Nuclear Plant Delayed Yet Again - Costs Soar

Subtitle:  Vogtle Plant Expansion approaching $17 billion and 3 years late

The twin-reactor nuclear power plant under construction at the Vogtle site in Georgia (US) has once again had delays and cost over-runs. see link.   From the article:  

“The abysmal failure to execute this project, with the long delays, repeated construction screw-ups and escalating costs, means that even if Vogtle (expansion) is completed, it will not be the starting gun of the race for new (nuclear) reactor construction in the U.S.,” said Mark Cooper, a fellow with the Institute for Energy and the Environment. “It will be the mausoleum in which nuclear power is laid to rest.”  

Vogtle nuclear power plant and expansion project --
Wiki Commons by Charles C. Watson Jr.

This is not a surprise (see link) as nuclear power plants are almost always reported (and sold) at a figure far below the final cost, and their startup dates are optimistically stated as many years before they finally start. It will likely be at least 10 years total, maybe more, to get the plant running.   The project was announced with a 4 year construction period for the first reactor, and clearly that will not happen as 3 years are already added to the schedule. 

The consequences to the utility, and ultimately the rate-payers, are grim.  This is for at least three reasons: 1), the builder must pay interest on the construction loans, 2)  inflation keeps increasing the prices of labor and materials, and 3) the utility must keep purchasing power to send into the grid, power that the nuclear plant is not producing. This may be from keeping older plants running past their shutdown date, or buying power from others. None of this is news, as the South Texas Nuclear Plant (STNP) showed clearly back about 30 years ago. Austin, San Antonio, and Houston all were scrambling to find power for their cities when the STNP ran years and years over schedule. The power they had to purchase was very, very expensive.   

One can speculate what problems are causing the cost over-runs and the delays.   Typical delays on large projects include, but are not limited to, tearing out and re-working faulty construction, equipment suppliers providing late or defective items, serious adverse weather, unforeseen site conditions, and redesign for new regulatory (NRC) requirements.  Also, delays can be caused by worker slowdowns, lawsuits for allowable causes, owner-contractor disputes, contractor-subcontractor disputes, faulty design that requires corrections, acts of God or the enemy (force majeur), improper scheduling by the contractor, inadequate workforce staffing or untrained workforce (learning on the job), poor supervision, and others. 

Even with the unprecedented move of charging rate-payers more on their monthly bills while the plant is constructed, this Vogtle plant will be very costly, perhaps as much as $20 billion at completion.  It may very well require more than 10 years to complete.  At that, it should indeed be the "mausoleum in which nuclear power is laid to rest".   

Sadly, nuclear proponents have only rose-colored glasses and will say something like "it is wrong to condemn an entire industry because one new-technology plant was a bit over-budget."     In the same vein as the nuclear safety mantra, with its steady progression from “no one has ever been injured”, to “no member of the public has ever been injured”, to “no member of the public has died”, to “nuclear power is safer than coal or natural gas,”  nuclear proponents dig ever-deeper in finding creative ways to vainly justify the enormous costs and years-long schedule overruns for nuclear power plants. 

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California   
copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 26

Subtitle: Evacuation Plans are Required at Nuclear Plants

In recognition of all the safety issues and dangers from operating nuclear power plants, the US government requires each nuclear plant owner to prepare and publish emergency plans to ensure public safety in the event of an emergency.  Such an emergency plan was put into action in 1979 near Three Mile Island during the reactor core meltdown.   In Japan

Chernobyl radiation plume, extent and severity

at Fukushima in 2011, another massive evacuation was performed for several miles around the plant after the reactor meltdowns.  A US navy aircraft carrier near Fukushima increased its distance from the plant to avoid the radioactive plume.   The radiation plume from the Chernobyl reactor meltdown and explosion covered an entire continent – Europe.  The radiation was strongest close to the plant and decreased somewhat with distance.   (see map nearby). 

From the NRC’s backgrounder on emergency preparedness, “[b]efore a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have “reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.” The NRC’s decision of reasonable assurance is based on licensees complying with NRC regulations and guidance. In addition, licensees and area response organizations must demonstrate they can effectively implement emergency plans and procedures during periodic evaluated exercises.”

Also, “[f]or planning purposes, the NRC defines two emergency planning zones (EPZs) around each nuclear power plant. The exact size and configuration of the zones vary from plant to plant due to local emergency response needs and capabilities, population, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The two types of EPZs are:

1) The plume exposure pathway EPZ extends about 10 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary
concern is the exposure of the public to, and the inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination.

2) The ingestion pathway EPZ extends about 50 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary concern is the ingestion of food and liquid that is contaminated by radioactivity.”

The NRC also classifies each emergency event into four categories of increasing severity.  From the backgrounder, “[e]mergency Classification is a set of plant conditions which indicate a level of risk to the public. Nuclear power plants use the four emergency classifications listed below in order of increasing severity.

1) Notification of Unusual Event - Under this category, events are in process or have occurred which indicate potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. No release of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring is expected unless further degradation occurs.

2) Alert - If an alert is declared, events are in process or have occurred that involve an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Any releases of radioactive material from the plant are expected to be limited to a small fraction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guides (PAGs).

3) Site Area Emergency - A site area emergency involves events in process or which have occurred that result in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases of radioactive material are not expected to exceed the EPA PAGs except near the site boundary.

4) General Emergency - A general emergency involves actual or imminent substantial core damage or melting of reactor fuel with the potential for loss of containment integrity. Radioactive releases during a general emergency can reasonably be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs for more than the immediate site area.”

Finally, more from the backgrounder on additional information: “[d]etailed information about emergency preparedness is contained in NRC regulations, specifically Appendix E to Part 50 of Title 10 in the Code of Federal Regulations and in NUREG-0654 (FEMA-REP-1), a joint publication of the NRC and FEMA published in November 1980, entitled “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.” These documents along with additional information on the NRC’s Emergency Preparedness and Response programs is available on the NRC Web site at:”  (see link).

The official evacuation zone around a nuclear reactor is divided into concentric circles with a 2 mile radius, 5 miles, and 10 miles.   (corresponding roughly to 3, 7, and 15 kilometers).   However, for a catastrophic release, the General Emergency from above, and appropriate wind conditions, one can envision attempting to evacuate a large city.  For example, Houston lies only approximately 70 miles northeast of the South Texas Nuclear Plant.  Houston has more than 6 million people in the metropolitan area (Woodlands – Houston – Sugar Land).  An attempt to evacuate millions of people from Houston was made only a few years ago due to the arrival of a hurricane.  The evacuation was a complete failure, with thousands of vehicles stranded and running out of fuel on highways that were blocked for hours. ( see link for description of Houston evacuation in 2005)   San Antonio, with approximately 2.3 million, lies just to the north and west of the South Texas Nuclear Plant.    

The Dallas-Ft. Worth metroplex, with almost 7 million people, lies only approximately 60 miles northeast of another twin-reactor plant near Glen Rose, the Comanche Peak plant.   There are many, many other nuclear plants located within similar distances to major population centers in the US.  

If nuclear power was as safe as its proponents insist, there would be no need for federal regulations describing and requiring evacuation plans.

Previous Articles

The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.

Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten -- Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete

Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown And Explosion

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen 

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - this article

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell
Marina del Rey, California

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part Nine

Subtitle: Nuclear power plants require long construction schedules

Up until now, the Truth About Nuclear Power series has discussed the costs of operating and constructing the plants, and the impact on scarce water resources.  It has been shown that nuclear power plants cost far too much to construct, use far too much water, cannot compete in today’s electricity market, and if they were the sole source of electricity on a grid, power prices would escalate to unacceptably high levels.   

This article discusses one of the reasons nuclear plants cost so much, and debunks one of the favorite talking points of the nuclear advocates.  The advocates are fond of saying that nuclear plants would not cost so much if only the lawyers would step aside and let the plants be built without lawsuits.   In fact, frivolous lawsuits are now barred for new nuclear power construction in the US.  However, costly delays are occurring, and will occur in the future for the usual set of construction delay issues.  Delays cost money, and the longer the delay, the more money is spent by one of the parties to the construction. 

Examples of construction delays include, but are not limited to, tearing out and re-working faulty construction, equipment suppliers providing late or defective items, serious adverse weather, unforeseen site conditions, and redesign for new NRC requirements.  Also, delays can be caused by worker slowdowns, lawsuits for allowable causes, owner-contractor disputes, faulty design that requires corrections, acts of God or the enemy (force majeur), improper scheduling by the contractor, inadequate workforce staffing or untrained workforce (learning on the job), poor supervision, and others.

As one example, nuclear power plants have many critical welds.  The critical welds must be performed by qualified welders, who are paid a premium.  Also, the critical welds are required to be x-rayed to ensure the welds meet quality control specifications and will be sufficiently strong.  It takes time, and costs money to x-ray and inspect all those critical welds.  It is well-known that the South Texas Nuclear Plant had many faulty critical welds that failed x-ray inspection and had to be welded again until they were right. 

Another example, again from the South Texas Nuclear Plant, of faulty design that required correction is the mis-match on the drawings for two halves of the plant.  The piping and other items that were to connect across the match-line were off by a noticeable amount.  The work was delayed while the engineering firm re-engineered and re-issued the proper drawings.  Delays caused by faulty rebar for concrete have been an issue at the Vogtle plant under construction in Georgia, USA.   Other delays at Vogtle include design changes, and delivery of equipment.  Vogtle is now reported to be 21 months behind schedule.  That number will surely increase as more time passes.    See link for list of delays and cost over-runs at Vogtle.  

Delays occur in other countries, also.  As an example, the Finland plant being installed by Areva had delays with the concrete.  Apparently, the concrete was not to the required specification.  That project is also years behind schedule. 

Even without delays, nuclear plants require longer to construct due to the inherent danger of nuclear power (discussed in Part Five) and the three levels of containment required by the NRC.  In short, there are many more items of equipment required to contain the deadly radioactivity if and when an accident occurs.   More items of equipment require longer construction times.  Also, more testing is required before startup, more inspection as the construction progresses, all of which take time. 

Conclusion

Nuclear power plants require long construction schedules, made longer by delays that have nothing to do with lawsuits to impede progress.

Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links.  Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine - this article

Part Ten - Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - Nuclear Plants Are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete

Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part Four

Subtitle: Nuclear plants use far more fresh water than other power plants

Nuclear power plants, as currently designed and built, consume prodigious amounts of water for cooling.  Compared to combined-cycle gas turbine plants (CCGT), nuclear plants use 4 times as much water for the same output of electricity.   Some plants use cooling towers, and others use once-through cooling where the water is pumped through the plant once, then sent off usually into a lake, river, or ocean.   

South Texas Nuclear Plant with Cooling Reservoir
source: Texas Water Development Board

For this article, the example of the South Texas Nuclear Project is used.  This power plant is a twin-reactor, pressurized water reactor design built near the mouth of the Colorado River in Texas, USA.  The photo nearby shows the location, just north of the small town of Matagorda, on the Gulf of Mexico.  The plant is roughly 50 miles northeast of Corpus Christi, and 100 miles southwest of Houston.   The photo shows the nuclear power plant in the middle foreground, the 7,000 acre cooling reservoir at center, and the Gulf of Mexico at the top.  The Colorado River can be seen, barely, at the left center. 

The plant, known as STNP, is designed to use approximately 50,000 acre-feet (AF) of river water per year for cooling.  The reservoir receives water pumped from the nearby Colorado River, plus any rain that happens to fall.  Rainfall is important in this case, as it averages 30 inches per year over the long term.  Recently the rainfall has been much less due to a prolonged drought.  However, in an average year, the rainfall provides approximately 17,000 AF per year for the plant.   That then, requires the river to provide 50,000 - 17,000 = 33,000 AF per year.  

The water requirements for various types of power plants are shown below, in AF/yr/1000 MW of electrical output.  These are based on the design where hot water that is discharged from the plant evaporates in the cooling reservoir to lose its heat.  

1.  Nuclear power.........................20,300 AF/y/1000 MW
2.  Gas powered steam plant......12,700
3.  CCGT plant................................5,070

From this, it can be seen that nuclear power requires 4 times as much water (20,300 / 5,070 = 4) compared to a modern CCGT plant.  In areas where fresh water is scarce, this is an important consideration when selecting power plant technology.  

Lake Travis and Mansfield Dam, TX
source: LCRA

For the STNP, the Colorado River water is impounded far upstream by Mansfield Dam and held in Lake Travis, a 1.1 million AF reservoir north of Austin, Texas.  Lake Travis is near historic low levels as this is written (March, 2014) due to an extended drought.  The lack of water could cause the STNP output to be reduced. 

For some perspective, had a CCGT design been used along with the 7,000 acre reservoir, the plant would be more than self-sufficient in water needs.   In fact, a much smaller reservoir could have been constructed, approximately one-third the surface area.  

Conclusion:   Nuclear power plants consume 4 time as much water for cooling compared to a modern CCGT power plant.  

Previous installments in The Truth About Nuclear Power can be found below:

Part One - Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete
Part Two - Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail
Part Three - Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct
Part Four  -  This article
Part Five - Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant
Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten - Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands
Part Thirteen - Nuclear Plants Are Heavily Subsidized
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things
Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion
Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979
Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen
Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process
Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream
Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part Three

Subtitle: Nuclear power plants cost far too much to construct.  

The instant cost plus inflation, escalation, and interest on loans adds up to more than $10,000 per kW. 

Vogtle Nuclear Plant and Construction Site
photo - Wiki Commons by Charles C. Watson Jr.

One reason that nuclear power plants are uneconomic is they cost far too much to construct for the amount of power that they produce.  If one were to build a new nuclear power plant in the USA today, the final cost would be more than $10,000 per kW.   Several references support this assertion, Severance (2009), MIT (2003), and California EnergyCommission (2010).  All of these three referenced sources use $4,000 per kW as the overnight cost.

Overnight cost is the cost to construct if the plant could be built all at one time, or “over night”.  Of course, a nuclear power plant cannot be built overnight, as they require years to construct.  The added years increase the cost by escalation of materials and labor, and by interest on construction loans.   

Severance calculates the escalation for materials and labor to be $3,400 per kW, and for interest on construction loans to be an additional $3,100 per kW (figures rounded).   The total then is $4,000 plus $3,400 plus $3,100 equals $10,500 per kW.  A new, twin-reactor plant that produces 2,000 MW net electricity would then cost $21 billion to construct.   However, as indicated in Part Two of this series, Severance and the others did not include funds to make the plant operate safely if a large commercial aircraft crashes into the plant.  Not only the reactor, but the spent fuel storage area and the cooling water system must remain operable, per new NRC regulations.  This brings the cost to construct to approximately $12,000 per kW. 

How does this estimate compare to recent experience in the US?  There are two reactors under construction in Georgia, at the Vogtle plant.  Two more reactors were cancelled in Texas due to the excessive cost estimate at the South Texas Nuclear Project, STNP.   The STNP expansion project would add two reactors to the existing two, and was cancelled after a cost estimate of $17 billion was conceded by the reactor vendors to be too low.  As a result, we will never know how much that plant would cost to construct. 

The Vogtle plant is advertised as costing “only” $14.3 billion for twin reactors at 1100 MW each using the Westinghouse AP-1000 design.  However, cost overruns already incurred have increased the cost to $15.5 billion.  It is notable that Georgia changed the state law to allow the utility to bill customers in advance for construction costs.  This was an attempt to not pay finance charges on the construction loans.  In essence, rate-payers pay more money for electricity they are already using, and the utility company spends that cash for the nuclear construction.  Without this creative financing, the Vogtle plant would be right in line with Severance’s number, $20 billion more or less.   

The Vogtle plant is also plagued by delays in the construction, which would add to the cost if traditional financing were used.   At present (1Q 2014), the reactors are two years behind schedule, with four years to go for the first reactor to start up.  Many problems can arise in the next four years, which will likely add to the cost and delays.  As Severance shows, each year of delay adds approximately $1.2 to $1.6 billion in interest costs to the final cost for a twin-reactor plant.    An interesting account of the Vogtle plant’s progress can be found at 

http://www.taxpayer.net/library/article/doe-loan-guarantee-program-vogtle-reactors-34

[Update 6/24/2014: Vogtle facing more delays and cost increases  see link  -- end update]

In Finland, a single-reactor Areva nuclear plant is experiencing similar cost overruns and schedule delays. 

[Update 7/16/2014:  Finland's Areva EPL reactor plant is 7 years behind schedule and Billions of Euros over budget.  Per the article linked below:

“ "Areva was ready to do anything to win the Olkiluoto deal, including downplaying project management deficiencies. They had also previously delivered and commissioned nuclear reactors but they had never undertaken an entire project end-to-end, since the main French contractor had always been the EDF Group (Électricité de France), explained Les Échos editor in chief Pascal Pogam in an interview with Yle’s A-Studio current affairs program.

Based on accounts by parties such as the Olkiluoto owner-operator, the Finnish power consortium Teollisuuden Voima or TVO, Areva is said to have lied about the possibility of constructing a nuclear reactor within the agreed schedule."   see link  -- end update ]

Criticism

It is asserted that other countries can and do build nuclear power plants for approximately $2000 per kW.  As an example, China claims to build AP-1000 reactors at $2,000 per kW, according to world-nuclear.org.   One must pause at that; perhaps the lower labor rate in China is the reason, perhaps lower escalation for materials, and perhaps favorable (read: zero) cost for interest on construction.   However, the same website (world-nuclear.org) states that France’s current program has reactors that cost the US-equivalent of $5,000 per kW for overnight costs.  (Euro 3,700 per kW)

Conclusion

Truth Number 3:  Nuclear power plants cost far too much to construct, more than $10,000 per kW. 

Overview of The Truth About Nuclear Power series:

The series on Truth About Nuclear Power has several main themes:

1         

          Nuclear power operating costs are too high, cannot compete

2         

         Nuclear power costs too much to construct, require government assistance in loan guarantees or bill current ratepayers for construction funds (Georgia).

3         

         Nuclear power is unsafe to operate, near-misses occur frequently, disasters happen too; they must run at steady, high output to reduce upsets; this increases revenue to spread out the very high fixed costs; older reactors are more uneconomic and less safe (San Onofre leaks in new heat exchanger is a prime example)

4         

         Nuclear power is unsafe long-term for spent fuel storage

5         

         Nuclear power consumes far too much precious water

6         

         New designs to overcome these failures are unlikely to work, or to be economic if they can be made to work

a.       Thorium Reactors have serious developmental issues

b.      Modularized, smaller PWR (pressurized water reactor) reactors lose economy of scale advantages

c.       High temperature gas-turbine style reactors are far from developed

d.      Fusion at high temperature e.g. in magnetic bottle, is a pipe dream

7         

         Nuclear death spiral on the demand for power is real and present, customers have a variety of ways to self-generate (distributed generation), and alternatives become attractive as power prices increase.  Nuclear power will increase power prices, the greater the percent nuclear, the more alternatives become attractive. 

      Part One  --  Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete.

Part Two  --  Preposterous Power Pricing in Nuclear Proponents Prevail
Part Three -- this article
Part Four  --  Nuclear Plants Use Far More Fresh Water
Part Five --   Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten - Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands
Part Thirteen - Nuclear Plants Are Heavily Subsidized
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things
Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion
Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979
Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen
Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process
Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream
Part Thirty - Conclusion

      Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

      Marina del Rey, California

Saudis to Build Nuclear Plants at $7 Billion Each

"[T]he kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] will build 16 nuclear reactors by 2030 at a cost of around $7 billion each." - source.


In an ever-growing list of countries that either are building, or plan to build, nuclear-powered electric power plants, none are building at an affordable cost.  The USA, Finland, China, now Saudi Arabia all publish numbers that indicate a new, 1,000 MW reactor costs anywhere from $7 to $11 billion.  China is building a six-reactor plant for $66 billion, or $11 billion apiece.   The recently-cancelled South Texas Nuclear Project Expansion in the USA was to cost $17 billion, but that was just a dream; no shovel had been turned and no delays had yet started, with the inevitable increase in financing costs.  Fully costed, the STNP expansion would be at least $22 billion, more likely $25 billion.  


At these price levels, electricity must be sold for at least 35 cents per kWh, just to pay for the investment and provide a reasonable return.  


The Saudis indicated that their growing economy requires a 7 percent per year increase in electric power production.  They don't want to burn oil for making power, they would rather sell the oil.  Thus, the need for nuclear power plants.  The Saudis are smart, as I've written before, but they are mistaken on this one.  No economy grows, nor can it grow, at much above 3 percent per year for very long.  A temporary growth spurt might occur of 7 or 8 percent for a year or two, but this is not sustainable.  


Thus, there is no need for the nuclear power plants. The Saudis should, instead, do what the rest of the world does where economics are important: build combined-cycle gas turbine power plants (CCGT).  The Saudis have access to natural gas in the Middle East, and could easily purchase what they don't self-produce.  These CCGT power plants are much more efficient than conventional steam-based power plants, at 59 percent compared to approximately 35 percent.  They also do not use nearly as much water, which is a huge consideration for nuclear power plants.  Where, and how, will the Saudis obtain sufficient cooling water for 16 nuclear power plants?  Nuclear plants require at least twice as much water for cooling, compared to the CCGT plants.  Of course, the nuclear power plants could be built on the coast and use seawater.  This greatly increases the cost of the plant because seawater is more corrosive than fresh water. 


Perhaps the Saudis have another motive, from watching what the Iranians have done in the past several years with their nuclear "power" program.  Perhaps, just perhaps, the Saudis are in a race for parity and do not want the Iranians to have the upper hand, even in nuclear power plants. 


Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 
Marina del Rey, California