The Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor meltdowns have been extensively
watched and written about. This article gives
my perspective. The basics are these:
the plants were heavily damaged by a larger-than-expected earthquake, at 9.0
magnitude, and a larger-than-expected tsunami of approximately 50 feet height about
40 minutes after the first earthquake. (the
initial shock was followed by hundreds of after-shocks.
Some of the after-shocks were major earthquakes themselves, at 7 or greater magnitude.) Meltdowns occurred in 3 reactors, with the extent of the meltdowns yet unknown. Explosions that destroyed containment buildings occurred in 4 plants. Radioactive water was dumped into the ocean because operators had no other place to store it. More radioactive water continues to this day to leak out of cracked foundations, through the porous soil and into the ocean. Fish caught nearby were ruled unsafe for human consumption due to radioactivity. Children living near the meltdown plants already have high rates of thyroid cancer, yet thyroid cancer in children is extremely rare. US sailors on an aircraft carrier developed radiation sickness and other health issues. This disaster is still unfolding, as even the technology-savvy Japanese struggle with what to do and how to do it. No matter what nuclear technology is in place, a meltdown will occur when zero power is available for day after day. That is the fundamental fact of Fukushima Dai-ichi.
Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, Reactors 1-6 Before Earthquake source: ORNL |
Some of the after-shocks were major earthquakes themselves, at 7 or greater magnitude.) Meltdowns occurred in 3 reactors, with the extent of the meltdowns yet unknown. Explosions that destroyed containment buildings occurred in 4 plants. Radioactive water was dumped into the ocean because operators had no other place to store it. More radioactive water continues to this day to leak out of cracked foundations, through the porous soil and into the ocean. Fish caught nearby were ruled unsafe for human consumption due to radioactivity. Children living near the meltdown plants already have high rates of thyroid cancer, yet thyroid cancer in children is extremely rare. US sailors on an aircraft carrier developed radiation sickness and other health issues. This disaster is still unfolding, as even the technology-savvy Japanese struggle with what to do and how to do it. No matter what nuclear technology is in place, a meltdown will occur when zero power is available for day after day. That is the fundamental fact of Fukushima Dai-ichi.
The lessons for all of the nuclear industry are clear, and
grim: even the best designers and
operators take huge risks when gambling human lives and health against the
powers of Nature.
It should be noted that the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors are not large, but are medium size. If a similar meltdown occurs in a modern, large reactor, the devastation would be proportionately greater.
The nuclear industry advocates continually state the plants
are safe; yet disaster after disaster occurs.
Is it time to invoke the insanity clause: when one repeats the same old
steps over and over, while expecting different results, this is insanity? The Big Three meltdowns thus far are Three
Mile Island, Chernobyl, and now Fukushima. What plant will be next in the massive
meltdown missive?
Facts on events of March 11, 2011
It is important to note a few features of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi plants: there are six reactors located right on the coast, they use
seawater for cooling, and they are only a few feet above sea level. An earthquake rated at 9.0 occurred, and
reactor units 1, 2, and 3 automatically shut down. The land movement, or shaking, in the
East-West direction was greater than the design. Unit 4
was already shut down for routine maintenance.
Emergency generators started at all six reactors 1 – 6. 40 minutes later, the 50-foot tsunami hit
and all power was lost except for one generator at reactor 6. The other emergency generators stopped. The one operating generator was then connected
also to reactor 5, and those two reactors (5 and 6) were cooled sufficiently to
go into cold shutdown. Note that the diesel-powered generators were
underwater for some time during the multiple tsunami waves.
However, units 1, 2, and 3 reactor cores melted down due to
an extended lack of emergency power.
Also, buildings in units 1, 2, 3, and 4 exploded – probably from
hydrogen production as the fuel melted. It is not yet clear exactly why unit 4
exploded, as
it was not operating at the time of the earthquake.
Fukushima Dai-ichi Containment Building After Explosion source: ORNL |
In addition, the operators were unable to maintain cooling
in the spent fuel pool at reactors 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Subsequently, operators attempted to cool the meltdown
reactors’ cores, with little success.
Ultimately, out of desperation, seawater was used. Seawater is highly corrosive, so metal parts
in contact with seawater are ruined. Afterward,
a series of water storage tanks were installed and water was pumped through the
melted-down reactors and spent fuel pools and back to the storage tanks.
Substantial leaks through the ground and into the sea
occurred, with radioactive water flowing into the sea. The earthquakes damaged the foundations
sufficiently to provide leakage pathways through the foundations and into the
sea. Note that some nuclear apologist
sites claim that the earthquake itself caused no damage. This is patently untrue. If no earthquake damage occurred, the
foundations would not be cracked and leaking radioactive water into the sea.
It will be years before anyone can open the reactors and
determine the extent of the damage due to earthquake and meltdown, just as was
the case after the meltdown at Three Mile Island.
What everyone needs to know about nuclear power
plants and their designs: designers play the probability game. Somebody (perhaps an expert) provides the
odds of natural disasters of different severities occurring in the next 50 to
60 years, for things such as earthquake, tsunami, dam failure, tornado, volcanic
eruption, hurricane and its storm surge, and others. Typically, a small event is quite common,
but the largest events are extremely rare.
To save money, the plant is designed to withstand a given event with an
appropriately remote chance of occurrence in the plant’s lifetime. The plant is not designed to withstand the
greatest known event of all-time, especially when the odds of the event
occurring during the 50 to 60 year life of the plant are very small. This is
the probability calculus used in designing nuclear power plants. In
the Fukushima Dai-ichi event, the earthquake design was slightly exceeded,
however the multiple aftershocks of large magnitude were likely not in the
design basis. The tsunami design was far
less than the actual 50-foot tsunami that occurred. One source states the design was for a
23-foot tsunami. That then shows that
nature flung a wall of water more than 27 feet higher than was expected and
planned for in the design.
The next unexpected design problem was complete isolation
from any power for days on end. The plants are designed for a power failure,
with onsite diesel-powered generators to supply power for some hours until grid
power is restored. At Fukushima
Dai-ichi, the diesel-powered generators were inoperable after the tsunami. There was no backup plan in place for grid
power loss for days or weeks, plus no diesel-powered generators. The Japanese management and operators were
smart, well-trained, resourceful people, yet even they could not prevent
meltdown in the cores without a power source. What happens when a similar outage occurs in a third-world country?
There are other lessons from Fukushima Dai-ichi. What about other deprivations, other than
grid power and emergency generator power?
What of loss of cooling water – the lake, river, or other source? Even
nuclear plants close to shore, as Fukushima Dai-ichi is, can lose ocean
cooling if the land is thrust upward in an earthquake so that the water intakes
are now above sea level. Even if
electrical power were restored in time, it is mighty difficult to cool reactor
cores without any water. What about dam
break, with flood including mud, debris, rocks, or ice blocks? Ash rain from volcano? Crash impact from missile? Crash impact from a heavy aircraft, even a
bomber loaded with bombs? Multiple
mechanical breakdown of critical pumps – e.g. bolts all failing at the same
time as happened at Salem 2 in 2014. Or,
the electrical grid disconnected plus diesel generators that will not start due
to any malfunction.
What about sabotage – deliberate destruction of key cooling
equipment due to a security breach? This
is a favorite theme of movies, but could it happen? Hopefully not, with security teams on the
alert.
Nuclear advocates falsely insist that the Fukushima Dai-ichi
core meltdowns were due to the old, BWR (boiling water reactor) design. That is false. Even a modern PWR (pressurized water reactor)
design would meltdown without power for several days. This is a fact that is recognized by NRC and
other sober persons.
Foundation cracks and radioactive water leaks, as have
occurred at Fukushima Dai-ichi, are being addressed now, three years
later. The plan is to install an ice-dam
in the earth surrounding the plant. The
ice will be kept cold by refrigeration units, powered by the grid. In effect, there will be a giant section of
artificial perma-frost underneath the leaking foundations. One hopes that this works, and that the grid
does not fail yet again. Meanwhile, for
three years the cracked foundations have leaked radioactive water into the
ocean.
Aftermath
Despite the claims of nuclear proponents, Fukushima
radiation clearly has impacted public health, land, air, and ocean with
contamination. The radioactive air plume
arrived in just a few days at the US west coast, although the radioactivity was
far below danger levels. Tsunami flotsam arrived in other countries,
radioactive water flowed into the ocean, fish, crops, and milk were
contaminated.
It is early yet in the life of a nuclear meltdown, but there
will be cancers, diabetes, thyroid illness, and mental problems (worry, stress). There may also be birth defects. Unlike at Chernobyl, there will likely be no
early deaths from radiation sickness.
However, there very well could be early deaths from cancer.
Japan has made decisions on shutting down other nuclear
reactors, instead using other fuels / plants for power – oil, coal, and natural
gas. Recently, some reactors have been
restarted. Nuclear power is very
controversial in Japan at this time. Germany has declared it will not build new
reactors, and will shut down existing reactors in a few years’ time. China has declared it will continue building
reactors, as will India.
Other countries took a long, sober look at their own
reactors and preparations for a similar situation: if a long period without
power occurs, what would they do? The US response is to have a few resource
centers, with critical equipment being available to any reactor in dire
straits. One hopes the nature of the disaster lends
itself to timely delivery of the critical equipment.
Other new requirements were issued by the NRC. The NRC issued a long report with about 20 new
requirements for the existing fleet and any new construction. See link.
Conclusion
It appears the world has reached a tipping point, or perhaps
is beginning to lose patience with the never-ending lies and deceptions from
the nuclear industry. Before Three Mile
Island, the industry insisted the plants were safe. Even the NRC bought into the “things are safe”
mantra, until operator error after a common equipment malfunction (a pump
stopped pumping) at Three Mile Island showed the “things are safe” line was
totally wrong. Then, Chernobyl exploded and
spewed radiation all around the northern hemisphere – yet the nuclear
apologists stated this was an aberration, rogue operators in a badly designed
plant were doing an unauthorized test (it had graphite for moderation – basically carbon that can easily burn). Now,
Fukushima Dai-ichi has three reactor cores melted down, with four containment
buildings blown apart in four separate explosions, a spent fuel pool that
overheated, cracked foundations that allow radioactive water to flow into the
ocean, and many children already diagnosed with thyroid cancer. Their young lives are changed forever. Even today, nuclear apologists insist that the
Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster (they don’t call it a disaster, rather the word
they use is “incident”) was just an unfortunate natural event that is too rare
to ever be concerned about again.
The truth about nuclear power is this: no design is adequate
for what Nature can put forth. No humans
can accurately and confidently run the numbers and predict the odds of a
massive natural disaster. No
contingency plan can anticipate every eventuality. The price we pay as a society, as a human
race, is living with the very real, and rational, fear of another meltdown in a
reactor near you. How many more human
errors will be made, as equipment breaks down, as natural disasters occur, in
combinations that were not planned for? How much more unsafe are the plants, when the
regulatory agency relaxes rule after rule after rule?
This concludes the article on Fukushima: The Disaster That
Could Not Happen. Next, is the San
Onofre Shutdown Saga.
Previous Articles
The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen) safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two) nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five) the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act. Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them. Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.
The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen) safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two) nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five) the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act. Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them. Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.
Additional articles will be linked as they are published.
Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete
Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct
Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water
Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant
Part Six – Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs
Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power
Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules
Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go
Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term
Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term
Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe
Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things
Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown And Explosion
Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979
Part Twenty Two - this article
Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much
Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants
Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants
Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
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