Subtitle: $8 Million Is Too Costly to Study Nuclear-Caused Cancer
The NRC has cancelled an $8 million study that would have determined, then published, the statistics on greater-than-normal incidences of diseases among persons, especially children, living within close distances of nuclear power plants. The technology and data is available for the study, but NRC chose not to allocate funding to the study. Predictably, nuclear advocates cheered, and nuclear opponents are disappointed. see link to the article.
An earlier (1991) study of health effects near nuclear plants was fatally flawed by design, and its results are not surprising.
Quoting the article: "Among the 1991 study’s many problems, according to scientists who were designing the new probe:
•"It tracked mortality rates based on where people died, rather than where they lived before getting cancer. That makes it hard to determine true lifetime exposure.
• "It tracked deaths, rather than total cancer cases. That may downplay the full health impact of living near a reactor, since many cancer patients survive.
• "It used countywide data to reach conclusions – a blunt instrument that may again downplay the impact on those living closest to a reactor. Residents in La Habra and San Clemente live in the same county – but few would argue that they had the same exposure to San Onofre. (Note, San Clemente is only a few miles from SONGS, while La Habra is approximately 40 miles away.)
"To remedy all that, the NRC asked the NAS (National Academy of Science) to evaluate cancer diagnosis rates, not just cancer deaths; and to explore how to divide the areas around nuclear facilities into geographical units smaller than counties. The NAS made no bones about the effort being difficult and time-consuming, but said it could be done."
This is certainly an area where citizen volunteers - qualified and motivated - should step forward to perform this study pro-bono. However, it is a shame that the US government cannot find the $8 million to perform the initial study of 7 reactors. In an era where government spending, and borrowing, is full of studies for irrelevant issues, this one is certainly deserving of funding.
See this link for a more detailed article on nuclear power and radiation health effects.
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
Copyright (c) 2015 by Roger Sowell, all rights reserved
Showing posts with label SONGS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SONGS. Show all posts
Sunday, September 13, 2015
Sunday, June 29, 2014
The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 23
Subtitle: San Onofre Shutdown Saga
The twin-reactor nuclear power plant at San Onofre, California, known as SONGS (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station), is now shutdown after a project to replace worn steam generators resulted in premature tube leaks that released a small amount of radioactive steam to the atmosphere. The plant's majority owner, Southern California
Edison, SCE, chose to shut down the plant permanently rather than determine the cause of the premature failure and correct the problem. More on the details of the technical side may be found in Part Ten, see link, and in Part 16, see link.
The reasons for choosing a different design for the worn steam generators, and the economic aftermath for ratepayers and utility shareholders are the subject of this article, Part 23 in the series.
Choosing a Bad Design
The NRC has two separate paths for allowing replacement parts at a nuclear power plant: 1) like-for-like, where the new part is so nearly identical to the old part that a comprehensive design review is not required, and 2) differences between the new and old parts are substantial, and a comprehensive design review is required. SCE informed NRC that the new steam generators, two each for each reactor at SONGS, were like-for-like. That turned out not to be true. A couple of differences were 1) more tubes in the new steam generators, and 2) each tube had a slightly smaller internal diameter.
A utility company is in business for profit, and tries to make more profit where it can and is legally permitted to do so. Even at a nuclear plant, opportunities occur to increase profits. One way to increase profit is to increase the plant's output. As with most process plants, it is normally not economically attractive to replace a constraining part because the increased benefits are small while the added costs for replacing the part are large. A constraining part in a nuclear power plant could be, for example, a steam generator or steam turbine.
That economic computation changes, however, when a part is so worn that it must be replaced to stay in business. At that point, engineers can perform an incremental project analysis to determine if the part can be replaced with a somewhat larger part that produces more profit. Due to economies of scale, making the part only a few percent larger can cost very little extra. For example, making a steam generator 5 percent larger in surface area could produce perhaps 5 percent more electrical output. This is not a hypothetical, as some nuclear plants across the US have increased their generating capacity to a few percent above the design capacity. This is very likely what SCE was trying to accomplish at SONGS.
Where SCE erred was choosing the new design for the steam generators. The design turned out to have more vibration so that adjacent tubes banged into each other, rubbing metal away so that tube walls thinned and holes formed. The holes allowed the radioactive water to leak into the steam system. Safety was compromised, and the NRC was correct in stopping SCE from running the plants until the problem was resolved.
Economic Consequences
This entire episode was also described in a newspaper article which is actually not badly written. (This is high praise from me, as most newspaper articles on technical subjects get it very wrong.) see link
The utility wanted approximately $4.7 billion in compensation from the California Public Utility Commission, CPUC, for making the utility whole. The customers, or ratepayers, would pay the entire amount in the utility's request. However, ratepayer advocates negotiated a reduced amount - but not by much. The settlement agreement provides for $1.4 billion reduction, leaving $3.3 billion for ratepayers. The CPUC will make a decision on who pays how much for what. The basics of the proposed settlement can be found here -- see link.
The higher, policy argument is this: should a monopoly utility be rewarded for making stupid economic decisions? In this case with SONGS, the amount in question is only $4.7 billion. SCE is a huge utility, with a bit more than $12 billion in annual revenue, $45 billion in assets, 5 million customer accounts serving 14 million customers, transmission peak of 22,500 MW, and employing approximately 13,000 people. (source: SCE Annual Report 2013)
As the LA Times article (linked above) noted, this proposed settlement is akin to bailing out the banks in the economic crisis of 2008-2009. As ratepayer advocates stated, it is simply wrong to reward bad behavior by a utility. In my own words, somebody should give a utility reason to pause, think it over, and realize that jobs will be lost and the company will suffer for taking such a great risk. SCE could have easily ordered identical new steam generators, the same as the ones that ran perfectly well for 20-plus years. That would have been the no-risk alternative. Instead, the new design was chosen (perhaps) to increase plant output and profit.
It is the CPUC's job to look out for the ratepayer. One hopes that the settlement agreement is not accepted, and the utility is forced to bear the entire costs of making a stupid decision.
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
The twin-reactor nuclear power plant at San Onofre, California, known as SONGS (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station), is now shutdown after a project to replace worn steam generators resulted in premature tube leaks that released a small amount of radioactive steam to the atmosphere. The plant's majority owner, Southern California
 |
| SONGS Nuclear plant aerial view Pacific Ocean at bottom, Interstate 5 at top source: Wikipedia |
The reasons for choosing a different design for the worn steam generators, and the economic aftermath for ratepayers and utility shareholders are the subject of this article, Part 23 in the series.
Choosing a Bad Design
The NRC has two separate paths for allowing replacement parts at a nuclear power plant: 1) like-for-like, where the new part is so nearly identical to the old part that a comprehensive design review is not required, and 2) differences between the new and old parts are substantial, and a comprehensive design review is required. SCE informed NRC that the new steam generators, two each for each reactor at SONGS, were like-for-like. That turned out not to be true. A couple of differences were 1) more tubes in the new steam generators, and 2) each tube had a slightly smaller internal diameter.
A utility company is in business for profit, and tries to make more profit where it can and is legally permitted to do so. Even at a nuclear plant, opportunities occur to increase profits. One way to increase profit is to increase the plant's output. As with most process plants, it is normally not economically attractive to replace a constraining part because the increased benefits are small while the added costs for replacing the part are large. A constraining part in a nuclear power plant could be, for example, a steam generator or steam turbine.
That economic computation changes, however, when a part is so worn that it must be replaced to stay in business. At that point, engineers can perform an incremental project analysis to determine if the part can be replaced with a somewhat larger part that produces more profit. Due to economies of scale, making the part only a few percent larger can cost very little extra. For example, making a steam generator 5 percent larger in surface area could produce perhaps 5 percent more electrical output. This is not a hypothetical, as some nuclear plants across the US have increased their generating capacity to a few percent above the design capacity. This is very likely what SCE was trying to accomplish at SONGS.
Where SCE erred was choosing the new design for the steam generators. The design turned out to have more vibration so that adjacent tubes banged into each other, rubbing metal away so that tube walls thinned and holes formed. The holes allowed the radioactive water to leak into the steam system. Safety was compromised, and the NRC was correct in stopping SCE from running the plants until the problem was resolved.
Economic Consequences
This entire episode was also described in a newspaper article which is actually not badly written. (This is high praise from me, as most newspaper articles on technical subjects get it very wrong.) see link
The utility wanted approximately $4.7 billion in compensation from the California Public Utility Commission, CPUC, for making the utility whole. The customers, or ratepayers, would pay the entire amount in the utility's request. However, ratepayer advocates negotiated a reduced amount - but not by much. The settlement agreement provides for $1.4 billion reduction, leaving $3.3 billion for ratepayers. The CPUC will make a decision on who pays how much for what. The basics of the proposed settlement can be found here -- see link.
The higher, policy argument is this: should a monopoly utility be rewarded for making stupid economic decisions? In this case with SONGS, the amount in question is only $4.7 billion. SCE is a huge utility, with a bit more than $12 billion in annual revenue, $45 billion in assets, 5 million customer accounts serving 14 million customers, transmission peak of 22,500 MW, and employing approximately 13,000 people. (source: SCE Annual Report 2013)
As the LA Times article (linked above) noted, this proposed settlement is akin to bailing out the banks in the economic crisis of 2008-2009. As ratepayer advocates stated, it is simply wrong to reward bad behavior by a utility. In my own words, somebody should give a utility reason to pause, think it over, and realize that jobs will be lost and the company will suffer for taking such a great risk. SCE could have easily ordered identical new steam generators, the same as the ones that ran perfectly well for 20-plus years. That would have been the no-risk alternative. Instead, the new design was chosen (perhaps) to increase plant output and profit.
It is the CPUC's job to look out for the ratepayer. One hopes that the settlement agreement is not accepted, and the utility is forced to bear the entire costs of making a stupid decision.
Previous Articles
The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen) safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two) nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five) the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act. Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them. Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.
The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen) safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two) nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five) the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act. Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them. Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article.
Additional articles will be linked as they are published.
Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete
Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct
Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water
Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant
Part Six – Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs
Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power
Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants
Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules
Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go
Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term
Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term
Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe
Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things
Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown And Explosion
Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979
Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen
Part Twenty Three - this article
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much
Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants
Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
Thursday, May 15, 2014
San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant Threatened by Wildfire
Subtitle: Power Outage Doomed Fukushima - is San Onofre Next?
The nuclear power plant in San Onofre in Southern California, now shut down permanently, today announced it was evacuating non-essential personnel in advance of a wildfire that threatens the plant. see link.
From the article, "The fires do not pose a safety issue at San Onofre at this time, but we continue to coordinate with regional agencies to ensure we remain apprised of evolving conditions." This is code-speak for "these wildfires can get out of hand quickly, with the high temperatures and high winds."
With the San Onofre plant shut down, there are still electrical loads to maintain cooling water pumps in service that keep spent fuel in the cooling pools sufficiently cool. This was a problem at Fukushima, as they had no electrical power after the earthquake and tsunami, and their emergency generators were flooded.
It would not take much for the wildfires to burn near or under the transmission lines that bring power to the San Onofre plant. It is certainly hoped that this does not happen. But, if it were to happen, it is also hoped that the plant management has ample supplies of diesel fuel with which to run the emergency generators to keep the spent fuel properly cooled.
The last thing California needs is a nuclear radiation release from San Onofre, with the resulting evacuation of millions of local residents.
Someone should put in a call to Chevron, or ExxonMobil, or one of the other oil companies, and order up a couple of tank-trucks of diesel fuel to be brought on-site and kept there just in case.
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
The nuclear power plant in San Onofre in Southern California, now shut down permanently, today announced it was evacuating non-essential personnel in advance of a wildfire that threatens the plant. see link.
From the article, "The fires do not pose a safety issue at San Onofre at this time, but we continue to coordinate with regional agencies to ensure we remain apprised of evolving conditions." This is code-speak for "these wildfires can get out of hand quickly, with the high temperatures and high winds."
With the San Onofre plant shut down, there are still electrical loads to maintain cooling water pumps in service that keep spent fuel in the cooling pools sufficiently cool. This was a problem at Fukushima, as they had no electrical power after the earthquake and tsunami, and their emergency generators were flooded.
It would not take much for the wildfires to burn near or under the transmission lines that bring power to the San Onofre plant. It is certainly hoped that this does not happen. But, if it were to happen, it is also hoped that the plant management has ample supplies of diesel fuel with which to run the emergency generators to keep the spent fuel properly cooled.
The last thing California needs is a nuclear radiation release from San Onofre, with the resulting evacuation of millions of local residents.
Someone should put in a call to Chevron, or ExxonMobil, or one of the other oil companies, and order up a couple of tank-trucks of diesel fuel to be brought on-site and kept there just in case.
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
Wednesday, April 9, 2014
The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part Ten
Subtitle: Nuclear plants require costly upgrades after 20 to
30 years
 |
| Steam generators inside containment structure Purple-cutaway view. source: NRC |
One of the favorite arguments of the nuclear proponents is
that, even though a nuclear plant costs more to build, it lasts for 60
years. The second part of the statement
is not true, although the first part is definitely true. Equipment wears out, and must be replaced at
significant cost. As an example, the
pressurized water reactors, PWR, have an expensive heat exchanger – the steam
generator – that suffers tube degradation over time. see image. NRC requirements cause these steam generators
to be replaced when tube degradation reaches a certain level. For some plants, the replacement works. At California’s San Onofre plant – SONGS –
however, four replacement steam generators failed recently very soon after
startup. The plant owner, Southern
California Edison, SCE, elected to shut down the plant permanently rather than
complete the steps required by the NRC to ensure the steam generators could be
repaired and operate safely.
Details of the SONGS steam generator troubles can be found at
the NRC website: see link.
The NRC described the tube degradation as “unexpected.” Apparently, the type of tube wear and
degradation is one that has never been witnessed before. The
tube wear was due to adjacent tubes rubbing against each other, and tubes
rubbing against retainer bars. The safety concern, unique to nuclear power
plants using the PWR design, is a sudden loss of main steam header pressure. In the words of the NRC, this is a main steam
line break. The reason this is a safety
concern is that radioactive hot water under high pressure flows on the inside
of the tubes in the steam generator. At
a somewhat lower pressure, water flows on the outside of the tubes. The water on the outside of the tubes is
heated, boils, and turns to steam (hence the name, steam generator). The tube walls must retain their strength to
prevent leaks of the radioactive water through the tubes and into the steam
system. The steam system's pipes run outside
the containment building, into the steam turbine, and from there steam flows
into the condenser. With both systems operating normally,
pressurized radioactive water on the inside of the tubes, and lower pressure water/steam on the outside, the tubes have an easier task in keeping the
two water systems separate. But, if a
main steam line breaks, the pressure difference across the tube walls increases
suddenly and dramatically. Weak tubes
would, of course, fail and send radioactive water and steam into the
atmosphere. This is unacceptable, but is
a natural consequence of choosing to generate power using nuclear fission as
the heat source.
Indeed, this is exactly what happened at SONGS when the new
steam generators sprung a leak, radioactive water entered the steam system, and
a small amount of radioactive steam was released into the atmosphere. See link As required, SCE shut down the plant to
investigate.
The sticking point in the order from NRC to SCE was this: “SCE
will determine the causes of tube-to-tube interaction and implement actions to prevent
recurrence of loss of integrity in the Unit 3 steam generator tubes while
operating.” That is a most reasonable
requirement, find out what happened, and implement steps to make sure it does
not happen again. SCE, however, either
could not, or would not take the time and expense to determine the causes. Instead, SCE shut down both reactors in the
plant.
It should be noted that minor tube wear is normal and
expected. Indeed, with the more than
9,000 individual tubes in one steam generator, a tube that is near failure due
to excessive wear can be plugged to remove it from service. The difference in this case was the rapid
tube wear so very soon after the new steam generators were placed in
service. The original steam generators
lasted not quite 30 years, as the SONGS reactors came online in 1983 and 1984, and
the steam generators were replaced around 2010.
The radioactive steam leak occurred in January, 2012.
There is much more to the story of the leaking tubes at SONGS. As time permits, that story will be told. It involves SCE trying to obtain an extension to the operating permit by claiming the replacement steam generators were sufficiently similar to the original equipment to qualify for "like-for-like" status, when the new steam generators were not "like-for-like." A United States Senator became involved. A re-licensing procedure would have been lengthy and the plant would be shut down for the duration of that procedure.
In addition, the 2000 MW of electricity was lost to the grid, and had to be replaced somehow. A part of that story is related at this link. The good news is that at least 75 MW of the power must be from energy storage systems. That will provide a significant boost to the grid-scale energy storage firms.
Other nuclear plants also have been in the news due to tube
wear and degradation, including the St. Lucie plant in Florida. See link Also, the Watts Bar plant has suffered tube
wear and has ordered replacement steam generators. Finally, the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in
Ohio is replacing its steam generators, also.
It’s an exciting time.
How many more nuclear plants will go the way of SONGS, due to faulty
replacement steam generators that have tubes wear on each other?
Conclusion
It can be seen, then, that the nuclear power
plant in California lasted a bit less than 30 years, not the 50 or 60 years as
nuclear proponents claim. Nuclear plants require costly upgrades after
20 to 30 years, but the anticipated added life does not always appear.
Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links. Additional articles will be linked as they are published.
Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete
Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct
Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water
Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant
Part Six – Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs
Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power
Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules
Part Ten - this article
Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go
Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands
Part Thirteen - Nuclear Plants Are Heavily Subsidized
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term
Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe
Part Thirteen - Nuclear Plants Are Heavily Subsidized
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term
Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe
Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things
Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion
Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979
Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen
Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion
Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979
Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen
Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear
Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much
Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants
Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process
Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream
Part Thirty - Conclusion
Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process
Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream
Part Thirty - Conclusion
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
Thursday, April 3, 2014
California PUC Orders Replacement Power for Shut Down Nuclear Plant
California Public Utility Commission requires two utilities in Southern California to procure power that is either renewable, demand response resources, or energy efficiency to replace that which was removed when the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was closed due to premature tube failure. Also, at least 75 MW of the new power must be from storage systems.
More on this later, as this requires some contemplation, research, and reflection. Text of the press release follows. (see link for press release)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PRESS RELEASE
Media Contact: Terrie Prosper, 415.703.1366, news@cpuc.ca.gov Docket #: R.12-03-014
CPUC ACTS TO ENSURE ENERGY RELIABILITY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO, March 13, 2014 - The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), in its
ongoing mission to ensure safe and reliable utility service to customers, today directed Southern
California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) to procure energy supplies to meet
Southern California needs, including from preferred resources (such as renewable power, Demand
Response resources, and energy efficiency) or energy storage.
SCE was ordered to procure between 500 and 700 megawatts (MW), and SDG&E to procure
between 500 and 800 MW by 2022 to meet local capacity needs stemming from the retired San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
Said Commissioner Mike Florio, who is the assigned Commissioner for the Long-Term Procurement
Proceeding, “This groundbreaking decision begins the process of acquiring new resources to replace
the 2,200 megawatts that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station would have supplied. It
authorizes SCE and SDG&E to procure up to 1,500 megawatts of new resources, at least 600
megawatts of which must be from California’s preferred resources, namely renewable power,
Demand Response resources, and energy efficiency. The CPUC and the utilities will work to ensure
going forward that preferred resources can provide not just clean energy, but the essential reliability
services that are needed to ensure a stable and reliable grid. This will put us firmly on the path
toward meeting California’s greenhouse gas reduction goals by eventually phasing out the use of
fossil fuels to generate electricity.”
Added CPUC President Michael R. Peevey, “This action helps us move forward in meeting the electricity needs of Southern California now that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station is
permanently closed. Our combination of preferred resources and some more conventional generation
will help in making a more secure energy future for Southern California consumers.”
Said Commissioner Catherine J.K. Sandoval, “The shutdown of San Onofre was significant and
unforeseen, but opened up opportunities for new technologies to take its place. Up to 1,500
megawatts of the generation authorized to replace San Onofre can come from energy efficiency,
Demand Response, renewable energy, and energy storage, in line with California’s vision for a
healthier environment and economic sustainability. This decision provides flexibility while fulfilling
the CPUC’s duty to ensure safe and reliable service at just and reasonable rates.”
Said Commissioner Michael Picker, “Keeping the lights on is not just about comfort; it’s about
safety and it’s about keeping our economy strong. The procurement plan that the CPUC adopted
today is prudent and necessary for San Diego and south Orange County as we move forward from
San Onofre and close many of the very old, dirty, and faltering natural gas plants in the area.”
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
 |
| San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station San Onofre, California source: wikipedia |
More on this later, as this requires some contemplation, research, and reflection. Text of the press release follows. (see link for press release)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PRESS RELEASE
Media Contact: Terrie Prosper, 415.703.1366, news@cpuc.ca.gov Docket #: R.12-03-014
CPUC ACTS TO ENSURE ENERGY RELIABILITY IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO, March 13, 2014 - The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), in its
ongoing mission to ensure safe and reliable utility service to customers, today directed Southern
California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) to procure energy supplies to meet
Southern California needs, including from preferred resources (such as renewable power, Demand
Response resources, and energy efficiency) or energy storage.
SCE was ordered to procure between 500 and 700 megawatts (MW), and SDG&E to procure
between 500 and 800 MW by 2022 to meet local capacity needs stemming from the retired San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
Said Commissioner Mike Florio, who is the assigned Commissioner for the Long-Term Procurement
Proceeding, “This groundbreaking decision begins the process of acquiring new resources to replace
the 2,200 megawatts that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station would have supplied. It
authorizes SCE and SDG&E to procure up to 1,500 megawatts of new resources, at least 600
megawatts of which must be from California’s preferred resources, namely renewable power,
Demand Response resources, and energy efficiency. The CPUC and the utilities will work to ensure
going forward that preferred resources can provide not just clean energy, but the essential reliability
services that are needed to ensure a stable and reliable grid. This will put us firmly on the path
toward meeting California’s greenhouse gas reduction goals by eventually phasing out the use of
fossil fuels to generate electricity.”
Added CPUC President Michael R. Peevey, “This action helps us move forward in meeting the electricity needs of Southern California now that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station is
permanently closed. Our combination of preferred resources and some more conventional generation
will help in making a more secure energy future for Southern California consumers.”
Said Commissioner Catherine J.K. Sandoval, “The shutdown of San Onofre was significant and
unforeseen, but opened up opportunities for new technologies to take its place. Up to 1,500
megawatts of the generation authorized to replace San Onofre can come from energy efficiency,
Demand Response, renewable energy, and energy storage, in line with California’s vision for a
healthier environment and economic sustainability. This decision provides flexibility while fulfilling
the CPUC’s duty to ensure safe and reliable service at just and reasonable rates.”
Said Commissioner Michael Picker, “Keeping the lights on is not just about comfort; it’s about
safety and it’s about keeping our economy strong. The procurement plan that the CPUC adopted
today is prudent and necessary for San Diego and south Orange County as we move forward from
San Onofre and close many of the very old, dirty, and faltering natural gas plants in the area.”
Today’s decision, combined with prior CPUC decisions aimed at ensuring energy supplies for
Southern California, brings a total of 1,900 to 2,500 megawatts to the L.A. Basin from SCE, up to 60
percent of which may come from preferred resources. SDG&E is required to procure at least 25
percent and up to 100 percent of new local capacity from preferred resources. SCE and SDG&E are
required to procure at least 50 megawatts and 25 megawatts, respectively, from energy storage. The
CPUC’s actions thus far will offset the retirement of the 2,200 megawatt San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station and nearly 5,900 megawatts of once-through cooling plants.
A previous CPUC decision determined that it was not feasible to rely solely on preferred resources to
meet local energy needs and that conventional gas-fired resources must also be utilized in order to
ensure reliability. The CPUC said it strongly intends to continue pursuing preferred resources to the
greatest extent possible, but must always ensure that grid operations are not potentially compromised
by excessive reliance on intermittent resources and resources with uncertain ability to meet need. The
CPUC’s ongoing Resource Adequacy proceeding is exploring the ability of various preferred
resources and energy storage to meet needs. Until that time, the CPUC must take a prudent approach to reliability, which entails a gradual increase in the level of preferred resources and energy storage
into the resource mix to historically high levels.
The proposal voted on is available at
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M088/K979/88979084.PDF.
Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California
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