Showing posts with label Chernobyl. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chernobyl. Show all posts

Sunday, April 24, 2016

Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster 30 Years After

Subtitle:  No More Chernobyls - Build Wind-Turbines and Solar Power

The greatest nuclear disaster of all-time occurred 30 years ago next Tuesday, April 26.   I do not re-post my own articles, as a rule, however the article from Truth About Nuclear Power series from 2014 is posted below.  The article is about the Chernobyl explosion and nuclear fallout, describing what happened and the impacts.  

With 30 years distance, it is appropriate to review where we were then and where we are now in terms of our knowledge, our need for electricity, and the options we have.  

Then vs Now

In 1986, the world had essentially five technologies for electricity generation: coal, natural gas, nuclear via fission, oil, and hydroelectricity.   Some interesting statistics are available from EIA on electricity production world-wide: First, as much electricity from renewable sources was produced in 2014 as was produced by nuclear power in 1986, both at 1520 tWh for the respective years.  Yet, the renewable energy sources were almost zero in 1986, at 95 tWh.  

 Hydroelectric generation has almost doubled, from 1991 tWh to 3769 tWh in 2014.  Electricity from oil-burning has remained almost constant, at 1000 tWh.    Nuclear-based electricity increased by approximately 2/3, from 1518 tWh to 2417 tWh in 2014.  Electricity from coal almost tripled in the 30 years.   Electricity from natural gas increased by almost 7 times, from 750 tWh in 1986 to 4933 tWh in 2014.  

The interesting thing is to rank the electricity generation sources by relative amount of increase over almost 30 years (1986 to 2014):  

Oil                 --       0 percent increase (production remained constant)
Nuclear          --     67 percent increase
Hydroelectric  --   100 percent increase (production doubled)
Coal               --   200 percent increase (production tripled)
Natural Gas    --   600 percent increase (production increased 7-fold)
Renewables    -- 1500 percent increase (production increased 16-fold)

Options Available Today

The point of the above is that no longer are we, as the human race, constrained by electricity sources so that nuclear power must be a part of the mix.   With coal now known to becoming scarce, and mines running out of economically extract-able product within 20 years in the US and 50 years worldwide, the nations of the world must embark on a rational plan to replace the electricity production that formerly was based on coal-burning.   That is a huge task, with coal providing 39 percent of all the world's electricity in 2014. 

When one combines the task of replacing coal-fired plants with retiring and replacing the aging nuclear reactors that were built primarily 40 years ago, which is another 11 percent of world electricity, that is 50 percent, one-half, of all the world electricity production within the next 50 years.    The essential question is, what technology will replace one-half of the world's electrical power generation over the next 50 years?  

The lesson from Chernobyl is not that that particular technology was accident-prone, and will never be built again.  The lesson is that humans make errors.  Even nuclear power plant operators make errors.   The proof is not just in Chernobyl's explosion, where operators certainly made errors, but also in the massive meltdown of the Three Mile Island reactor in Pennsylvania, USA.  That meltdown was entirely due to operator error, making one bad decision after another.  Only pure, dumb luck prevented the core meltdown from rupturing the reactor pressure vessel.  

 Yet more proof exists in the triple-reactor meltdowns just 5 years ago in Japan at Fukushima Dai-Ichi.   Bad decisions at the design phase set the stage for nuclear plant operators to be unable to pump, thus circulate, cooling water to safely shut down after a predictable earthquake, and a predictable and foreseeable tsunami.  What kind of idiots put emergency generators in the basement of nuclear reactors, where flood-waters will disable them?  

Building more nuclear plants is not the solution.   In any event, it is impossible to design, obtain permits, and construct enough nuclear power plants in the 50 years.  For the US alone, replacing the coal-fired and aging nuclear power plants within 20 years requires approximately 320 new, 1,000 MWe nuclear plants.   Clearly, that is not possible given the licensing and construction requirements.  

World-wide, one can expect that constructing new coal-fired power plants will cease in a very short time-frame, most likely within 5 years.   No one will want to build a coal-fired plant that will run out of coal before the plant's effective life of 45 to 50 years is reached.  For coal reserves, see link. 

The best solution, then, is to continue the path already established over the past 30 years, with investing in renewable energy projects, especially wind-turbines where the wind is adequate, and solar where so much sunshine falls daily on either side of the Equator.   Intermittency issues are no longer a concern, with subsea pumped storage hydroelectric for storing either wind energy, or solar energy, for all consumers that are near the ocean.  For inland consumers, the new-generation battery storage systems recently announced in California hold great promise.   For subsea storage, see link.  For the new-generation battery, see link.   

Below is the original article on the Chernobyl disaster.  

----------------------------------------

Subtitle: Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

This article 20 begins five articles on what may be the most serious nuclear plant disasters and near-disasters: Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima, San Onofre, and St. Lucie.  Many 
Radiation Plume from Chernobyl
credit: BBC
others could be included, from countries around the world.  One reference lists more than 80 serious nuclear power incidents.   The US’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission lists 70 incidents in the past four years in the US alone that required the NRC to send a special investigation team to the plant, or an augmented investigation team.   The Chernobyl article begins with a brief summary or overview of the facts, taken from the NRC's "Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station 1986," then commentary afterward.

Chernobyl Overview, from NRC Report, Section 4.1 (pg 124)

(quote) “The accident occurred during a test of the turbine generator system.  This test was designed to demonstrate that following a reactor trip, with the resulting loss of onsite power and isolation of the steam supply to the turbine, the rotating inertia of the turbine generator would be sufficient to generate enough electrical power to energize certain safety systems until the diesel generator system could be started and accept the electrical loads.  This test had been performed earlier at similar plants (Russian).  The specific purpose of this test was to determine if a new generator magnetic field regulator would maintain the voltage output from the generator for a longer period.

In the process of establishing the test conditions for the reactor, the operators brought the plant to an unstable operating condition.  However, for a number of reasons, the operators chose to run the test from this unstable condition.  To prevent the reactor from automatically shutting down, the operators purposely bypassed several systems important to safety.  The role of the operator in this accident is discussed in Chapter 5.

With the safety systems bypassed, the plant was in an unstable and vulnerable condition.  The most prominent parameter of this unstable condition was the positive void reactivity coefficient.  This coefficient allowed the reactivity to increase as the volume of steam increased in the core.  Other significant parameters included the low initial power level, low subcooling, low initial steam void fraction in the core, fuel burnup condition, and control system characteristics.  The design characteristics of the Chernobyl plant are detailed in Chapter 2.

The initiation of the test caused the steam volume in the core to increase.  Under the unique test conditions (for which the plant was not designed), and with the safety systems bypassed, a significant insertion [? Increase?] of reactivity resulted.  The resulting power increase produced additional steam voids which added reactivity and further increased the power.  Evaluations to date indicate the reactor was brought to a prompt critical condition.  Assessment of Soviet (and other) analyses also indicates that the energy deposition in the fuel was sufficient to melt some of the fuel.   The analyses to date suggest the following possible sequence of events.  The rapid expansion associated with melting, quickly ruptured the fuel cladding and injected fragmented and molten fuel into the coolant channel.  The interaction of the coolant with the hot fuel fragments produced steam very rapidly.  The high temperatures and rapid production of steam quickly over-pressurized the pressure tubes in the core region.   The pressure tubes then failed and over-pressured the cavity region around the graphite blocks.  Sufficient force was generated to lift the top plate off the reactor and possibly to fail the reactor building and eject core material.  This postulated sequence of events can be associated with the first “explosion” heard by operators at the plant.  A second “explosion” was reported to have occurred approximately 3 seconds after the initial one.

Various speculations on the source of this noise include a second criticality, a hydrogen detonation, or even an echo or reverberation. 

In summary, the event was caused by a combination of procedural and management deficiencies, human errors, and unique design characteristics. “  (end quote)   see link

Analysis

For the non-technical readers on SLB, a brief deconstruction of the above is in order. The test was to determine if the generators had enough inertia to keep spinning and generate power, even though steam was shut off to the turbine, to keep emergency systems energized until the diesel-powered generators could be started and brought up to speed.  

The plan was to run the reactor at part-load, which would have tripped the existing safety systems into a shut-down.  The safety systems were therefore disabled.  However, the reactor load was far below the planned load.   The reactor went into a mode that had more steam bubbles than normal, which is dangerous because steam does not slow down fission products such as neutrons.  This is the "positive void reactivity coefficient" mentioned above.  Also, the operators pulled the control rods, almost all of them, out of the reactor.   The resulting power surge caused the reactor to go critical, which melted down part of the nuclear fuel and caused not only an explosion, but the graphite parts of the reactor to catch fire.   

Radiation Worldwide

The core explosion, fire, and residual heat from the burning reactor core (that lasted several days) released huge amounts of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.  The plume of airborne particles flew high above the Earth, in a westerly and northerly direction, and tripped radiation monitors in several countries as it circled the globe.   One of the first countries the plume reached was Poland on April 26 and 27, 1986.   Almost all of Europe was impacted with radiation levels many times higher than normal.  The radiation plume eventually reached almost every northern hemisphere country. 

Personally, I was working doing consulting engineering with a contract in West Germany near Dusseldorf.  I finished the initial visit by March 1 of 1986, then returned to the US to do the office work.  A second visit to Germany in July made me quite nervous, particularly in the food we ate while there.  Everyone was very upset over the radiation cloud that rained deadly particles down on the entire continent.  

From a nuclear power plant safety standpoint, the important point is that the nuclear power industry has always insisted that their power plants are safe.  Even after Chernobyl blew up, the argument was “well, that is a Russian design and nobody has any of those.  Besides, the operators went rogue and operated the plant improperly, which made it explode.  That can never happen here.”

The proper response is, “A nuclear plant can never be made fool-proof.  Fools are just too ingenious.”   As shown in part 16 of TANP, operators in western nuclear plants make plenty of mistakes, not only in design but in operation, training, maintenance, parts replacement, security measures, even mundane chores like tightening bolts to the proper torque. 

Health Issues

At Chernobyl, 28 workers died from acute radiation poisoning within 4 months of the explosion.  Many others have died since, but a direct link to Chernobyl radiation exposure is unclear.   The World Health Organization, WHO, estimates 240,000 workers were exposed to high levels of radiation while cleaning up the radioactive debris.  Another 346,000 people were evacuated and relocated away from the radioactive zone near the plant.  see link   

WHO states that greater incidence of thyroid cancer was caused by Chernobyl.   There also is almost a doubling of leukemia cases.    In addition, the radiation caused cataracts in the eyes, increased deaths from cardio-vascular disease, mental health and psychological trauma.  

UPDATE - 6/11/2014 

So much more could be written about the Chernobyl disaster.  In fact, an internet search turns up nearly 5 million websites with the term "Chernobyl."   Hundreds of books about Chernobyl have also been written.   Until the multiple-meltdowns at Fukushima, Japan in 2011, Chernobyl was the greatest nuclear disaster of all-time.  

From an institutional safety standpoint, Chernobyl refutes many of the nuclear proponents' arguments.  First, the plant was subject to regulations in its own country, the USSR.   International regulations apparently were largely ignored.  Who is to say that future nuclear power plant operators will not do something equally devastating, especially as nuclear plants are built in more and more countries?   

Nuclear apologists or proponents are fond of saying that modern plants are secure, have safety systems and backup systems, and have designs that would never allow such an event to happen again.  That is mere talk; as mentioned in the Conclusion below, it is only too easy for operators to disable safety systems or ignore warnings, and run the plant in manual mode.   What is also apparent from the NRC report linked above is the very, very rapid change from quasi-normal operation to reactor criticality, meltdown and explosion.  At Chernobyl, the change required only a few seconds.  Operators tried desperately to insert some of the control rods, but it was too late.  

It is also clear from the NRC even reports that many, if not all nuclear plants in the US run some of their systems in manual mode at times.  Nothing can be made to run forever, as parts degrade and fail and must be replaced or repaired.  A control system normally has an automatic mode and a manual mode, and only well-trained operators should be allowed to run the systems in manual mode.  

What is also apparent from Chernobyl is the industry did not speak out in a timely manner about what happened and the risk to other countries from the radioactive cloud that was headed their way.  It is true that the operators in the plant had more things on their mind right about then, if they were still alive after the explosion.   However, it was radiation detectors in other countries that first gave the alarm internationally.   The extent and magnitude of the event was not known for days.  The psychological impact on billions of people was not small.   What of the parents of small children, who needed to drink milk?  What worries did couples have about future children?  What worries did other people have about radiation sickness, or long-term illnesses such as thyroid cancer and other cancers?    

The next two articles in TANP discuss two more disasters involving core meltdowns: Three Mile Island and Fukushima.  In both instances, like at Chernobyl, a combination of bad design and human error caused major disaster.  Fukushima was a bit more complex because a natural disaster, and earthquake with tsunami initiated the events.  

-- end update

Conclusion

Nuclear power advocates insist that the plants are safe, that modern designs cannot have catastrophic meltdowns.  However, it is clear that human error can easily defeat the best designs, and natural events can overwhelm even the best operators.  Chernobyl operated quite safely until human plans and human errors created the enormous disaster that affected millions of people around the world.

--------------- End of 2014 article on Chernobyl ---------------

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
copyrignt © 2016 by Roger Sowell, all rights reserved


Thursday, July 3, 2014

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 26

Subtitle: Evacuation Plans are Required at Nuclear Plants

In recognition of all the safety issues and dangers from operating nuclear power plants, the US government requires each nuclear plant owner to prepare and publish emergency plans to ensure public safety in the event of an emergency.  Such an emergency plan was put into action in 1979 near Three Mile Island during the reactor core meltdown.   In Japan
Chernobyl radiation plume, extent and severity
at Fukushima in 2011, another massive evacuation was performed for several miles around the plant after the reactor meltdowns.  A US navy aircraft carrier near Fukushima increased its distance from the plant to avoid the radioactive plume.   The radiation plume from the Chernobyl reactor meltdown and explosion covered an entire continent – Europe.  The radiation was strongest close to the plant and decreased somewhat with distance.   (see map nearby). 


From the NRC’s backgrounder on emergency preparedness, “[b]efore a plant is licensed to operate, the NRC must have “reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.” The NRC’s decision of reasonable assurance is based on licensees complying with NRC regulations and guidance. In addition, licensees and area response organizations must demonstrate they can effectively implement emergency plans and procedures during periodic evaluated exercises.”

Also, “[f]or planning purposes, the NRC defines two emergency planning zones (EPZs) around each nuclear power plant. The exact size and configuration of the zones vary from plant to plant due to local emergency response needs and capabilities, population, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries. The two types of EPZs are:

1) The plume exposure pathway EPZ extends about 10 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary
concern is the exposure of the public to, and the inhalation of, airborne radioactive contamination.

2) The ingestion pathway EPZ extends about 50 miles in radius around a plant. Its primary concern is the ingestion of food and liquid that is contaminated by radioactivity.”

The NRC also classifies each emergency event into four categories of increasing severity.  From the backgrounder, “[e]mergency Classification is a set of plant conditions which indicate a level of risk to the public. Nuclear power plants use the four emergency classifications listed below in order of increasing severity.

1) Notification of Unusual Event - Under this category, events are in process or have occurred which indicate potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. No release of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring is expected unless further degradation occurs.

2) Alert - If an alert is declared, events are in process or have occurred that involve an actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of safety of the plant. Any releases of radioactive material from the plant are expected to be limited to a small fraction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guides (PAGs).

3) Site Area Emergency - A site area emergency involves events in process or which have occurred that result in actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Any releases of radioactive material are not expected to exceed the EPA PAGs except near the site boundary.

4) General Emergency - A general emergency involves actual or imminent substantial core damage or melting of reactor fuel with the potential for loss of containment integrity. Radioactive releases during a general emergency can reasonably be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs for more than the immediate site area.”

Finally, more from the backgrounder on additional information: “[d]etailed information about emergency preparedness is contained in NRC regulations, specifically Appendix E to Part 50 of Title 10 in the Code of Federal Regulations and in NUREG-0654 (FEMA-REP-1), a joint publication of the NRC and FEMA published in November 1980, entitled “Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.” These documents along with additional information on the NRC’s Emergency Preparedness and Response programs is available on the NRC Web site at:”  (see link).

The official evacuation zone around a nuclear reactor is divided into concentric circles with a 2 mile radius, 5 miles, and 10 miles.   (corresponding roughly to 3, 7, and 15 kilometers).   However, for a catastrophic release, the General Emergency from above, and appropriate wind conditions, one can envision attempting to evacuate a large city.  For example, Houston lies only approximately 70 miles northeast of the South Texas Nuclear Plant.  Houston has more than 6 million people in the metropolitan area (Woodlands – Houston – Sugar Land).  An attempt to evacuate millions of people from Houston was made only a few years ago due to the arrival of a hurricane.  The evacuation was a complete failure, with thousands of vehicles stranded and running out of fuel on highways that were blocked for hours. ( see link for description of Houston evacuation in 2005)   San Antonio, with approximately 2.3 million, lies just to the north and west of the South Texas Nuclear Plant.    

The Dallas-Ft. Worth metroplex, with almost 7 million people, lies only approximately 60 miles northeast of another twin-reactor plant near Glen Rose, the Comanche Peak plant.   There are many, many other nuclear plants located within similar distances to major population centers in the US.  

If nuclear power was as safe as its proponents insist, there would be no need for federal regulations describing and requiring evacuation plans.

Previous Articles

The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.

Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 













Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty Six - this article

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion


Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell
Marina del Rey, California








Wednesday, July 2, 2014

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 25

Subtitle: Price-Anderson Act Gives Too Much Protection to Nuclear Plants

[UPDATE 7/3/2014-  India has its own problems with its version of nuclear liability law.  See near end of article. -- end update]

In an earlier article in The Truth About Nuclear Power series, (part 13 see link), several forms of government subsidy for nuclear power were discussed.  This article discusses one of those subsidies in more detail, the Price-Anderson Act by which government assumes the liability from a large nuclear accident, after industry reaches the stated cap on its liability.  To encourage the nuclear industry to build any plants at all, the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act.

Even as early as the 1950s, the nuclear industry was aware of the catastrophic nature of a nuclear accident, a meltdown due to a loss-of-cooling-accident, radiation released into the atmosphere or water, and the potential for hundreds of thousands of deaths or even many, many more.    Industrial insurance underwriters also were keenly aware of the risks, and had their premiums adjusted accordingly.  Utilities that wanted to enter the nuclear power business realized quickly that they could not afford to build the plants, plus pay for insurance premiums.  The price for their nuclear-based power would be prohibitive – and the adverse publicity would be devastating.  One can imagine the headlines: “Nuclear Disaster Insurance Increases Electricity Prices to Unaffordable Levels.”  Or, some similar headline.  

Subsequent events have shown that such nuclear calamity is not only possible, but extremely deadly.  Three major events have happened to date, at Three Mile Island in 1979 with a reactor core partially melting down, Chernobyl in 1986 with a core explosion, and Fukushima Dai-ichi in 2011 with three reactors melted down and four containment buildings exploded.    With hundreds of reactors operating world-wide and almost one hundred more either planned or under construction, more meltdown disasters are inevitable.  

With the economic consequences in mind, the industry asked for relief from Congress, and Congress responded with the Price-Anderson Act in 1957.    The language of the Act mentions “extraordinary liability that companies would incur if a nuclear accident were to happen…”    The extraordinary liability is a result of nuclear activities being classified as an ultrahazardous activity.  These activities are defined as an activity that cannot be made safe even with the utmost care taken.   Examples include the use and storage of of explosives, blasting such as in mining or quarrying, use, storage and transport of certain chemicals, nuclear materials used in medicine and industry, and nuclear power reactors. 

Note that most of these activities have existed long before nuclear energy was discovered.   The concept of an ultrahazardous activity is not new; it is merely the proper category in which nuclear energy must be placed.    The person or company that engages in ultrahazardous activities bears the risk of any harm to persons or property from that activity - with very limited legal defenses to liability.  He also carries insurance to limit his own risk.  However, for nuclear power plants, the insurance is simply unaffordable – except as provided for under the Act. 

An example from my own industrial experience deals with the use and storage of a certain thermally-unstable chemical.   The chemical was a liquid, and was used as an initiator in the production of PVC resin from vinyl chloride monomer.   The chemical was packaged in a plastic cube surrounded by cardboard, approximately one foot on each side.  The boxes of initiator were stored in a dugout-style bunker with stout walls and a flimsy roof, the entire room kept at below freezing temperature.  The nature of the initiator was that it was stable when very cold, but would explode when warmed to something below ambient temperature.   A description from an initiator supplier states it is a “refrigerated organic peroxide undergoing self-accelerating thermal decomposition below room temperature.”     My company did not have, nor did it require, an act of Congress to limit the liability from using the explosive initiator.   Nuclear power is far, far more dangerous than that explosive liquid. 

The words of the Price-Anderson Act are excerpted below:

“Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 to ensure that adequate funds would be available to compensate victims of a nuclear accident. It also recognized that the risk of extraordinary liability that companies would incur if a nuclear accident were to happen would render insurance costs prohibitively high, and thwart the development of nuclear energy.  
. . . 
The Price-Anderson Act requires owners of commercial reactors to assume all liability for damages to the public resulting from an ``extraordinary nuclear occurrence'' and to waive most legal defenses they would otherwise have. However, in exchange, their liability will be limited to capped amounts established in the Act.”   – Re-Authorization of the Price-Anderson Act, December 9, 2003, Senate Report 108-218.  

The Act is all that stands between nuclear plants and total shutdown, immediately.  Without it, no nuclear plant would assume the risk of $2 trillion – or more – in damages from an “extraordinary nuclear occurrence” – a meltdown and subsequent deaths of millions of people. 

As mentioned earlier, the US has narrowly escaped such an incident at Three Mile Island in 1979, where only by sheer dumb luck did clueless plant operators turn on a water injection pump just before the nuclear fuel melted all the way through the reactor walls.   The operators had no clue what they were doing, and actually turned off a water pump earlier in the day that could have prevented the meltdown.  The meltdown eroded almost all the way through the reactor walls.   This incident was discussed in some detail in Part 21 -- see link. 

If an accident occurs, and a million people were to die from radiation, liability would be approximately $7 million per each death, using the US EPA’s value of a statistical life.    That alone is $7 trillion, for a single incident.  There are many nuclear reactors close to population centers that each contain millions of people: near Miami: Turkey Point and St. Lucie, near Atlanta: Vogtle and Hatch, along the northeast corridor: Three Mile Island (where one reactor melted down but the other continues to operate to this day),  North Anna, Surry, Calvert Cliffs, Salem, Limerick, Peach Bottom, Susquehanna, Indian Point, and Millstone, near Chicago: LaSalle, Braidwood, Byron, Dresden, and Quad Cities, near Dallas: Comanche Peak, near San Francisco: Diablo Canyon, and near Phoenix: Palo Verde (a triple-reactor plant).   Note that many of the sites listed have two reactors, although some have a single reactor. 

Even if a settlement could be reached with each decedent’s estate for $1 million each, a million victims would still require a payout of $1 trillion.  It can be seen then, why no nuclear power plants would be built with that amount of potential liability.  As the preface to the Price-Anderson Act states, [Congress] “recognized that the risk of extraordinary liability that companies would incur if a nuclear accident were to happen would render insurance costs prohibitively high, and thwart the development of nuclear energy.” 

Insurance for Liability 

The Act requires each nuclear power plant to carry $300 million in liability insurance for each reactor.  

“First, each licensed reactor must carry the maximum amount of insurance commercially available to pay any damages from a severe nuclear accident. That amount is currently $300 million.”  -- the Act

Excess Damages beyond Insurance Amount

Excess damages, beyond $300 million, are covered up to approximately $10 billion by requiring all covered commercial reactors to pay up to approximately $100 million each; with approximately 100 US reactors, the total reaches $10 billion.   The Act states:

“Any damages exceeding that amount are to be assessed equally against all covered commercial reactors, up to $95.8 million per reactor (most recently adjusted for inflation by NRC in August 2004).Those assessments would be paid at an annual rate of no more than $10 million per reactor. According to the NRC, all of the nation’s 103 commercial reactors are currently covered by the Price-Anderson retrospective premium requirement.

Funding for public compensation following a major nuclear incident would therefore include the $300 million in insurance coverage carried by the reactor that suffered the incident, plus the$95.8 million in retrospective premiums from each of the 103 currently covered reactors, totaling $10.2 billion. On top of those payments, a 5 percent surcharge may also be imposed, raising the total per-reactor retrospective premium to $100.6 million and the total potential compensation for each incident to about $10.7 billion.

Under Price-Anderson, the nuclear industry’s liability for an incident is capped at that amount, which varies depending on the number of covered reactors, amount of available insurance, and an inflation adjustment that is made every 5 years.”  -- The Act

Excess Damages Beyond $10 Billion

For a large event with damages beyond $10 billion, the US government assumes the amount above $10 billion.  

“The Act provides that in the event that actual damages from an accident are in excess of this amount, [$10.7 billion] Congress will ‘‘thoroughly review’’ the incident and take such action as is necessary to provide ‘‘full and prompt compensation to the public.’’ "  -- Price-Anderson Act

Conclusion

The very existence of nuclear power plants depends on Congress renewing the Price-Anderson Act as it periodically expires.  Without the government assuming the excess liability, nuclear plants would shut down immediately.  No utility company has resources of $1 trillion, and certainly cannot buy insurance in that amount.  The Act is the single largest subsidy for nuclear power, greater than loan guarantees ($8 billion roughly for each reactor), the carbon tax on coal plants that benefits nuclear plants due to their “carbon free” power production, no lawsuits being permitted during construction (a limited exception applies), increased electricity prices during nuclear plant construction to avoid paying interest on loans, and operating safety regulations routinely relaxed to allow nuclear plants to continue operating without meeting safety standards. 

It is a struggle to think of any other industry that enjoys such a government benefit: what other industry would shut down tomorrow if its uninsurable risks were not borne by the government?    The risks are so great, and the cost of insurance is just too high for the nuclear power industry to compete, or even exist, without the comfortable cushion of the Price-Anderson Act.  

Indeed, that raises the question: are nuclear plant operators too comfortable, too complacent, due to the certain knowledge that any catastrophic event will be paid first by $300 million in insurance, and then cost them only $100 million each?  Any amount over and beyond those limits will be paid for by the US Government.   Perhaps nuclear plants would pay more attention to safety, and operating procedures if they knew the plant would shut down or be sold at auction to pay the damages.   Perhaps the nuclear industry would be much more self-policing if the limits were $20 billion for each reactor, not the $100 million that exists today.   (see link to part 16 for a description of near misses in US reactors over the previous four years) 

[UPDATE 7/3/2014:  India has its own problems with apportioning civil liability from a nuclear disaster.  A Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Law is nearing completion, but it places risk and costs on equipment suppliers for latent or patent defects, plus inferior service (e.g. installation work).  Understandably, nuclear reactor suppliers are not happy.  see link.   -- end update ]

Previous Articles

The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.

Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 













Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty Five - this article

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion


Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell
Marina del Rey, California