ExxonMobil Refinery Explosion in Torrance CA 2015

Subtitle:  Increased Fines For Violations Is A Better Solution

The basic facts:  the 155,000 BPD oil refinery owned by ExxonMobil and located in Torrance, California (suburb of Los Angeles) had a large but non-fatal explosion in February, 2015 when hydrocarbon vapors that had flowed into an electrostatic precipitator system ignited and exploded.  Four workers were injured.   The refinery has been operating at reduced-capacity ever since, with the fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) unit shut down until adequate repairs are made and government regulatory agencies are satisfied that the refinery can operate safely again. 

Just two days ago (13 January, 2015), a public meeting was held in Torrance at which the Chemical Safety Board presented its findings on the explosion.  A newspaper account of that meeting can be read here (see link). 

As a former practicing, and consulting refinery process engineer for many years, and much experience in dozens of similar refineries world-wide, I take keyboard under fingers here to offer some insights.   First, a word of my background and qualifications that I have never before shared in public. 

Many years ago, in approximately 1994 or '95, 1990 (verified) the People's Republic of China's national oil company, refining division, surveyed and analyzed all of the country's refineries to determine what could be done to modernize, improve, and make the refineries more efficient.   First, the effort was internal, using the best Chinese engineers and professors.   Following that effort, the Chinese government wanted an outside expert opinion on the matter.   They solicited bids for the work from consultants around the world, including (as I recall) from Japan, the UK, the US, and other nations.  Within the US, the little consulting company where I worked (20 engineers), received an invitation to bid.  To make a long story short, my company won the award and my boss and I were soon on a plane to Beijing for a three-week consulting trip. 

We had (and still have, in my case  (note: sadly, Dick Moriarty passed away)  ) extensive knowledge of oil refineries, and had performed many such operating and profit improvement studies on refineries world-wide.  We looked at refineries from start to finish, crude storage and distillation, to products blending and all off-sites units.   What we did not know was that the Chinese national television station brought a full crew with cameras, lights, and microphones to record our introductions on our first morning of the Chinese refinery improvement consulting project.   The head Chinese dignitary made a speech on camera, and a few others made speeches, then a translator told my boss that he was next.   Just before my boss spoke, the last speaker spoke Chinese first, then English for our benefit. He described the process just above of the Chinese effort to improve their refineries and their need for an outside opinion.   He ended by saying, "And now our distinguished foreign consultants will make their comments."   (I will never forget that phrase, Distinguished Foreign Consultants.)

My boss looked at me, and said to the camera something very short, thanked our hosts for selecting us, and ended by saying, "and now my associate Roger Sowell will describe the approach we take in our refinery profit improvement studies."   I was caught with no time to prepare, or think of what to say.   The lights were bright, the microphone was now in front of me, and the camera lens was aimed right at me. 

Richard "Dick" Moriarty and Roger Sowell
with Chinese refinery management
at Yanshan Refinery
Beijing, People's Republic of China, 1990

So, I echoed my boss' sentiments on how happy I was to be in China, for our company to be selected after a world-wide bidding process, and delighted to have the opportunity to work with the wonderful Chinese engineers and managers to study their petroleum refineries.   I described briefly the process we used, first to go over each process unit with the management to gain an understanding, then take the operating data back to the States for analysis using our proprietary computer software and our engineering experience.   

I seldom relate this story of the Chinese refinery consulting at Yanshan Petrochemical Corporation near Beijing. My point in relating this now is that I have the background to offer a considered opinion on events such as refinery explosions like the one at Torrance in February 2015.   (The Chinese company was not the only major international oil company that hired us, as we also consulted for PetroCanada, AGIP in Italy, Total in France, and many others).  

There are calls presently in California to tighten the regulatory scheme on safety in oil refineries.   As can be seen on the Chemical Safety Board's web pages, the CSB is comparing the Torrance refinery explosion to the earlier Chevron refinery fire and explosion in Richmond, California.   There is a concerted effort to have oil refineries redesigned and built in what is referred to as an inherently safe manner, or to use "inherently safer design."   One example of inherently safer design is to use non-corrodible materials of construction so that piping and vessel wall thickness does not decrease over time, leading to a rupture, leak, fire, or explosion.  Another example is to provide safety interlocks so that a fluid cannot flow because a valve cannot be opened when it is unsafe.    There is a great body of literature on inherently safer design.    It should be noted, and I make this point in my speeches on the matter, that requiring non-corrodible materials is extremely costly, as for example using titanium for all wetted piping and vessels instead of carbon steel or stainless steel.  

What occurred in Torrance at the refinery was a combination of bad human judgement and equipment failure.   Essentially, the FCC has three sections, a reactor section, a main column, and a vapor recovery unit.   The reactor section itself has two sections, the reactor and regenerator.  All of these are connected by various pipes.  In normal operation, feed oil enters the reactor, contacts catalyst and reacts, the products are separated from the spent catalyst, and the products flow into the main column for separation into various streams.  Vapor products from the main column are routed to the vapor recovery unit, where valuable products are separated from light gases.  The light gases are generally burned in the refinery as fuel. Spent catalyst from the reactor is sent to the regenerator, where the catalyst is contacted with hot air that burns carbon off of the catalyst.  The regenerated catalyst is recycled back to the reactor.  Combustion gases from the regenerator are sent to a power recovery turbine and from there to an air pollution control system, the electrostatic precipitator that exploded in Torrance.   This description is necessarily simplified, as there are many more items of equipment in an FCC unit.  

I worked in and with dozens of FCC units in my operating and consulting career.   They are fascinating units with many challenges and great opportunities for profit.  

The problem in Torrance occurred when part of the FCC unit was shut down for repairs, the reactor section.  However, and this is crucial, the main column was not shut down.   It is always required that flammable hydrocarbons be kept away from any work area, and the ExxonMobil team tried to do that.  They closed the correct valves, and injected steam into the reactor to form a barrier or seal against the hydrocarbons in the main column.   However, according to the CSB report released on 14 January 2016, (yesterday as this is written), steam leaked out of the power recovery turbine, or expander as it is also known, into the work area.  This interfered with the workers and may have been unsafe in itself, since a cloud of steam in a refinery obscures visibility and may make it difficult to breathe.   The steam rate was reduced so the workers could perform their tasks.  see link to CSB report. 

Meanwhile, and unknown to the personnel, a critical valve leaked and allowed hydrocarbon vapors to pass from the main column, through the reactor, pass the leaking valve (spent catalyst slide valve), through the regenerator and power recovery system and into the electrostatic precipitator.   A spark ignited the vapors, and an explosion resulted.    All of this is explained in great detail in the CSB report. 

For further context, there are more than 100 FCC units in the US today, with many more world-wide.  Almost every modern refinery has an electrostatic precipitator to meet the stringent air pollution requirements.   These FCC units operate approximately 3 years before being shut down for planned maintenance.   There are of course many other unplanned shutdowns, also.   But, using just 100 FCC units, and 3 years between shutdowns, there are approximately 33 units shut down each year, or roughly 3 every month.  Yet, there are very few explosions that result from these shutdowns, and subsequent startups.   One could argue that most planned shutdowns do not leave the main column full of hydrocarbons, so there is no need to insert a steam blanket to keep the hydrocarbons away from the workers.  Yet, there have been other occasions during which the procedure was performed with no harm or damage.   Clearly, then, the procedures are acceptable but something was different in this case.  

It appears, based on the CSB description of events, that the problem would not have occurred if the spent catalyst slide valve had not leaked, or if the steam had not leaked out of the expander, or a combination of both.   

It would be an over-reaction for regulating agencies to enact new, burdensome rules on the entire industry in an attempt to prevent an accident that almost never occurs.  Yet, there are calls for exactly that, to make the refining industry be subjected to inherently safer design.  

A better approach is to increase the penalties and fines for those who violate the existing safety regulations, so that a violation will be so costly that the workers, and managers, exercise extreme caution.    One example, was a refinery management that was interested in the impact on their US refinery of an explosion similar in scope and damage to the one in March, 2005 at BP's Texas City Refinery.   That explosion killed 17 people and hospitalized more than 100 others.   The injuries, deaths, and damage occurred after human error caused flammable liquids to overflow a vent pipe, vaporize, reach an ignition source and explode.   In that case, the equipment was fine but the humans made errors.   That explosion cost BP several billion dollars in fines, repairs, and legal settlements.   Such a sum would bankrupt many smaller companies.  That sobering fact was what was brought home to a different company.  Safety is vital, not only for the safety and lives of the employees, but surrounding communities, and also the ongoing viability of the company in many cases.  see link to BP Texas City Explosion of 2005. 

In the Torrance explosion, a combination of human decisions and equipment malfunction were at fault.  In retrospect, it would have been better to shut down the main column, and insert a blind flange in the line at the spent catalyst slide valve.  In short, make it almost impossible for any hydrocarbons to leak into an area where an ignition source could create a fire or explosion.  

UPDATE 1:  16 January 2016 - The Chair of the Chemical Safety Board wrote a letter to the editor opining that California refineries need more regulations to force them to operate safely (my paraphrase).  see link to the letter to editor. 

Chairperson Sutherland wrote:  

"If finalized as currently written, California’s new safeguards (i.e. regulations) for oil refineries would strengthen the state’s oversight by requiring management to take steps to reduce risks to the greatest extent feasible. And the draft regulations include some important safeguards on the forefront of refinery safety, such as requiring incident monitoring and tracking data.

I eagerly support Gov. Brown and the state Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) for initiating these changes. I believe the actions being taken here in California are some of the most substantial positive safety changes happening right now."    

Chairperson Sutherland added that "California can lead the nation in refinery safety," an indication that the new California regulations would, or should, be extended to all US refineries.   

I note in passing that Chairperson Sutherland has zero technical education, as her biographical sketch available online states she holds a BA in Political Science/Art History, as well as an MBA (in Information Technology) and a JD.  She is an attorney licensed in Maryland.  Her only brush with non-computer technology appears to be a brief stint at Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.  She has been Chair of CSB since August, 2015, a total of six months as of this date.  

 -- (end update 1)

Here ends this article for today.   There may be additional updates.  

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
copyright (c) 2016 by Roger Sowell, all rights reserved. 

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 20

Subtitle: Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

This article 20 begins five articles on what may be the most serious nuclear plant disasters and near-disasters: Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima, San Onofre, and St. Lucie.  Many

Radiation Plume from Chernobyl
credit: BBC

others could be included, from countries around the world.  One reference lists more than 80 serious nuclear power incidents.   The US’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission lists 70 incidents in the past four years in the US alone that required the NRC to send a special investigation team to the plant, or an augmented investigation team.   The Chernobyl article begins with a brief summary or overview of the facts, taken from the NRC's "Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station 1986," then commentary afterward.

Previous articles on The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasized the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article. 

Overview, from NRC Report, Section 4.1 (pg 124)

(quote) “The accident occurred during a test of the turbine generator system.  This test was designed to demonstrate that following a reactor trip, with the resulting loss of onsite power and isolation of the steam supply to the turbine, the rotating inertia of the turbine generator would be sufficient to generate enough electrical power to energize certain safety systems until the diesel generator system could be started and accept the electrical loads.  This test had been performed earlier at similar plants (Russian).  The specific purpose of this test was to determine if a new generator magnetic field regulator would maintain the voltage output from the generator for a longer period.

In the process of establishing the test conditions for the reactor, the operators brought the plant to an unstable operating condition.  However, for a number of reasons, the operators chose to run the test from this unstable condition.  To prevent the reactor from automatically shutting down, the operators purposely bypassed several systems important to safety.  The role of the operator in this accident is discussed in Chapter 5.

With the safety systems bypassed, the plant was in an unstable and vulnerable condition.  The most prominent parameter of this unstable condition was the positive void reactivity coefficient.  This coefficient allowed the reactivity to increase as the volume of steam increased in the core.  Other significant parameters included the low initial power level, low subcooling, low initial steam void fraction in the core, fuel burnup condition, and control system characteristics.  The design characteristics of the Chernobyl plant are detailed in Chapter 2.

The initiation of the test caused the steam volume in the core to increase.  Under the unique test conditions (for which the plant was not designed), and with the safety systems bypassed, a significant insertion [? Increase?] of reactivity resulted.  The resulting power increase produced additional steam voids which added reactivity and further increased the power.  Evaluations to date indicate the reactor was brought to a prompt critical condition.  Assessment of Soviet (and other) analyses also indicates that the energy deposition in the fuel was sufficient to melt some of the fuel.   The analyses to date suggest the following possible sequence of events.  The rapid expansion associated with melting, quickly ruptured the fuel cladding and injected fragmented and molten fuel into the coolant channel.  The interaction of the coolant with the hot fuel fragments produced steam very rapidly.  The high temperatures and rapid production of steam quickly over-pressurized the pressure tubes in the core region.   The pressure tubes then failed and over-pressured the cavity region around the graphite blocks.  Sufficient force was generated to lift the top plate off the reactor and possibly to fail the reactor building and eject core material.  This postulated sequence of events can be associated with the first “explosion” heard by operators at the plant.  A second “explosion” was reported to have occurred approximately 3 seconds after the initial one.

Various speculations on the source of this noise include a second criticality, a hydrogen detonation, or even an echo or reverberation. 

In summary, the event was caused by a combination of procedural and management deficiencies, human errors, and unique design characteristics. “  (end quote)   see link

Analysis

For the non-technical readers on SLB, a brief deconstruction of the above is in order. The test was to determine if the generators had enough inertia to keep spinning and generate power, even though steam was shut off to the turbine, to keep emergency systems energized until the diesel-powered generators could be started and brought up to speed.  

The plan was to run the reactor at part-load, which would have tripped the existing safety systems into a shut-down.  The safety systems were therefore disabled.  However, the reactor load was far below the planned load.   The reactor went into a mode that had more steam bubbles than normal, which is dangerous because steam does not slow down fission products such as neutrons.  This is the "positive void reactivity coefficient" mentioned above.  Also, the operators pulled the control rods, almost all of them, out of the reactor.   The resulting power surge caused the reactor to go critical, which melted down part of the nuclear fuel and caused not only an explosion, but the graphite parts of the reactor to catch fire.   

Radiation Worldwide

The core explosion, fire, and residual heat from the burning reactor core (that lasted several days) released huge amounts of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.  The plume of airborne particles flew high above the Earth, in a westerly and northerly direction, and tripped radiation monitors in several countries as it circled the globe.   One of the first countries the plume reached was Poland on April 26 and 27, 1986.   Almost all of Europe was impacted with radiation levels many times higher than normal.  The radiation plume eventually reached almost every northern hemisphere country. 

Personally, I was working doing consulting engineering with a contract in West Germany near Dusseldorf.  I finished the initial visit by March 1 of 1986, then returned to the US to do the office work.  A second visit to Germany in July made me quite nervous, particularly in the food we ate while there.  Everyone was very upset over the radiation cloud that rained deadly particles down on the entire continent.  

From a nuclear power plant safety standpoint, the important point is that the nuclear power industry has always insisted that their power plants are safe.  Even after Chernobyl blew up, the argument was “well, that is a Russian design and nobody has any of those.  Besides, the operators went rogue and operated the plant improperly, which made it explode.  That can never happen here.”

The proper response is, “A nuclear plant can never be made fool-proof.  Fools are just too ingenious.”   As shown in part 16 of TANP, operators in western nuclear plants make plenty of mistakes, not only in design but in operation, training, maintenance, parts replacement, security measures, even mundane chores like tightening bolts to the proper torque. 

Health Issues

At Chernobyl, 28 workers died from acute radiation poisoning within 4 months of the explosion.  Many others have died since, but a direct link to Chernobyl radiation exposure is unclear.   The World Health Organization, WHO, estimates 240,000 workers were exposed to high levels of radiation while cleaning up the radioactive debris.  Another 346,000 people were evacuated and relocated away from the radioactive zone near the plant.  see link   

WHO states that greater incidence of thyroid cancer was caused by Chernobyl.   There also is almost a doubling of leukemia cases.    In addition, the radiation caused cataracts in the eyes, increased deaths from cardio-vascular disease, mental health and psychological trauma. 

UPDATE - 6/11/2014 

So much more could be written about the Chernobyl disaster.  In fact, an internet search turns up nearly 5 million websites with the term "Chernobyl."   Hundreds of books about Chernobyl have also been written.   Until the multiple-meltdowns at Fukushima, Japan in 2011, Chernobyl was the greatest nuclear disaster of all-time.  

From an institutional safety standpoint, Chernobyl refutes many of the nuclear proponents' arguments.  First, the plant was subject to regulations in its own country, the USSR.   International regulations apparently were largely ignored.  Who is to say that future nuclear power plant operators will not do something equally devastating, especially as nuclear plants are built in more and more countries?   

Nuclear apologists or proponents are fond of saying that modern plants are secure, have safety systems and backup systems, and have designs that would never allow such an event to happen again.  That is mere talk; as mentioned in the Conclusion below, it is only too easy for operators to disable safety systems or ignore warnings, and run the plant in manual mode.   What is also apparent from the NRC report linked above is the very, very rapid change from quasi-normal operation to reactor criticality, meltdown and explosion.  At Chernobyl, the change required only a few seconds.  Operators tried desperately to insert some of the control rods, but it was too late.  

It is also clear from the NRC even reports that many, if not all nuclear plants in the US run some of their systems in manual mode at times.  Nothing can be made to run forever, as parts degrade and fail and must be replaced or repaired.  A control system normally has an automatic mode and a manual mode, and only well-trained operators should be allowed to run the systems in manual mode.  

What is also apparent from Chernobyl is the industry did not speak out in a timely manner about what happened and the risk to other countries from the radioactive cloud that was headed their way.  It is true that the operators in the plant had more things on their mind right about then, if they were still alive after the explosion.   However, it was radiation detectors in other countries that first gave the alarm internationally.   The extent and magnitude of the event was not known for days.  The psychological impact on billions of people was not small.   What of the parents of small children, who needed to drink milk?  What worries did couples have about future children?  What worries did other people have about radiation sickness, or long-term illnesses such as thyroid cancer and other cancers?    

The next two articles in TANP discuss two more disasters involving core meltdowns: Three Mile Island and Fukushima.  In both instances, like at Chernobyl, a combination of bad design and human error caused major disaster.  Fukushima was a bit more complex because a natural disaster, and earthquake with tsunami initiated the events.  

-- end update

Conclusion

Nuclear power advocates insist that the plants are safe, that modern designs cannot have catastrophic meltdowns.  However, it is clear that human error can easily defeat the best designs, and natural events can overwhelm even the best operators.  Chernobyl operated quite safely until human plans and human errors created the enormous disaster that affected millions of people around the world. 

Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links.  Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten -- Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete

Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - this article

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California

  

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 15

Subtitle:  Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

This article begins the second theme of the Truth About Nuclear Power series, with the first theme being nuclear power is uneconomic, the second theme is nuclear power is

Universal sign for nuclear radiation

unsafe to operate.   There are many who will immediately say that nuclear power is safe, and point to various facts to support their position.   These next few articles will refute that argument and show that, not only are nuclear plants not safe, they grow more unsafe each year.  

For those who have not read the articles on nuclear power being uneconomic, please see this link. 

The approximately one dozen articles on nuclear safety will include (1) the relationship between plant operators and the regulatory commission, NRC, and show that safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance.  (2) Also, the many, many near-misses each year in nuclear power plants will be discussed.   (3) The safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel will be a topic. (4)  Safety aspects of spent fuel reprocessing will be discussed.  (5) The health effects on people and other living things will be discussed.  The three major nuclear disasters (to date) will be discussed, (6)  Chernobyl, (7) Three Mile Island, and (8)  Fukushima.   (9) The near-disaster at San Onofre will be discussed, and (10) the looming disaster at St. Lucie.  (11)  The inherent unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act.  (12) Finally, the serious public impacts of evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act, will be the topic of an article. 

Safety Rules are Bent

The NRC has been working with nuclear power plant owners to routinely weaken safety regulations, which allows the plants to continue operating, according to a 2011 investigation by AP (Associated Press).  see link   The plant owners argue that the safety regulations in question are overly-safe and unnecessary.  Yet, many of the relaxed regulations are alarming.   It is doubtful that the general public is aware of just how dangerous the plants are in the first place, and made even more unsafe by relaxing the regulations. 

From the AP investigation:  "Examples abound. When valves leaked, more leakage was allowed — up to 20 times the original limit. When rampant cracking caused radioactive leaks from steam generator tubing, an easier test of the tubes was devised, so plants could meet standards.

Failed cables. Busted seals. Broken nozzles, clogged screens, cracked concrete, dented containers, corroded metals and rusty underground pipes — all of these and thousands of other problems linked to aging were uncovered in the AP's yearlong investigation. And all of them could escalate dangers in the event of an accident."

The US plants were originally designed for only 40 years operation.  Safety margins were used that would allow the plants to run for 40 years, and a bit more as good engineering practice.  It is the "bit more" that is at issue.  One example is the brittleness of the reactor vessel.  That is rather an important item, as the reactor vessel contains the nuclear fuel, plus pressurized water at high temperature.  The AP report states the criterion for brittleness was relaxed not once, but twice. Brittle metal in reactor vessel walls are less likely to withstand periodic pressure surges, but instead will crack.   Additionally, some plants seek an operating extension beyond the original 40 years, which is a recipe for more frequent failures as the plants age well beyond their design life. 

Another quote: "One 2008 NRC report blamed 70 percent of potentially serious safety problems on "degraded conditions." Some involve human factors, but many stem from equipment wear, including cracked nozzles, loose paint, electrical problems, or offline cooling components."  A specific instance was burst steam generator tubes at Indian Point in 2000 that released radioactive steam into the air.  Another instance cited is cracked nozzles on the reactor vessel head at Davis-Besse. 

Finally, many pipes are corroded and leaking liquids into the environment.  Valves are also leaking, many at rates that are above the allowable limits.  

Conclusion

This, then, is the state of nuclear power plants in the US.  The equipment is old, has been run hard, often at 100 percent capacity or slightly more for years on end.  How does a plant run at greater than 100 percent capacity?  Some equipment gets replaced with larger equipment, in a procedure known as debottlenecking, then the remaining equipment runs at greater than its design of 100 percent.  Upsets occur, causing pressure variations or pressure surges.  Electrical equipment degrades over time, pipes corrode, valves leak, all of which are normal and expected as process plants age.  The fact is, the nuclear power plants are grinding down, quite literally in many cases.  The safety factor that was there, once, is no longer there.   Nuclear safety is compromised by bending the rules.  

Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links.  Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten -- Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete


Part 15 - this article

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks 

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 

Marina del Rey, California

Reconsider Nuclear Power - Is It Ever Safe?

Below is the text of a post I made on nuclear power, from July 2009, titled "Nuclear Nuts." It seems appropriate to bring this to the fore, since the Japanese nuclear reactors have begun having serious problems. The pro-nuclear crowd is, for the most part, congratulating themselves over how well the Japanese nuclear reactors have held up, with only a few (six or eight or so) having any problems. Plus, they point out, it was not the March 11th earthquake that caused the problem but the giant tsunami that followed it.

I'm an engineer. I know what engineers can do, and I know their limitations. I'm also an attorney, with a law practice that deals with engineers and the myriad of issues that arise in engineering. I'll expand this post over the next few days as my time permits, but for now, the following observations.

First, no plant has ever been designed to withstand what natural forces can dish out. The earthquake in Japan was a 9.0, yet we have evidence of larger earthquakes occurring. The tsunami was 10 meters (30 feet, more or less), yet we have evidence of much, much larger tsunamis in the past. As but one example, there is a tsunami that will smash the entire US West coast from Hawaii, when a portion of the big island collapses into the sea. It is not a matter of IF, but a matter of WHEN. The tsunami will be hundreds of feet high. There are at least six nuclear power plants along the west coast, with four reactors right on the beach in California at San Onofre, and at Diablo Canyon. What Japan is dealing with now, California will be dealing with then.

Second, even the Japanese designs were not sufficient for the earthquake and tsunami that followed. The large initial quake was followed by many smaller aftershocks. It is also apparent that insufficient fuel was available for the Japanese reactors' emergency diesel generators, so even if they had generators that still worked, they would have been out of fuel.

Third, concrete containment structures may or may not maintain their integrity after a large earthquake and multiple aftershocks. It appears that the world is about to learn if the Japanese concrete containment has leaks or not, following the reactor core meltdowns.

Fourth, evacuating people in Japan involved a few hundred thousand people. For the San Onofre plant, which is near San Diego and suburbs of Los Angeles, there are likely millions of people who must be evacuated. That is a logistical problem of immense proportions.

Below, "Nuclear Nuts" addresses the question of nuclear plant safety. I did not include the safety and radiation release aspects of an earthquake plus a tsunami when I wrote that in 2009. Clearly, they are not safe when subjected to such stresses.

Another aspect of nuclear power plant safety must be mentioned. The plants are getting old, and things deteriorate, break, malfunction, and wear out with age. The Japanese are finding that old plants, (40 years old is one reactor with a melt-down), just don't work after an earthquake. The reactors in the USA are also from the 1970's and a few in the 1980s, so are also in the 40 year age bracket. Some are receiving extended operating licences for their third twenty-year period, meaning they will operate to age 60. This is a recipe for disaster.

Yet another aspect of a serious malfunction is a total loss of grid power, then the loss of cooling water, and having spent nuclear fuel stored on-site. The spent fuel also produces heat that must be removed by pumping water through a pool where the fuel is stored. When that water no longer circulates, the spent fuel also overheats.

-- Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

March 14, 2011 at 11:31 p.m. PDT

Marina del Rey, California

Nuclear Nuts, reproduced here and found on SLB here.

A few weeks ago [in June, 2009]I crossed the internet path of one internet nuclear advocate [the "gentleman" hereafter], a self-proclaimed “knowledgeable nuke” and one who fervently believes that nuclear energy is “safe, reliable, and affordable, a huge boon to mankind.” He is an advocate for very small nuclear power plants, with thousands to be built and located in city neighborhoods and industrial facilities.

Further, this gentleman states that nuclear power via atomic fission does not release any deadly materials in an uncontrolled fashion into the environment, unlike burning fossil fuels. [note: this is false, just ask the Japanese]

And last, the gentleman states that I am dead wrong when I stated that atomic energy is the most dangerous and toxic form of energy man has ever devised.

I have run across his type before: a true zealot, a true believer, and one who is not to be swayed by the force of any evidence supported by facts, as his mind is closed to any new or contrary information.

So, knowing in advance that this is a hopeless endeavor, that is, persuading the gentleman and others of similar ilk of the error of his beliefs, I press on, but only this one time. I have far too many things to accomplish in this life to waste more time arguing with one who will not listen to compelling arguments. Taking his assertions in order, “1) safe, 2) reliable, 3) affordable, and 4) a huge boon to mankind.”

Is nuclear power safe? As an attorney highly familiar with negligence and liability, both strict and otherwise, nothing is perfectly safe at all times. Safety is a matter of degree. Measuring sticks one can use to determine the level of safety include how many safeguards are required, how many injuries or deaths occur, and how the law views the matter. For example, driving a car may be considered safe. Yet a car (at least in the U.S.), must have quite a number of safety features before it is allowed to operate on the roads. These safety features include side impact doors, crash-absorbing bumpers, frame crumple zones, air-bags, seat belts, padded headrests and dashboards, the list goes on and on. In addition, there are laws for operating motor vehicles that are designed to increase safety, such as no talking on cell phones and no texting while driving, stopping required at red lights and stop signs, speed limits, operating the headlights at night, not driving while impaired by drugs or alcohol, and others. Yet thousands of people are killed or injured each month while driving. Even though driving a car kills people, driving is not considered an ultra-hazardous activity under the law.

An ultra-hazardous activity is defined under the law as “an activity that necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and is not a matter of common usage.” Examples of ultra-hazardous activities include blasting, other uses of explosives, radioactive materials, and certain chemicals.

Nuclear power from fission uses radioactive elements, and is by definition an ultra-hazardous activity. The legal consequence of this is that no matter what happens, and no matter the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, the owner of the ultra-hazardous material is at fault when the plaintiff is harmed by the ultra-hazardous material or activity.

Next, safety can be measured by the amount of harmful material released into the environment, and the harm resulting from that material. Nuclear power plants have exploded (Chernobyl), have leaked radioactive water into the ground and streams (numerous times), and have sunk to the bottom of the sea in submarines, thereby poisoning the surrounding seas. The preparation of nuclear fuel leaves in its wake devastating damage to the environment, as for example the uranium mines in the U.S. Southwest. The Kerr-McGee plant that processed plutonium is another example of nuclear radioactive material that poisoned people, as the Karen Silkwood lawsuit clearly showed.

From the above, it can be seen that nuclear power is anything but safe. The industry makes claims to a safety record, but in reality the record is not yet written. Many thousands of tons of deadly radioactive waste material, as spent fuel rods, are stored in the more than 100 operating nuclear power plants in the U.S. These deadly radioactive wastes will likely be processed in one form or another someday, and the accidents, radiation burns, early deaths, radiation sicknesses, and long-term health consequences such as cancers from radiation have not yet occurred. But they will.

The removal from service and disassembly of many of the oldest nuclear power plants have also not occurred, with the attendant disposal of the radioactive portions of those plants. How many more radiation-related illnesses and premature deaths will occur at that time?

Further, nuclear fission that occurs in power plants produces the raw material for nuclear bombs: plutonium. No amount of denial by pro-nuclear forces can alter that fundamental physical fact. Also, the other, non-plutonium portion of spent nuclear fuel can be used to deadly effect in a dirty bomb, in which conventional explosives are wrapped in nuclear fuel and exploded. The resulting spread of toxic radioactivity is deadly to lifeforms. For those who deny that nuclear power plants produce bomb material, why is there so much angst in the world over some nations acquiring nuclear power plants, such as North Korea and Iran?

Point two, is nuclear power reliable? One must put the question in context, reliable in relation to what? If the comparison is to intermittent renewable energy sources such as wind, or solar, nuclear power is a bit more reliable. But compared to coal-fired plants, nuclear is no more reliable.Compared to gas-fired plants, it is no more reliable. And, compared to load-following gas-fired plants, it is less reliable. No utility can place a phone call to the nuclear plant on its grid during a peak power situation and ask the operators to crank it up another 20 percent for the next few hours, but a gas-fired plant can easily do that. No nuclear plant can be brought from a cold condition to full generating power within an hour, as can a gas-fired peaker power plant. The nuclear plant is designed to run at a steady output, and no other. Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission can, and does, order nuclear power plants to cut back production or shut down entirely for various reasons. This certainly adversely affects the reliability.

Third, is nuclear power affordable? Many experts thought so in the 1970’s, but few would agree today. In fact, with a 2008 / 2009 cost estimate of $17 to 20 billion for a 2200 MW twin-reactor plant, nuclear power is one of the most expensive options around. That cost estimate was made before the NRC issued a new ruling, that every new nuclear power plant in the U.S. must be designed and built to withstand the impact of a large commercial aircraft. That alone will increase the construction cost by another 10 percent or more. As Craig Severance, CPA, has written, to justify the enormous initial cost and long construction time, the sales price of nuclear-generated power from a new plant must be 25 to 30 cents per kwh. By my estimates, when the aircraft impact design features are included, that will likely be 30 to 35 cents per kwh. In stark contrast, power from a new gas-fired plant is around 12 cents, and from a new coal-fired plant 9 to 10 cents.

Also under the subject of affordability, the gentleman claims that U.S. states with the highest nuclear power generation have the lowest costs of electricity. He cites the southeastern states for this proposition. The opposite turns out to be the case. In all modesty, I took a look at published, reputable data from the U.S. Energy Information Agency, EIA. From my engineering days, I have simple yet adequate skills in plotting data points on a graph, and determining the coordinates of the best-fit linear trend line through those points (see Figure 1 below). In all fairness, developing a trend-line is rather easy these days, when one uses a commercial spreadsheet such as Microsoft’s Excel™.The trend-line shows a positive slope, indicating that power price increases as the percentage of nuclear power generation increases in a state. The data showed that 31 U.S. states have nuclear power plants, with the lowest percent of total generation in Ohio at 6 percent, and the highest in Vermont at 70 percent. Interestingly, the average price for residential retail power in Ohio was 9.5 cents, and in Vermont was 48 percent higher, at 14.1 cents per kwh, in 2007. Connecticut was the highest of all, at 19.1 cents per kwh. The slope of the trend line shows a 0.75 percent increase in power price for a 1 percent increase in nuclear power generation in the state. For a 15 percent increase in nuclear power, the average power price will increase a bit more than 0.9 cents per kwh, or roughly 10 percent of the 2007 price nationwide. For those who advocate increasing nuclear power up to the level achieved by France, 80 percent, this chart clearly shows that would increase the average power price in the USA by 40 percent.

Yet, this data for 2007 uses power produced from mostly aged, nearly-paid-for nuclear power plants.New nuclear plants would, as shown above, require much higher power prices and would increase the cost of power to customers by much more.

Figure 1.

Power price increases 0.63 cents per kwh

for each 10 percent increase in nuclear power

This brings me to the gross unfairness of nuclear power on electricity prices. The poor and those on fixed incomes suffer the most from high power prices, as they have few options but to pay the price or do without. This is dangerous to health and safety in extreme heat and extreme cold.

Fourth and finally, is nuclear power a huge boon to mankind? Given the above, that nuclear power is by definition ultra-hazardous, produces vast quantities of toxic, radioactive wastes that can be used to manufacture nuclear bombs and dirty bombs, is not reliable due to mandatory power reductions or shutdowns, and is one of the most expensive forms of power on the planet that causes grossly disparate effects on the poor and those on fixed incomes (the elderly), the answer must be an emphatic and resounding NO.

The only thing positive about a nuclear power plant is the fuel is cheap. But, there are energy sources that are cheaper still. Four of those energy sources are solar, wind, wave, and ocean current.A fifth is geothermal, but it is very limited. Yet a sixth is hydroelectric, but there is virtually no possibility of increase. The natural resources of those first four power sources are enormous, and have scarcely been tapped to date. Each has features to recommend it, and each has certain drawbacks. But the drawbacks to not include the use of ultra-hazardous materials, do not include generation of deadly toxic wastes that endure for decades or centuries, and do not include power sales prices at 35 cents per kwh or more. Even the reliability issue is minor and getting smaller with new developments. Innovative and cost-effective storage systems are under development and testing in the national laboratories for wind, wave, and solar, which will forever make moot the reliability issue. Ocean current will not require energy storage systems, as the ocean currents flow no matter what is happening in the environment around them.

In conclusion, the propositions that nuclear energy is safe, reliable, affordable, a huge boon to mankind, and releases no toxics to the environment are clearly wrong. The facts clearly show this. No amount of dreaming or wishing or hoping by the gentleman or anyone else with similar opinions will change that.

UPDATE 1 (Nov 4, 2009): After several months and many comments, it is instructive to compare my assertions and facts to the beliefs stated by some of the commenters. First, much more natural gas has been found, just as I said. So much so that gas storage in the U.S. is completely full, and gas prices are very low. So much so that wind power projects are at a reduced rate because wind power generally replaces gas-fired power. Europe is drilling for and finding gas in their shale deposits, especially in Poland. New LNG import terminals are being delayed due to the vast amount of natural gas now available in the US. No need to import it if we can open a valve on land.

On the nuclear power plant front, South Texas Nuclear Project's proposed expansion is on the ropes - due to cost. This is just as I predicted. The cost estimate was $13 billion, and just recently was increased to $17 billion. The City of San Antonio is rethinking their involvement, and postponing their decision. How could such a thing happen, since nuclear proponents insist (indeed, shout it out loud) that such plants are proven technology with well-known cost estimates?

A second major event rocked the new nuclear power plant world this week, as the Areva company (the French vendor for the Finnish plant under construction) has just received a slap across the face for inadequate safety systems. The design must be revised to satisfy the nuclear regulatory agencies from France, Finland, and U.K. How could that be, since we are equally assured by the nuclear proponents that such plants' designs are safe? One would think that the design as approved was truly safe. Apparently not.

And a further point on the cost increase to withstand an impact from a large commercial aircraft. Some commenters stated that all 103 of the US plants already meet that safety standard. This is not true. The new safety standard applies to more than just the reactor dome, it also applies to the cooling system, and spent fuel storage.

It is also increasingly apparent, after a very cool summer and early killing frost, increasing polar ice at both poles, and almost zero hurricanes in the Atlantic, that CO2 has nothing to do with the earth's temperature. If the IPCC and AGW alarmists were correct, the increased CO2 (from 350 all the way up to 388 ppm) should have roasted the earth already. We should already have islands underwater (where are they?), seaports and seashores disappearing (where are they?), an early Spring and late Fall (not in the northern hemisphere, nor the southern), many more hurricanes (did not happen), and Arctic ice almost gone (it is increasing back to the 2005 level). [end update 1]