place.   Warmists will add a fifth source of heat bombarding the Arctic ice: radiant heat from CO2 and water molecules in the atmosphere above the ice.  

So, what is different this year, that is not accelerating the ice melt?  One cannot determine the cause from the simple figure above.   One thing we do know for certain, though, is that the tiny amount of CO2 added to the atmosphere during the past year could not be responsible for a sudden and large change in melt rate.  

This graph bears watching closely, especially as the upcoming IPCC meeting in November will attempt (once again, because they failed each previous time) to obtain an accord to retard fossil fuel use world-wide.   

Warmists, especially those in the alarmist camp, have a very difficult time refuting solid evidence of Arctic ice growing, year over year over year.  

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell. 

Hurricane Dolores in Los Angeles

A post from 2009 on SLB (see link)  titled Hurricanes in Los Angeles was critical of public officials in their warnings and evacuation plans ahead of that hurricane.  Of course, hurricanes almost never hit Los Angeles because the ocean surface temperature offshore Southern California is far too cold to sustain a hurricane. 

Today, however, the remnants of Hurricane Dolores 2015 sit offshore Los Angeles, and moisture from the storm's arms is turning into rain, creating flash flooding in the regions surrounding Los Angeles. 

From the National Weather Service, the following warning was issued:

AT 550 PM PDT...DOPPLER RADAR INDICATED AREAS OF STRONG AND SLOW MOVING  THUNDERSTORMS PRODUCING HEAVY RAIN ACROSS THE CENTRAL PORTION OF THE SAN GABRIEL MOUNTAINS AND ADJACENT FOOTHILLS OF THE SAN GABRIEL VALLEY ALONG THE INTERSTATE   210 CORRIDOR. VERY HEAVY RAINFALL WITH RATES OVER ONE INCH IN 30 MINUTES HAVE BEEN OBSERVED... CAPABLE OF PRODUCING FLASH FLOODING AND DEBRIS FLOWS. 

Global warming alarmists will almost certainly use the Dolores 2015 event as proof of their theories that man-made carbon-dioxide is heating the atmosphere, and that creates stronger hurricanes, floods, and storms.    Of course, when such alarmists are asked to explain similar events that occurred pre-1970, they alarmists attribute those to natural causes.   It is notable that 28 floods occurred pre-1970 according to a document published by State of California Department of Water Resources (see link) titled "History of California Flooding (2013), Table C-1"  Of the 28 floods, 3 were from tsunamis, and 3 were from failed dams, leaving 22 from rain events.   Those 22 are not all of the floods pre-1970, only the major floods. 

Sometimes it seems that the warmists simply do not understand that history did not start in 1970.   Hurricanes, floods, droughts, severe winters, heat waves, volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunamis all happened before 1970.  There were changes in local temperature, also.  

Sometimes, but rarely in my experience, a rational warmist will discuss such events.  Their response usually is along the lines of "we do not dispute the existence of severe weather events before 1970, only the severity and frequency.  Since 1970, man-made CO2 in the atmosphere has made the severity greater and increased the frequency of such events."  

Even that statement is full of problems, since some of the floods (8 of the pre-1970) were statewide in scope.  It is difficult to imagine greater severity.   The response to showing the warmists actual data is usually along the lines of "you are only considering a small part of the Earth's surface, California is far less than 1 percent of the globe.  We consider the entire globe, hence Global Warming."    When such statements are made by warmists, be sure to ask them to provide the data for your inspection.  Note whether the data is from authoritative sources, or from agenda-driven ideologues. Also note whether the data is truly global in scope, or skips over parts of the Earth where the data do not fit their agenda.  

Finally, it is always fun to ask warmists how the severe and prolonged cold weather events continue to occur, 45 years since 1970 and with CO2 levels now at 400 ppm.  Note that ice is more persistent on the US Great Lakes, Great Lakes' water temperature is colder than historic averages, ice and snow are more intense in many areas, and many glaciers are growing. 

Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 
Marina del Rey, California

copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell.  All rights reserved.