Showing posts with label ORNL. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ORNL. Show all posts

Thursday, March 10, 2016

Fukushima Nuclear Meltdowns Five Years On

Subtitle: Fukushima Design Flaws Should Not Have Existed

 The 9.0-magnitude earthquake off north-eastern Japan on March 11, 2011 occurred five years ago to the day.  The 50-foot tsunami that followed the earthquake had devastating consequences to a large area in Japan, especially knocking out the grid power and disabling the emergency power to several of the six nuclear reactors at the Fukushima power complex.   As is well-known today, three of the reactors melted down, three containment buildings exploded, and great quantities of nuclear radiation were released into the air, the soil, and the ocean.   Radioactive water continues to leak into the ocean even today.  

SLB has a post from 2014 on the Fukushima nuclear disaster, titled "Fukushima - The Disaster That Could Not Happen."  (see link).   This is article 22 of the 30-article series on Truth About Nuclear Power (that presently has more than 21,000 pageviews). 
Fukushima nuclear reactors after meltdowns and explosions
March 11, 2011 (credit: ORNL)


While pausing to offer condolences to those who lost loved ones, and whose lives were changed for the worse, this article discusses a few additional aspects of what went wrong and what lessons should be learned. 

In simplest terms, sheer stupidity created the Fukushima nuclear meltdowns.   There are essentially no lessons that were taught that day, beyond what competent engineers already knew and know.   The lesson is: nuclear designers and advocates should not be trusted with the safety aspect of nuclear plants. 

First, it was well-known that a nuclear power plant requires a considerable water supply and means to circulate that water for cooling a reactor after a shutdown.   It was equally well-known that a loss of grid power could occur, in fact, that is the very reason that emergency generators are installed in nuclear power plants.   Fukushima had the emergency generators.  It was also well-known that diesel fuel is required to run the emergency generators.  Fuel was stored on-site, but only sufficient fuel for 8 to 10 hours for each reactor.  It was also well-known that Japan is prone to earthquakes and tsunamis.  In fact, some of the nearby areas have or had tsunami protection systems such as seawalls, and gates that could close to prevent water from entering a river valley.    So much for not knowing what to do if power is lost, and not knowing about earthquakes and tsunamis at Fukushima. 

What was incredibly wrong was the emergency generators and batteries were in the basement of the buildings, where seawater flooded them and made them inoperable.  

It was also a bad decision to design the plants to withstand a tsunami of only 20 feet, when it was well-known that earlier tsunamis were much higher.  The actual tsunami was approximately 50 feet high.   Historical tsunamis in Japan include one from 1896 that was 30 to 38 meters (100 to 130 feet); in 1933 the tsunami was 21 meters (70 feet approximately).   There can be no excuse for building Fukushima reactors to withstand a tsunami of only 20 feet.  

It should be noted that elevating the entire plant another 30 to 40 feet adds a trivial amount to the construction cost.   In the alternative, constructing a water-tight wall with appropriate openings also would add a trivial amount to the construction cost. 

From the ORNL paper referenced in the earlier SLB post, (see link), the tsunami design portion has strange wording that leads to even more unease about Japanese nuclear designs:

"At the target site, the height of the design tsunami should exceed all the
calculated historical tsunami heights.

 ...the design tsunami is compared with the historical records …. it is confirmed
the height of the design tsunami that is obtained in this paper is twice that of

historical tsunamis on an average”  --  (see p. 14 of the ORNL paper linked above)

Several things are wrong with this statement.  "At the target site," should not be used for the design basis, instead, "in the general area" would give a much safer design.   

Next, "should exceed all the calculated historical tsunami heights" should be "exceed all the actual historical tsunami heights."     There is, or should be, sufficient evidence in a long-populated country like Japan to know, not have to guess or calculate tsunami heights.    

Finally, "it is confirmed ... is twice that of historical tsunamis ON AN AVERAGE."  This is so wrong it beggars belief.  One does not design a plant to meet the average conditions, instead, one designs for the worst case.  

It is clear from the evidence that a nearby nuclear power plant, also part of the Fukushima complex, managed quite well during and after the earthquake and the tsunami.  That reactor was built on higher ground and had an emergency generator that functioned long enough.   

What is also abundantly clear is that nuclear industry professionals are not to be trusted with their assurances that reactors are designed, built, and operated safely.   There is a great need for independent, competent engineers to review the designs and actual construction, and especially the design basis, to identify problems such as existed at Fukushima and went undetected for decades.  

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California  

Copyright (c) 2016 by Roger Sowell, all rights reserved


Saturday, June 6, 2015

More Thorium Silliness

Just a few thoughts that came to mind while reading comments on WUWT, the latest puff-piece on Thorium-based nuclear power plants. 

First, very few commenters have a grasp of what a molten salt is or does, especially when that molten salt contains radioactive thorium and uranium and other fission products.  

One comment, in particular, shows a vast ignorance of economics. claiming ". . . near-free (sic) and unlimited electrical power ($0.03/kWh), which will gut the remaining industrial sectors of Western economies. . ."  This refers to thorium-powered nuclear plants built in China.   The 3 cents per kWh might be the fuel and variable operating cost, but certainly does not include amortized capital costs.  As shown previously on SLB, a molten-salt reactor using liquid fluoride salts will cost much more than the present generation of uranium-powered pressurized-water reactors, and those cost approximately $10,000 per MW or more.  The per-kWh cost just for the capital cost would be approximately 25 cents, depending on how much state subsidy is applied to the capital cost.    Note: apparently "forgetting" to include the capital costs is a favorite ploy of nuclear proponents, because it allows them to compare (barely favorably) a nuclear plant's "cost" to natural gas.  

Another clueless commenter states ". . . there isn’t really much for the CHinese (sic) to do except size up the design. . . "  This particular commenter claims to be ". . .a design engineer who worked on projects for nearly 40 years. . ."   The "size up the design" refers to scale-up of a thorium molten salt reactor.   As I wrote elsewhere on SLB, scale-up from the pilot plant size at Oak Ridge to a full-scale commercial plant of 1,000 MW electrical output is a massive, daunting task.  (see link)  In pertinent part: "Scale-up from ORNL size (7 MW thermal) by 500 times is an enormous challenge.   Note that scale-up with a factor of 7 to 1 is a stretch, yet such a factor (using 6) requires four steps (40, 250, 1500, and 3500) to use round numbers.   Each larger plant requires years to design, construct, and test before moving to the next size, and that is if the larger design actually works the first time."  

The same clueless commenter on scale-up added to his list of errors with this:  ". . .corrosion problems that some rag on about . . . were all but solved. . ."   This refers to the very real corrosion and cracking in the reactor material, in fact, any material that touched the hot molten radioactive fluoride salt.  A material was developed and tested, but not for the 40 or more years with multiple heating-up and cool-down cycles that a commercial reactor must withstand, not to mention any vibrational stresses caused by any earthquakes.   The Oak Ridge National Laboratory "developed (in 1977) an improved and very expensive alloy Hastelloy N for nuclear applications with molten Fluoride salts.   In tests, Hastelloy N with Niobium (Nb) had much better corrosion resistance to molten fluoride salts."  (source: link just above from SLB article on thorium molten salt reactors).  

There are many other, equally silly comments. 

Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 

Marina del Rey, California
copyright (C) 2015 by Roger Sowell




Sunday, July 20, 2014

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 28

Subtitle: Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Preface   

This article, number 28 in the series, discusses nuclear power via a thorium molten-salt reactor (MSR) process.   (Note, this is also sometimes referred to as LFTR, for Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor)   The thorium MSR is frequently trotted out by nuclear power advocates, whenever the numerous drawbacks to uranium fission reactors are mentioned.   To this point in the TANP series, uranium fission, via PWR or BWR, has been the focus.  Some critics of TANP have already stated that thorium solves all of those problems and
Thorium Molten Salt Reator process
source:  Idaho National Lab
therefore should be vigorously pursued.  Some of the critics have stated that Sowell obviously has never heard of thorium reactors.   Quite the contrary, I am familiar with the process and have serious reservations about the numerous problems with thorium MSR.  


It is interesting, though, that nuclear advocates must bring up the MSR process.  If the uranium fission process was any good at all, there would be no need for research and development of any other type of process, such as MSR and fusion.   Indeed, as already pointed out in TANP, uranium fission plants have barely captured 11 percent of world-wide electricity production after 50 years of heroic efforts.   One would expect, if nuclear power were as great as the advocates claim, that nuclear plants would already supply 80 or 90 percent of all electric power in the world.  Clearly, they do not because they are not at all great, they have enormous and insurmountable drawbacks in cost, safety, and toxic product legacy left for future generations.    Once the thorium MSR process is discussed in this article, the next article will discuss yet a third hope for the nuclear advocates, in case fusion fizzles out and MSR melts away to nothingness.   That next article will be on high-temperature gas reactors, the HTGR.   As will be seen, HTGR also has serious drawbacks.  

One final preliminary point: some of the nuclear advocates that push MSR lament the fact that, many years ago, thorium MSR lost in a competition with uranium PWR to provide propulsion for ships and submarines for the US Navy.   They say, wrongly, that Admiral Rickover chose uranium PWR over thorium MSR so that the US could develop atomic bombs.  What is much more likely the reason uranium PWR won is that the materials used for the MSR developed the severe cracking described below.   No Admiral in charge of submarines could take a chance on the reactor splitting apart from the shock of depth charges.    

The Idaho National Lab MSR Description  (see drawing above)

"The Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) system produces fission power in a circulating molten salt fuel mixture with an epithermal-spectrum reactor and a full actinide recycle fuel cycle. In the MSR system, the fuel is a circulating liquid mixture of sodium, zirconium, and uranium fluorides. The molten salt fuel flows through graphite core channels, producing an epithermal spectrum. The heat generated in the molten salt is transferred to a secondary coolant system through an intermediate heat exchanger, and then through a tertiary heat exchanger to the power conversion system. The reference plant has a power level of 1,000 MWe. The system has a coolant outlet temperature of 700 degrees Celsius, possibly ranging up to 800 degrees Celsius, affording improved thermal efficiency. The closed fuel cycle can be tailored for the efficient burnup of plutonium and minor actinides."  - See link 


Thorium’s Listed Advantages 

a) Fuel is plentiful because thorium is abundant

b) Fuel is cheap on a kWh produced basis

c) Molten salt reactor supposedly is safer, via a solid salt plug underneath the reactor that melts upon overheating if power is lost or some other upset occurs.   This allows the reactor contents, hot molten fluoride salts with radioactive thorium, uranium, and plutonium, to flow by gravity into several separate collection chambers to self-cool.

d) Low pressure reactor using molten salt – supposedly safer than a high-pressure PWR design. 

Oak Ridge  MSR Test Project

a) The reactor was small, with thermal output only 7 MWth.  The reactor process had no steam generator and no electricity was produced.  It ran only a few months.

b) Metal that was used for contacting molten salt developed intergranular cracking; completely unsuitable for commercial reactor use.  see link

c) ORNL then developed (in 1977) an improved and very expensive alloy Hastelloy N for nuclear applications with molten Fluoride salts.   In tests, Hastelloy N with Niobium (Nb) had much better corrosion resistance to molten fluoride salts.  

Future MSR designs and problems

a) The MSR design is much like a PWR design: each has a reactor, steam generator, and turbine/generator for the three primary sections.  However, as shown in the Idaho National Lab drawing above (INL), there are four loops in this design.  PWR has three circulating fluid loops: cooling water, boiler feedwater/steam, and the primary heating loop,  Yet, the MRS has a fourth loop, for radioactive molten salt for MSR.    Any MSR design that hopes to be economic will also be huge, likely in the 1000 MWe output size, to employ economy of scale.  This requires scaleup of approximately 500-to-1 compared to the ORNL project.   With a cycle efficiency of approximately 30 to 33 percent, the thermal output will be approximately 3500 MWth.   Scaleup from ORNL size by 500 times is an enormous challenge.   Note that scaleup with a factor of 7 to 1 is a stretch, yet such a factor (using 6) requires four steps (40, 250, 1500, and 3500) to use round numbers.   Each larger plant requires years to design, construct, and test before moving to the next size, and that is if the larger design actually works the first time.    It is also instructive (and very, very expensive) that the MSR design has a dual-compressor and heat removal fluid instead of the conventional steam condenser system.  Costs and operating problems for this design are much, much greater than for a PWR.  

b) The materials of construction for a very hot molten Fluoride salt mixture will likely be extremely expensive, if made of Hastelloy N to prevent the widespread cracking found at ORNL.   It remains to be seen if even Hastelloy N will have a sufficient strength and thickness after 40 years of service. 

c) Pumping the very hot, corrosive, molten salt mixture will require expensive alloy materials, and due to the salt’s density, high horsepower for pumping.   Also, pumping a hot molten radioactive salt requires sophisticated pump seals to ensure safety and prevent leaks.   As described above, the thorium MSR design will have four main circulating loops, while a PWR system has only three.   However, the cost for MSR hot molten salt circulation pump will be more expensive than the PWR pressurized water circulation pump due to the high-cost alloy required, and the almost double horsepower motor to drive the pump. 

d) If a molten salt pump is not used, circulation can be achieved by a thermal density difference loop.  However, this also presents serious design and control problems.  

e) The steam generator design presents a complex and likely insurmountable problem. Even if a successful design is somehow created, leaks of high-pressure water into the low-pressure molten salt are inevitable and will create all manner of hell. Havoc is too mild for the mess that will happen.   Water that contacts the hot molten salt will explode into steam, possibly rupturing the piping or equipment and flinging radioactive molten salt in all directions.   In addition, the steam generator’s material of construction also must resist the hot, corrosive molten salt.  The steam generator will also likely be made of Hastelloy N, which adds to the already high cost of the plant.   It is also notable that the INL MSR design has two heat exchangers for the steam generator loop, which decreases overall cycle thermal efficiency.   It does not increase safety, as water will leak into the molten salt. 

f) Controlling the plant output, adding more fuel, and removing unwanted reaction byproducts, all are obstacles.  

g) With the low thermal efficiency, MSR plants will require approximately the same quantity of cooling water as uranium fission plants.   That, as discussed previously in TANP, is a serious disadvantage in areas that are already short of water. 

Conclusion

It can be seen then, that thorium MSR has few advantages, if any, over PWR.  They each have three or four circulating loops and pumps, however MSR will have much more expensive materials for the reactor, steam generator, molten salt pumps, and associated piping and valves.   There will be no cost savings, but likely a cost increase.  That alone puts MSR out of the running for future power production.  

The safety issue is also not resolved, as stated above: pressurized water leaking from the steam generator into the hot, radioactive molten salt will explosively turn to steam and cause incredible damage.  The chances are great that the radioactive molten salt would be discharged out of the reactor system and create more than havoc.  Finally, controlling the reaction and power output, finding materials that last safely for 3 or 4 decades, and consuming vast quantities of cooling water are all serious problems.  

The greatest problem, though, is likely the scale-up by a factor of 500 to 1, from the tiny project at ORNL to a full-scale commercial plant with 3500 MWth output.   Perhaps these technical problems can be overcome, but why would anyone bother to try, knowing in advance that the MSR plant will be uneconomic due to huge construction costs and operating costs, plus will explode and rain radioactive molten salt when (not if) the steam generator tubes leak.    There are serious reasons the US has not pursued development of the thorium MSR process.  Reports are, though, that China has started a development program for thorium MSR, using technical information and assistance from ORNL.   One hopes that stout umbrellas can be issued to the Chinese population that will withstand the raining down of molten, radioactive fluoride salt when one of the reactors explodes.  

Previous Articles

The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.



Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 













Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Eight - this article 


Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 
Marina del Rey, California