On Generation IV Nuclear Plants

Subtitle: Safer and Cheaper, or Just Make-Work Projects?

Tonight, 4-11-2019, the South Texas Section of AIChE will have the monthly dinner meeting, at which the presentation will discuss the research and status of Generation IV nuclear power plants.  This topic is the result, most likely, of the mis-guided belief by the current Section leadership that man-made climate change requires non-carbon-based electric power generation.  Therefore, they say, more nuclear plants should be built.  And, since no one can deny that the existing crop of nuclear power plants are far too dangerous and far too costly, they see a need for a new generation of nuclear designs.   This article poses a few questions I would ask, given the opportunity, about these planet-saving Gen IV nuclear power plants. 

What is a Gen IV plant?  These are, according to the NRC, nuclear plant designs that do not use light water as a moderator in the reactor.  At present, the existing plants use boiling water, or high pressure water in the reactor core as neutron moderators.  These have been shown to be far too expensive, as stated above.   The Gen IV plants will use various other things, such as graphite spheres in a high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR), molten fluoride salt in the reactor (MSR), or various molten or liquid metals in the reactor (molten lead, molten sodium, e.g.) .  

The questions, for now, include these:  What is the safety for Gen IV?  Will these plants require subsidies?  What is the on-line  capacity factor, or reliability of Gen IV?  What is the cost to construct?  What is the cost to operate?  What is the cost to decommission?  What are the issues with long-term spent fuel?

Safety

Will Gen IV reactors be safe, so safe that there is no longer an absolute need for the US government to provide damage payments for a catastrophic nuclear incident?  At present, every reactor enjoys such protection under the Price-Anderson Act.  Insurance companies refuse to insure nuclear plants, above a modest amount that is required by federal law.   Will these plants have materials of construction that operate reliably and safely for decade after decade?  We note that molten fluoride salts had serious metal cracking and embrittlement in earlier tests, are there proven alloys today that provide a safe operating system?

Subsidies

Will Gen IV plants require the numerous subsidies that current generation of light water reactors have?  SLB has articles on the numerous subsidies, such as liability for radiation leaks via the Price-Anderson Act, construction loan guarantees, new reactor direct subsidies for the first 10 years of operation, making lawsuits during construction almost impossible, and others.

Capacity Factor

Will Gen IV reactors run at 90 percent output year after year, for 40 years or more?  Will these exotic materials, molten lead, molten sodium, molten fluoride salts, create operating problems that shut the plant down routinely?  Test reactors over the years have had very serious drawbacks with pumping such materials, to name just one. 

Cost to Construct  

Will Gen IV plants be built at a low cost, so they can actually compete in the electricity market?  We see that pressurized water reactors now have an outrageous cost, of $12 billion for a 1000 MWe output.   How can anyone know what the costs to build will be?  The industry has time after time given low-ball initial costs, then see the actual costs balloon to 3, 4, and 5 times that initial cost.   

Cost to Operate

Will Gen IV plants have a low cost to operate, so that they can actually compete in the market?  We see today that plant after plant in the US cannot compete, even on their cash costs.  Current plants are shutting down, or crying to the government for more and more subsidies to keep the plants operating.   

Cost to Decommission

Will Gen IV plants require billions of dollars, and decades of time to decommission when the plants finally close?  Who provides that money?  Will it be a government subsidy, like the light water reactors now enjoy?

 Long-term Issues with Spent Fuel

Will the Gen IV reactors have spent fuel that must be stored, guarded, and cooled for centuries?  What are those radioactive byproducts, and what are the toxicity issues?  What requirements will be made to ensure many generations are safe from deadly radiation from these plants?

These questions will suffice, for now.   I hope to ask a question or two.

UPDATE:  The meeting concluded, my thoughts and comments are on the next post at this link.  end update 4-12-2019

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Houston, Texas

copyright (c) 2019 by Roger Sowell - all rights reserved

Topics and general links:

Nuclear Power Plants.......here

Climate Change................here  and here

Fresh Water......................here

Engineering......................here  and here

Free Speech.................... here

Renewable Energy...........here  

The Wisdom of Nuclear Plant Operating in a Flood

Subtitle: Very Risky Activity to Operate A Nuclear Plant with No Evacuations Possible

Very recently, a Category 4 Hurricane, Harvey 2017, came ashore on 25 August near Corpus Christi, Texas in the United States.   The weather fronts were such that the hurricane moved inland only approximately 50 miles, stalled there, then moved southward back over the Gulf of Mexico on 28 August.   The weather front north of the hurricane weakened, such that the hurricane or tropical storm system then moved parallel to the Texas coast in a north-easterly direction before crossing the shore near the Texas-Louisiana border and moving northward up the Mississippi River valley.   

Figure 1.  Location of South Texas Nuclear Plant and Houston
source: google maps

The slow movement over land and over water for the second time resulted in heavy rains over much of southeast Texas and parts of Louisiana.  In many Texas locations, records for rainfall in one storm event were broken.   Just over 50 inches of rain fell in at least one location.   Rivers swelled, overflowed, and many set new records for high levels.  Property was flooded in thousands of locations.   A set of two artificial dams just to the west of Houston, Texas (Barker and Addicks dams) were filled to the danger point.  The water operating authorities chose to release water from the reservoirs behind the dams to prevent catastrophic dam failures.   That water release flooded thousands more homes. 

Many roads were underwater in Houston and surrounding areas, including major freeways.  

No evacuation order was issued for the large, populous city of Houston, Texas.  Instead, the mayor advised the residents to shelter in place.   There were, however, a number of mandatory and voluntary evacuations ordered in other smaller cities and towns.    

The mayor stated publicly that it was impossible to safely evacuate 3-4 million people in such short time, citing the recent failed evacuation attempt for Hurricane Rita.   There were also many deaths on the highways in that failed evacuation attempt. 

Meanwhile, with all the flooding over such a widespread area, the 2,700 MW twin-reactor nuclear power plant located only 70 miles southeast of Houston's downtown area, kept running at full power.  (see figure 1)  The South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company chose to keep running, at least in part to further their reputation as the nuclear plant with the highest on-stream factor in the US. 

The question explored here is, was it wise to keep the STP (South Texas Project) operating at all during the flooding period of several days, when it would be impossible to evacuate the population located downwind of the plant if a massive radiation release event occurred. 

The fundamental issue is that nuclear plants certainly can meltdown, as at least five have done so in the past.  (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and three each at Fukushima-Dai-ichi).   All nuclear plants must have an evacuation plan, per government requirements.  That evacuation plan is predicated on the affected population having the means to evacuate.  

Clearly, the huge area in south and east Texas had no means to evacuate after the flooding began.  

It appears that the STP made it through the flooding and high winds, but were they simply lucky this time?   A look at the events that cause nuclear plants to shut down suddenly, without warning, shows that even the smallest problem can result in a shutdown.   A pump can breakdown, a valve can stick, a steam generator tube can rupture, just to list a few. 

It is also necessary to consider whether the electricity grid was or would be stressed if the STP shut down.  The Texas grid operator is ERCOT, for Electric Reliability Council of Texas.  It certainly appears that ERCOT did not need the power from the nuclear plant, with so much of the service area without power due to the winds and flooding.  

Instead, it appears the nuclear plant owners and operators placed their reputation for onstream days, for high onstream factor, above the safety of the public in the fourth largest metropolis in the country.  Knowing the city could not evacuate even if they tried, they kept running the reactors, pumping electricity into the grid when nearly one-fourth or more of the state's electric customers could not take power even though they wanted to. 

And, why would a business take such a risk?  In this case, it is entirely due to the federal government taking almost all the financial liability from harm and damage created by a radiation incident.    The Price-Anderson Act pays for all damages above a stated amount.  The nuclear plant itself would not pay for much, at all.  (see link to SLB articles on nuclear and Price-Anderson Act)

Surely the entire liability scheme must be re-examined in light of these events.   

For anyone other than a nuclear plant that is protected by the Price-Anderson Act provisions, operating with reckless disregard for human life, or operating in a normal manner that is reckless in the circumstances, can be a criminal act. 

The nuclear power plants must be shut down, and as soon as possible.   Millions of lives are at stake, or damaged forever for those that survive a nuclear meltdown with high winds that blow the radioactive particles into their homes, their businesses, and their very lungs.  

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California
copyright (c) 2017 by Roger Sowell - all rights reserved

Topics and general links:

Nuclear Power Plants.......here
Climate Change................here  and here
Fresh Water......................here
Engineering......................here  and here
Free Speech.................... here

Renewable Energy...........here 

Desperate Nuclear Plant Rescue - More Subsidies

Subtitle: Old Nuclear Plant is Losing Money - More Subsidies Proposed

This is becoming a repeating theme:  a nuclear plant operator loses money, announces shutdown; state lawmakers step in to change laws to subsidize the nuclear plant so it can keep operating.    This time around, it is the FitzPatrick nuclear plant, on the shore of Lake Ontario in New York state.   see link   "CNY state legislators sponsor bills trying to save FitzPatrick nuclear plant"   

FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant with Lake Ontario in background (NRC)

These new proposed subsidies are in addition to the long list of existing subsidies that US nuclear power plants enjoy.  see link to "US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized,"  and see link to "Price-Anderson Act Gives Too Much Protection to Nuclear Plants."

The FitzPatrick plant is due to shut down in 2017.  Lawmakers likely will not garner support for such a subsidy.   The simple fact is that a nuclear plant requires substantial investment in its latter years, after age 30 approximately.   But, with the low prices for electricity due to increasing natural gas power production, especially at night when the nuclear plant will not or cannot reduce its output, it is difficult for plant owners to justify spending the money on nuclear plant upgrades.   FitzPatrick just passed its 40th anniversary (July 1975 startup).  Any money spent on upgrades would not have a long life to return the investment.   It is better to shut down the plant and cut one's losses, instead of spending money and then shutting it down.  

Even though many nuclear proponents insist that nuclear plants run for 60 years, that is not the case.  When FitzPatrick shuts down in 2017, it will have operated only 42 years.   see link  to Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 10,  "Nuclear plants require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years"   

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
copyright (c) 2016 by Roger Sowell, all rights reserved

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 25

Subtitle: Price-Anderson Act Gives Too Much Protection to Nuclear Plants

[UPDATE 7/3/2014-  India has its own problems with its version of nuclear liability law.  See near end of article. -- end update]

In an earlier article in The Truth About Nuclear Power series, (part 13 see link), several forms of government subsidy for nuclear power were discussed.  This article discusses one of those subsidies in more detail, the Price-Anderson Act by which government assumes the liability from a large nuclear accident, after industry reaches the stated cap on its liability.  To encourage the nuclear industry to build any plants at all, the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act.

Even as early as the 1950s, the nuclear industry was aware of the catastrophic nature of a nuclear accident, a meltdown due to a loss-of-cooling-accident, radiation released into the atmosphere or water, and the potential for hundreds of thousands of deaths or even many, many more.    Industrial insurance underwriters also were keenly aware of the risks, and had their premiums adjusted accordingly.  Utilities that wanted to enter the nuclear power business realized quickly that they could not afford to build the plants, plus pay for insurance premiums.  The price for their nuclear-based power would be prohibitive – and the adverse publicity would be devastating.  One can imagine the headlines: “Nuclear Disaster Insurance Increases Electricity Prices to Unaffordable Levels.”  Or, some similar headline.  

Subsequent events have shown that such nuclear calamity is not only possible, but extremely deadly.  Three major events have happened to date, at Three Mile Island in 1979 with a reactor core partially melting down, Chernobyl in 1986 with a core explosion, and Fukushima Dai-ichi in 2011 with three reactors melted down and four containment buildings exploded.    With hundreds of reactors operating world-wide and almost one hundred more either planned or under construction, more meltdown disasters are inevitable.  

With the economic consequences in mind, the industry asked for relief from Congress, and Congress responded with the Price-Anderson Act in 1957.    The language of the Act mentions “extraordinary liability that companies would incur if a nuclear accident were to happen…”    The extraordinary liability is a result of nuclear activities being classified as an ultrahazardous activity.  These activities are defined as an activity that cannot be made safe even with the utmost care taken.   Examples include the use and storage of of explosives, blasting such as in mining or quarrying, use, storage and transport of certain chemicals, nuclear materials used in medicine and industry, and nuclear power reactors. 

Note that most of these activities have existed long before nuclear energy was discovered.   The concept of an ultrahazardous activity is not new; it is merely the proper category in which nuclear energy must be placed.    The person or company that engages in ultrahazardous activities bears the risk of any harm to persons or property from that activity - with very limited legal defenses to liability.  He also carries insurance to limit his own risk.  However, for nuclear power plants, the insurance is simply unaffordable – except as provided for under the Act. 

An example from my own industrial experience deals with the use and storage of a certain thermally-unstable chemical.   The chemical was a liquid, and was used as an initiator in the production of PVC resin from vinyl chloride monomer.   The chemical was packaged in a plastic cube surrounded by cardboard, approximately one foot on each side.  The boxes of initiator were stored in a dugout-style bunker with stout walls and a flimsy roof, the entire room kept at below freezing temperature.  The nature of the initiator was that it was stable when very cold, but would explode when warmed to something below ambient temperature.   A description from an initiator supplier states it is a “refrigerated organic peroxide undergoing self-accelerating thermal decomposition below room temperature.”     My company did not have, nor did it require, an act of Congress to limit the liability from using the explosive initiator.   Nuclear power is far, far more dangerous than that explosive liquid. 

The words of the Price-Anderson Act are excerpted below:

“Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 to ensure that adequate funds would be available to compensate victims of a nuclear accident. It also recognized that the risk of extraordinary liability that companies would incur if a nuclear accident were to happen would render insurance costs prohibitively high, and thwart the development of nuclear energy.  
. . . 
The Price-Anderson Act requires owners of commercial reactors to assume all liability for damages to the public resulting from an ``extraordinary nuclear occurrence'' and to waive most legal defenses they would otherwise have. However, in exchange, their liability will be limited to capped amounts established in the Act.”   – Re-Authorization of the Price-Anderson Act, December 9, 2003, Senate Report 108-218.  

The Act is all that stands between nuclear plants and total shutdown, immediately.  Without it, no nuclear plant would assume the risk of $2 trillion – or more – in damages from an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence” – a meltdown and subsequent deaths of millions of people. 

As mentioned earlier, the US has narrowly escaped such an incident at Three Mile Island in 1979, where only by sheer dumb luck did clueless plant operators turn on a water injection pump just before the nuclear fuel melted all the way through the reactor walls.   The operators had no clue what they were doing, and actually turned off a water pump earlier in the day that could have prevented the meltdown.  The meltdown eroded almost all the way through the reactor walls.   This incident was discussed in some detail in Part 21 -- see link. 

If an accident occurs, and a million people were to die from radiation, liability would be approximately $7 million per each death, using the US EPA’s value of a statistical life.    That alone is $7 trillion, for a single incident.  There are many nuclear reactors close to population centers that each contain millions of people: near Miami: Turkey Point and St. Lucie, near Atlanta: Vogtle and Hatch, along the northeast corridor: Three Mile Island (where one reactor melted down but the other continues to operate to this day),  North Anna, Surry, Calvert Cliffs, Salem, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Susquehanna, Indian Point, and Millstone, near Chicago: LaSalle, Braidwood, Byron, Dresden, and Quad Cities, near Dallas: Comanche Peak, near San Francisco: Diablo Canyon, and near Phoenix: Palo Verde (a triple-reactor plant).   Note that many of the sites listed have two reactors, although some have a single reactor. 

Even if a settlement could be reached with each decedent’s estate for $1 million each, a million victims would still require a payout of $1 trillion.  It can be seen then, why no nuclear power plants would be built with that amount of potential liability.  As the preface to the Price-Anderson Act states, [Congress] “recognized that the risk of extraordinary liability that companies would incur if a nuclear accident were to happen would render insurance costs prohibitively high, and thwart the development of nuclear energy.” 

Insurance for Liability 

The Act requires each nuclear power plant to carry $300 million in liability insurance for each reactor.  

“First, each licensed reactor must carry the maximum amount of insurance commercially available to pay any damages from a severe nuclear accident. That amount is currently $300 million.”  -- the Act

Excess Damages beyond Insurance Amount

Excess damages, beyond $300 million, are covered up to approximately $10 billion by requiring all covered commercial reactors to pay up to approximately $100 million each; with approximately 100 US reactors, the total reaches $10 billion.   The Act states:

“Any damages exceeding that amount are to be assessed equally against all covered commercial reactors, up to $95.8 million per reactor (most recently adjusted for inflation by NRC in August 2004).Those assessments would be paid at an annual rate of no more than $10 million per reactor. According to the NRC, all of the nation’s 103 commercial reactors are currently covered by the Price-Anderson retrospective premium requirement.

Funding for public compensation following a major nuclear incident would therefore include the $300 million in insurance coverage carried by the reactor that suffered the incident, plus the$95.8 million in retrospective premiums from each of the 103 currently covered reactors, totaling $10.2 billion. On top of those payments, a 5 percent surcharge may also be imposed, raising the total per-reactor retrospective premium to $100.6 million and the total potential compensation for each incident to about $10.7 billion.

Under Price-Anderson, the nuclear industry’s liability for an incident is capped at that amount, which varies depending on the number of covered reactors, amount of available insurance, and an inflation adjustment that is made every 5 years.”  -- The Act

Excess Damages Beyond $10 Billion

For a large event with damages beyond $10 billion, the US government assumes the amount above $10 billion.  

“The Act provides that in the event that actual damages from an accident are in excess of this amount, [$10.7 billion] Congress will ‘‘thoroughly review’’ the incident and take such action as is necessary to provide ‘‘full and prompt compensation to the public.’’ "  -- Price-Anderson Act

Conclusion

The very existence of nuclear power plants depends on Congress renewing the Price-Anderson Act as it periodically expires.  Without the government assuming the excess liability, nuclear plants would shut down immediately.  No utility company has resources of $1 trillion, and certainly cannot buy insurance in that amount.  The Act is the single largest subsidy for nuclear power, greater than loan guarantees ($8 billion roughly for each reactor), the carbon tax on coal plants that benefits nuclear plants due to their “carbon free” power production, no lawsuits being permitted during construction (a limited exception applies), increased electricity prices during nuclear plant construction to avoid paying interest on loans, and operating safety regulations routinely relaxed to allow nuclear plants to continue operating without meeting safety standards. 

It is a struggle to think of any other industry that enjoys such a government benefit: what other industry would shut down tomorrow if its uninsurable risks were not borne by the government?    The risks are so great, and the cost of insurance is just too high for the nuclear power industry to compete, or even exist, without the comfortable cushion of the Price-Anderson Act.  

Indeed, that raises the question: are nuclear plant operators too comfortable, too complacent, due to the certain knowledge that any catastrophic event will be paid first by $300 million in insurance, and then cost them only $100 million each?  Any amount over and beyond those limits will be paid for by the US Government.   Perhaps nuclear plants would pay more attention to safety, and operating procedures if they knew the plant would shut down or be sold at auction to pay the damages.   Perhaps the nuclear industry would be much more self-policing if the limits were $20 billion for each reactor, not the $100 million that exists today.   (see link to part 16 for a description of near misses in US reactors over the previous four years) 

[UPDATE 7/3/2014:  India has its own problems with apportioning civil liability from a nuclear disaster.  A Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Law is nearing completion, but it places risk and costs on equipment suppliers for latent or patent defects, plus inferior service (e.g. installation work).  Understandably, nuclear reactor suppliers are not happy.  see link.   -- end update ]

Previous Articles

The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.

Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten -- Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete

Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown And Explosion

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen 

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - this article

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell
Marina del Rey, California