The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 20

Subtitle: Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

This article 20 begins five articles on what may be the most serious nuclear plant disasters and near-disasters: Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima, San Onofre, and St. Lucie.  Many

Radiation Plume from Chernobyl
credit: BBC

others could be included, from countries around the world.  One reference lists more than 80 serious nuclear power incidents.   The US’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission lists 70 incidents in the past four years in the US alone that required the NRC to send a special investigation team to the plant, or an augmented investigation team.   The Chernobyl article begins with a brief summary or overview of the facts, taken from the NRC's "Report on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station 1986," then commentary afterward.

Previous articles on The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasized the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article. 

Overview, from NRC Report, Section 4.1 (pg 124)

(quote) “The accident occurred during a test of the turbine generator system.  This test was designed to demonstrate that following a reactor trip, with the resulting loss of onsite power and isolation of the steam supply to the turbine, the rotating inertia of the turbine generator would be sufficient to generate enough electrical power to energize certain safety systems until the diesel generator system could be started and accept the electrical loads.  This test had been performed earlier at similar plants (Russian).  The specific purpose of this test was to determine if a new generator magnetic field regulator would maintain the voltage output from the generator for a longer period.

In the process of establishing the test conditions for the reactor, the operators brought the plant to an unstable operating condition.  However, for a number of reasons, the operators chose to run the test from this unstable condition.  To prevent the reactor from automatically shutting down, the operators purposely bypassed several systems important to safety.  The role of the operator in this accident is discussed in Chapter 5.

With the safety systems bypassed, the plant was in an unstable and vulnerable condition.  The most prominent parameter of this unstable condition was the positive void reactivity coefficient.  This coefficient allowed the reactivity to increase as the volume of steam increased in the core.  Other significant parameters included the low initial power level, low subcooling, low initial steam void fraction in the core, fuel burnup condition, and control system characteristics.  The design characteristics of the Chernobyl plant are detailed in Chapter 2.

The initiation of the test caused the steam volume in the core to increase.  Under the unique test conditions (for which the plant was not designed), and with the safety systems bypassed, a significant insertion [? Increase?] of reactivity resulted.  The resulting power increase produced additional steam voids which added reactivity and further increased the power.  Evaluations to date indicate the reactor was brought to a prompt critical condition.  Assessment of Soviet (and other) analyses also indicates that the energy deposition in the fuel was sufficient to melt some of the fuel.   The analyses to date suggest the following possible sequence of events.  The rapid expansion associated with melting, quickly ruptured the fuel cladding and injected fragmented and molten fuel into the coolant channel.  The interaction of the coolant with the hot fuel fragments produced steam very rapidly.  The high temperatures and rapid production of steam quickly over-pressurized the pressure tubes in the core region.   The pressure tubes then failed and over-pressured the cavity region around the graphite blocks.  Sufficient force was generated to lift the top plate off the reactor and possibly to fail the reactor building and eject core material.  This postulated sequence of events can be associated with the first “explosion” heard by operators at the plant.  A second “explosion” was reported to have occurred approximately 3 seconds after the initial one.

Various speculations on the source of this noise include a second criticality, a hydrogen detonation, or even an echo or reverberation. 

In summary, the event was caused by a combination of procedural and management deficiencies, human errors, and unique design characteristics. “  (end quote)   see link

Analysis

For the non-technical readers on SLB, a brief deconstruction of the above is in order. The test was to determine if the generators had enough inertia to keep spinning and generate power, even though steam was shut off to the turbine, to keep emergency systems energized until the diesel-powered generators could be started and brought up to speed.  

The plan was to run the reactor at part-load, which would have tripped the existing safety systems into a shut-down.  The safety systems were therefore disabled.  However, the reactor load was far below the planned load.   The reactor went into a mode that had more steam bubbles than normal, which is dangerous because steam does not slow down fission products such as neutrons.  This is the "positive void reactivity coefficient" mentioned above.  Also, the operators pulled the control rods, almost all of them, out of the reactor.   The resulting power surge caused the reactor to go critical, which melted down part of the nuclear fuel and caused not only an explosion, but the graphite parts of the reactor to catch fire.   

Radiation Worldwide

The core explosion, fire, and residual heat from the burning reactor core (that lasted several days) released huge amounts of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.  The plume of airborne particles flew high above the Earth, in a westerly and northerly direction, and tripped radiation monitors in several countries as it circled the globe.   One of the first countries the plume reached was Poland on April 26 and 27, 1986.   Almost all of Europe was impacted with radiation levels many times higher than normal.  The radiation plume eventually reached almost every northern hemisphere country. 

Personally, I was working doing consulting engineering with a contract in West Germany near Dusseldorf.  I finished the initial visit by March 1 of 1986, then returned to the US to do the office work.  A second visit to Germany in July made me quite nervous, particularly in the food we ate while there.  Everyone was very upset over the radiation cloud that rained deadly particles down on the entire continent.  

From a nuclear power plant safety standpoint, the important point is that the nuclear power industry has always insisted that their power plants are safe.  Even after Chernobyl blew up, the argument was “well, that is a Russian design and nobody has any of those.  Besides, the operators went rogue and operated the plant improperly, which made it explode.  That can never happen here.”

The proper response is, “A nuclear plant can never be made fool-proof.  Fools are just too ingenious.”   As shown in part 16 of TANP, operators in western nuclear plants make plenty of mistakes, not only in design but in operation, training, maintenance, parts replacement, security measures, even mundane chores like tightening bolts to the proper torque. 

Health Issues

At Chernobyl, 28 workers died from acute radiation poisoning within 4 months of the explosion.  Many others have died since, but a direct link to Chernobyl radiation exposure is unclear.   The World Health Organization, WHO, estimates 240,000 workers were exposed to high levels of radiation while cleaning up the radioactive debris.  Another 346,000 people were evacuated and relocated away from the radioactive zone near the plant.  see link   

WHO states that greater incidence of thyroid cancer was caused by Chernobyl.   There also is almost a doubling of leukemia cases.    In addition, the radiation caused cataracts in the eyes, increased deaths from cardio-vascular disease, mental health and psychological trauma. 

UPDATE - 6/11/2014 

So much more could be written about the Chernobyl disaster.  In fact, an internet search turns up nearly 5 million websites with the term "Chernobyl."   Hundreds of books about Chernobyl have also been written.   Until the multiple-meltdowns at Fukushima, Japan in 2011, Chernobyl was the greatest nuclear disaster of all-time.  

From an institutional safety standpoint, Chernobyl refutes many of the nuclear proponents' arguments.  First, the plant was subject to regulations in its own country, the USSR.   International regulations apparently were largely ignored.  Who is to say that future nuclear power plant operators will not do something equally devastating, especially as nuclear plants are built in more and more countries?   

Nuclear apologists or proponents are fond of saying that modern plants are secure, have safety systems and backup systems, and have designs that would never allow such an event to happen again.  That is mere talk; as mentioned in the Conclusion below, it is only too easy for operators to disable safety systems or ignore warnings, and run the plant in manual mode.   What is also apparent from the NRC report linked above is the very, very rapid change from quasi-normal operation to reactor criticality, meltdown and explosion.  At Chernobyl, the change required only a few seconds.  Operators tried desperately to insert some of the control rods, but it was too late.  

It is also clear from the NRC even reports that many, if not all nuclear plants in the US run some of their systems in manual mode at times.  Nothing can be made to run forever, as parts degrade and fail and must be replaced or repaired.  A control system normally has an automatic mode and a manual mode, and only well-trained operators should be allowed to run the systems in manual mode.  

What is also apparent from Chernobyl is the industry did not speak out in a timely manner about what happened and the risk to other countries from the radioactive cloud that was headed their way.  It is true that the operators in the plant had more things on their mind right about then, if they were still alive after the explosion.   However, it was radiation detectors in other countries that first gave the alarm internationally.   The extent and magnitude of the event was not known for days.  The psychological impact on billions of people was not small.   What of the parents of small children, who needed to drink milk?  What worries did couples have about future children?  What worries did other people have about radiation sickness, or long-term illnesses such as thyroid cancer and other cancers?    

The next two articles in TANP discuss two more disasters involving core meltdowns: Three Mile Island and Fukushima.  In both instances, like at Chernobyl, a combination of bad design and human error caused major disaster.  Fukushima was a bit more complex because a natural disaster, and earthquake with tsunami initiated the events.  

-- end update

Conclusion

Nuclear power advocates insist that the plants are safe, that modern designs cannot have catastrophic meltdowns.  However, it is clear that human error can easily defeat the best designs, and natural events can overwhelm even the best operators.  Chernobyl operated quite safely until human plans and human errors created the enormous disaster that affected millions of people around the world. 

Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links.  Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten -- Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete

Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - this article

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California

  

The Truth About Nuclear Power – Part 19

Subtitle: Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

[ Update: 9/13/2015- NRC cancels health study (for cancer cases) around nuclear plants, including San Onofre (SONGS in Southern California), citing lack of funding.  See more in the discussion below. -- end update] 

The topic of radiation sickness and death from nuclear power plants is controversial, and causes heated argument from both sides of the nuclear power issue.  Over the decades, the nuclear proponents’ position has changed from “no one has ever been injured”, to “no

member of the public has ever been injured”, to “no member of the public has died”, to “nuclear power is safer than coal or natural gas.”   That is an interesting progression, as it implies that people HAVE been injured, and have died from nuclear plant radiation.  This article, number 19 in The Truth About Nuclear Power series, explores the injuries and deaths from nuclear plants radiation releases. [Updated 6/9/2014 for reduced cancers near Sacramento, California after nuclear plant shutdown -- Roger]

Previous articles on The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasized the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article. 

Introduction

This article explores two types of illness or death due to nuclear radiation.  First, acute radiation sickness, and second, long-term effects such as cancer from radiation exposure.

With acute radiation sickness the question is, how much radiation can a human tolerate, until illness or death occurs?   From the Mayo Clinic definition of radiation sickness: see link  

“Radiation sickness is damage to your body caused by a large dose of radiation often received over a short period of time (acute). The amount of radiation absorbed by the body — the absorbed dose — determines how sick you'll be.

Radiation sickness is also called acute radiation sickness, acute radiation syndrome or radiation poisoning. Common exposures to low-dose radiation, such as X-ray or CT examinations, don't cause radiation sickness.

Although radiation sickness is serious and often fatal, it's rare. Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during World War II, most cases of radiation sickness have occurred after nuclear industrial accidents such as the 1986 fire that damaged the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl or the 2011 earthquake that damaged the [Fukushima] nuclear power plant on the east coast of Japan.”

Symptoms of radiation sickness include: nausea and vomiting, headache, diarrhea, fever, dizziness and disorientation, weakness and fatigue, hair loss, bloody vomit and stools, infections, poor wound healing, and low blood pressure. 

Radiation dosage is measured in G-ray, which is one joule of energy deposited in one kilogram of mass. The abbreviation is Gy.   An older measurement unit is the “rad” or abbreviation for “radiation absorbed dose.”  One Gy is equal to 100 rad.  

Nuclear medicine, dentistry x-rays, and medical x-rays are not included here.  Only radiation releases from nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel processing, and fuel research labs, but not from military power plant such as on submarines or surface ships are discussed in this article. 

Disasters and Deaths

From an article by Wada, K, et. al., in Occupational Environmental Medicine, Aug. 2012 69(8): 599-602, “In the Chernobyl disaster, 134 plant staff and emergency workers received high doses of radiation ranging from 0.8 to 16 Gy resulting in acute radiation syndrome, and 28 of them died within the first 4 months.  In contrast, no workers have exhibited illness due to acute radiation syndrome in the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident. Almost 99% of the workers at Fukushima were exposed to a radiation dose of [less than] 100 mSv and the possibility of future adverse health effects is uncertain."  (reference is United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. 2008 see link note:  this article by Wada has excellent references for further reading)  (emphasis added)

A famous case in the US is that of Karen Silkwood, who died before her trial but was exposed to plutonium at her workplace, allegedly due to inadequate and illegal work practices.  Karen sued her employer, Kerr-McGee but died in a car accident. 

Long-term Chronic Effects – Cancers

One of the greatest fears, or concerns, of people is contracting cancer or having children with birth defects due to nuclear power plant radiation exposure.  A recent case on point is a lawsuit brought by nearly 80 US sailors against the Japanese government (dismissed for inability to sue a foreign government), and later amended to sue only the Japanese utility company, TEPCO, that owns the Fukushima nuclear plants that melted down in 2011.  The sailors worked on USS Ronald Reagan, an aircraft carrier involved in humanitarian efforts after the earthquake and tsunami.  The sailors allege that they now suffer from cancer, and at least one had a baby with birth defects. See link 

Additionally, investigations have been made over the years into “cancer clusters,” or areas where more cancers than average occur.  It is difficult to sort out the causes, or establishing but-for causation in the legal sense.  Cancer clusters tend to be near population centers, where multiple cancer-causing agents are known to exist.  Nuclear power plants are also near the population centers, but there are also chemical plants, smelters, and non-nuclear power plants, among others.   A 1991 study gives an excellent overview of cancer studies up to that time, from nuclear plants.   “A National Cancer Institute (NCI) survey published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, March 20, 1991, showed no general increased risk of death from cancer for people living in 107 U.S. counties containing or closely adjacent to 62 nuclear facilities. The facilities in the survey had all begun operation before 1982. Included were 52 commercial nuclear power plants, nine Department of Energy research and weapons plants, and one commercial fuel reprocessing plant. The survey examined deaths from 16 types of cancer, including leukemia. In the counties with nuclear facilities, cancer death rates before and after the startup of the facilities were compared with cancer rates in 292 similar counties without nuclear facilities (control counties).” See link

However, the NCI 1991 survey admits several issues: they studied only deaths due to cancer.  They did not have data to conclude if proximity to a nuclear plant was a factor, saying “the counties may be too large to detect risks present only in limited areas around the plants.” 

Also, the NCI study references a British study on childhood leukemia incidence that showed increased leukemia cases in children that lived near nuclear power plants.  See  "Cancer Near Nuclear Installations," David Forman, Paula Cook-Mozaffari, Sarah Darby, et al. Nature, October 8, 1987.

A study by Jablon and Boice, Jr. from 1993 of nuclear plant workers at one plant stated: “A second follow-up of 9,000 workers at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (MD, USA) identified 346 deaths in the years 1969-88, 101 of which were attributed to malignant neoplasms. The original study had the primary purpose of assessing the feasibility of studies of workers based upon individual plant and Nuclear Regulatory Commission records. The average, cumulative, occupational dose through 1984 was low, only 21 mSv, but ranged up to 470 mSv, with 12 percent of the workers receiving more than 50 mSv. Mortality from most causes of death was low and there was a deficit of deaths from diseases of the circulatory system. Ionizing radiation exposures were not related to the probability of death from neoplasms generally or from any specific form of cancer. There were only two deaths from leukemia, whereas four were expected at population death rates. Larger numbers of workers, followed for longer periods of time, are needed to determine the mortality risk to workers in the nuclear power industry. The difficulties in obtaining dose information for transient workers were so great, and so time consuming, as to make questionable the practicability of studying the workers at a large number of power plants in this way.”  See link

UPDATE - 6/9/2014: Cancer rates near Sacramento, CA decreased significantly after the Rancho Seco nuclear plant was shut down.  "The first long-term study of the full-population health impacts of the closure of a U.S. nuclear reactor found 4,319 fewer cancers over 20 years, with declines in cancer incidence in 28 of 31 categories – 14 of them statistically significant – including notable drops in cancer for women, Hispanics and children.

Published in the peer-reviewed medical journal, Biomedicine International, the major new article, “Long-term Local Cancer Reductions Following Nuclear Plant Shutdown,” is the work of epidemiologist Joseph Mangano, M.P.H. M.B.A., executive director of the Radiation and Public Health Project, and internist and toxicologist Janette Sherman, M.D." -- see link   

Approximately 18 million Americans live within 20 miles of a nuclear power plant (5 percent of total population), while 116 million live within 50 miles (almost one-third of total population)   -- end update] 

[Update- 6/14/2014: Thyroid cancer cases increased in children near Fukushima.  

"Medics from Fukushima Medical University tested children's thyroid glands because they are very sensitive to such chemicals as iodine. Thyroid cancer among children is very rare, but 72 children with suspected thyroid cancer have already been identified and this number is expected to grow in the coming years. . . "   -  Voice of Russia see link   -- end update]
Read more: http://voiceofrussia.com/radio_broadcast/no_program/273403296/

Conclusion

The effects of ionizing nuclear radiation from nuclear power plants are real and deadly.  It can be seen, now, why the industry had to change its tune from “no one has ever been injured,” because in fact hundreds of people died after the Chernobyl explosion.  Nuclear proponents argue quite vigorously that “Chernobyl can never happen again,” and that argument will be explored in a future article on TANP.  It is obviously wrong, as a meltdown at Fukushima occurred just a few years later.   Fukushima also exposed hundreds of workers to nuclear radiation, and it is not yet known how many of them will ultimately die from radiation exposure, i.e. cancer.   Given the unsafe operating practices in US nuclear power plants, the near meltdowns or near-misses that occur at alarming frequency (one every 3 weeks, on average), it can be seen that concerns over cancers, birth defects, and radiation sickness are justified.  No matter how the industry spins the facts, the evidence is clear.  Nuclear power is not only too costly, but it is unsafe.  It causes deaths and fear of agonizing, lingering death from cancers. 

It is a shame that in this modern era with internet and database capabilities, a comprehensive study cannot be conducted to determine how many people of all ages contract radiation-related illnesses such as leukemia, thyroid disease, and other cancers.   It is a certainty that the nuclear industry does not want that information discovered and published.    

[UPDATE 9/13/2015 - the NRC has cancelled a study that would have determined, then published, the statistics on greater-than-normal incidences of diseases among persons, especially children, living within close distances of nuclear power plants.   The technology and data is available for the study, but NRC chose not to allocate funding to the study.  Predictably, nuclear advocates cheered, and nuclear opponents are disappointed.  see link to the article.   

An earlier (1991) study of health effects near nuclear plants was fatally flawed by design, and its results are not surprising.   

Quoting the article: "Among the study’s many problems, according to scientists who were designing the new probe:

•"It tracked mortality rates based on where people died, rather than where they lived before getting cancer. That makes it hard to determine true lifetime exposure.

• "It tracked deaths, rather than total cancer cases. That may downplay the full health impact of living near a reactor, since many cancer patients survive.

• "It used countywide data to reach conclusions – a blunt instrument that may again downplay the impact on those living closest to a reactor. Residents in La Habra and San Clemente live in the same county – but few would argue that they had the same exposure to San Onofre.


"To remedy all that, the NRC asked the NAS to evaluate cancer diagnosis rates, not just cancer deaths; and to explore how to divide the areas around nuclear facilities into geographical units smaller than counties. The NAS made no bones about the effort being difficult and time-consuming, but said it could be done."   

This is certainly an area where citizen volunteers - qualified and motivated - should step forward to perform this study pro-bono.   Also, it is a shame that the US government cannot find the $8 million to perform the initial study of 7 reactors.   In an era where government spending, and borrowing, is full of studies for irrelevant issues, this one is certainly deserving of funding. --- end update 9/13/2015]

Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links.  Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten -- Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete


Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - this article

Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 18

Subtitle:  Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Why reprocess spent fuel?  There are at least two reasons, 1) to re-use the material that can be re-used in a nuclear reactor.  This eliminates or reduces the need to purchase new fuel.  2) to concentrate the long-lived radioactive isotopes, which reduces the amount of material required to be stored long-term.  

Previous articles on The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasized the economic aspect by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article. 

Economic Issues

The economic incentive to reprocess is actually puzzling because, as nuclear advocates insist, the fuel is ultra-cheap as it is.  Nuclear advocates preach on and on that nuclear power is cheaper than anything else because the fuel itself is so cheap compared to the amount of power produced.  If that is the case, then why would anyone want to reprocess the spent fuel?  Surely it must be cheaper to purchase new fuel.  

But, as shown in another post on SLB, nuclear fuel as uranium really is not as abundant as some believe.  see link.   In addition, finding enough suitable reactor sites with adequate cooling water is a serious problem with no solution.  Furthermore, the start of decommissioning hundreds of reactors per year and disposing of all the spent fuel and radioactive metal creates an intractable problem.  

France and other countries reprocess their spent fuel.  Yet France has higher electricity prices than does the USA, even though France’s electrical industry is subsidized.  See earlier article on France and nuclear, see link.  Perhaps reprocessing is not quite the economic dream that the nuclear advocates insist that it is. 

More on costs: to reprocess the spent fuel, it must be transported from nuclear power plants to reprocessing facilities.  One could, of course, build a reprocessing plant at each nuclear plant, but the economy of scale works against that.   A few, large reprocessing plants would have economy of scale working in their favor.  Transport costs would be high, if transport is to be done safely. 

Safety Issues

Packaging and transporting spent fuel safely is a serious problem.  If transported by truck, more trucks on the road will increase congestion and accidents.  Even if the nuclear fuel survives the collision intact in its containers, emergency workers will evacuate the population until the area is determined to be safe.  Media will have a frenzy over a nuclear-fuel accident.   The same is true for rail transport.  As has been seen recently with transporting oil by rail, more accidents occur.   It is unlikely that the nuclear power industry will welcome the increased adverse publicity and negative public relations generated by spent nuclear fuel transport accidents. 

Processing the spent fuel creates more opportunities for leaks, spills, and radiation exposure to workers.  The existing reprocessing plants in the US already have had radiation exposure accidents. 

A problem already exists in accounting for high-level radioactive wastes and ensuring the waste is not diverted to illegal activities such as dirty bombs or terrorism.   Increasing the amount reprocessed, year after year, only increases the safety issues. 

Long-term storage of high-level radioactive wastes is also required, no matter how much or how little the mass to be stored is.  Thousands of years is required for storage until the radiation level is sufficiently safe.   

An alternative to storage is using some of the separated plutonium, mixed with uranium, for reactor fuel known as MOX.  At least one of the Fukushima reactors that melted down had some MOX fuel.   This creates yet another, more severe hazard, when meltdowns occur as they inevitably will. 

Liability Issues 

Nuclear wastes such as spent nuclear fuel are classified by law as ultrahazardous.  With very, very few exceptions, any injury caused by handling, storing, or using spent nuclear fuel creates liability for the owner of the spent fuel.  Reprocessing, including transport and the resultant accidents, will increase the number of lawsuits that owners must defend. 

Conclusion

Reprocessing spent fuel makes no economic sense.  Reprocessing also increase the risk of radiation exposure through transportation, the separation process itself.  The long-term issue of storage of high-level waste remains.   These are yet more truths about nuclear power. 

Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links.  Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten -- Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - US Nuclear Plants are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete

Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous Short and Long Term

Part Eighteen - this article

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 
Marina del Rey, California

Grid-Scale Energy Storage in Submerged Spheres

Subtitle: Storing the Wind-Energy Makes It Reliable

First, a quote (or paraphrase) from Confucius: “I show a dull man one corner of a room, and he sits in the corner grinning.  I show a wise man one corner of a room, and he shows me the other corners, plus the entire house.”    There are quite a number of people grinning in the corner, based on some of the comments made at WUWT, which started this entire post.

Background

Some low-information commenters on Anthony Watts excellent blog made light (jeered, even) at my suggestion that the recently-announced MIT storage spheres will solve the intermittency problem of wind-energy.   A few, however, asked polite and intelligent questions.  This is my response to those polite folks. 

Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Basics

Now, as to the basics of how PSH (pumped storage hydroelectric) works, and then how the MIT spheres work.   There are numerous PSH sites in the US (more than 22,000 MW at last count by EIA – Energy Information Agency).   One of the largest sites is on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan, the Ludington Plant.   Like all PSH plants, there is an upper reservoir and a lower reservoir.  The lower reservoir is Lake Michigan.  The upper reservoir is man-made, about 360 feet above the lake, and on a sandy cliff-like edge of the lake.  At night, six turbine/pumps run in pump mode by drawing power from the grid to pump water from Lake Michigan into the upper lake.   The next day, the flow is reversed so that water flows from the upper lake through the turbine/pumps into Lake Michigan, this time generating power as needed.    The upper reservoir and land occupy 1,000 acres.  The generators produce 1,872 MW of power at maximum flow.  The penstocks (six of them) or pipes, are 1,300 feet long and 28 feet diameter.  These connect the upper and lower reservoirs.  The plant was built between 1969 and 1973.  As PSH plants go, it is large but has a low elevation change. 

In contrast, the Castaic PSH in Southern California, near Los Angeles, has an elevation change of 1,060 feet and produces 1,247 MW for up to 10 hours in generating mode.   Castaic PSH also draws power from the grid at night to pump water uphill from Castaic Lake into Pyramid Lake, the upper reservoir.  The tunnel connecting the two lakes is 7.2 miles long and is 30 feet in diameter.   Castaic PSH has six pump/turbines and one standard turbine generator.   Because the elevation difference is greater, Castaic has much lower water flow than does Ludington.

These two examples show a low-head and a high-head PSH plant (Ludington is low-head, and Castaic is high-head).  In this context, head is the elevation difference in feet between the upper and lower reservoirs.

MIT Storage Spheres

The MIT spheres on the ocean floor will do exactly the same function: draw power from the grid at night to pump water out of the spheres.  The spheres are not closed as one commenter assumes.  Instead, they are vented by a pipe to the atmosphere.  The sphere acts exactly like the lower reservoir.  It is at atmospheric pressure at all times.   A turbine/pump connected to a motor/generator draws power at night (or whenever the wind blows) and runs in pumping mode to send water out of the sphere into the surrounding ocean.  Air flows from the atmosphere through the vent pipe into the sphere.  The ocean, at that depth, has considerable pressure.  One can estimate the water pressure by dividing the water depth by two.  Thus, 1,000 feet of water will exert approximately 500 pounds of pressure.   (Engineers will know that the exact relationship is 32.2 divided by 14.696, but for estimating purposes, two will suffice.) 

During the day, when peak power is required, seawater is allowed to flow by natural pressure from the ocean through the turbine/pump into the sphere, turning the generator and producing power to the grid.  Water flowing in forces air out of the sphere through the vent line into the atmosphere.   With proper design, about 80 MW will be produced into the grid for each 100 MW consumed from the grid.

As to the servicing and maintenance issues someone asked about, this is trivial.  Proper design will have the entire turbine/pump and generator/motor equipment in the atmospheric pressure zone above the sphere.  Simply put, that building will also be vented to the atmosphere.  Likely, an elevator will convey workers and materials to the submerged sphere, much like in a mine shaft on land.   There is no need to contemplate high-pressure underwater activities.   Purists will say, at this point, yes but what about screens to keep fish and other marine life out of the turbines?   Those screens or similar devices may require periodic cleaning, but that can be done remotely with ROVs.  (remote operated vehicles, think unmanned submarines). 

As to the MIT paper indicating 6 hours of storage, and the naysayers objecting that this is far too little.  It should be pointed out that Castaic PSH has only 10 hours of generating capacity, and about 11 hours for Ludington.   However, these spheres would be storing offshore wind-energy and could require operation for several days.  There are three salient points about PSH generating time: one need only change the generating time by 1) increasing the diameter, 2) adding more spheres, or 3) increasing the head.  Put simply, if the sphere volume is the same and only one sphere is used, one can obtain double the generating time by setting the sphere twice as deep into the water – this increases the head.  Similarly, if one maintains the head constant, one can obtain 8 times the generating time by doubling the sphere’s radius.  Or, one could maintain the head constant and add more spheres of constant radius to obtain the increased generating time.  Note that it is not required to have a turbine/pump with motor/generator on each sphere.   The spheres can be connected one to another by suitable high-pressure pipes.  Very likely, the most economic choice for increased generating time is simply to increase the spheres’ size.   Spheres have a nice property for that, as materials required go up with the square of the radius, but volume increases with the cube of the radius.   One may also excavate out a hollow in the ocean floor and set the larger sphere in place, if water depth is an issue with a larger sphere. 

Now, as to the testing and prototyping as asked about: yes, the MIT publications state the system has been built, has been tested, and measurements taken on an actual sphere. 

Economics 

The economics are much criticized in the comments on WUWT.  It was overlooked, apparently, by the naysayers that MIT stated the cost per sphere will decrease as more are deployed.  This is the economy of mass production.  Henry Ford recognized this with automobiles; it still applies today.  Another cost-reduction will occur as spheres are made larger, this is the economy of scale for unit production.  Yet another cost reduction will occur as spheres are installed along trunk power lines laid on the ocean floor.  It will not be necessary to build the electrical infrastructure again for each sphere. 

Another word about economics: with a suitable number of spheres in place, there will be no need for land-based fossil-fuel power plants to be built in excessive numbers.  Instead of the 1,000 GW currently installed, the US could have only 600 GW installed, and let the spheres do the peak load work.   The savings from not installing 400 GW of on-shore fossil-fuel power is indeed large.  That will offset much of the cost of installing the spheres. 

As to the land-locked cities, spheres can be installed in the larger Great Lakes, with a power grid designed to send power from wind-farms in the Great Plains to those storage systems, then back out the next day.   Even shallow Lake Erie can have storage spheres, they would simply be buried in a suitable hole in the lake bottom.   

Conclusion

This wraps up the MIT sphere grid-scale storage technology.  It works.  It has zero energy cost.  It has very low environmental impact.  It can be constructed now, without waiting for offshore wind-turbines.  It reduces the cost of on-shore generating plants – fewer plants will be required.  Power from the spheres is almost instantaneous and can be at full power in less than 30 minutes.  It quite easily follows the load.  Economy of scale and mass production will decrease the costs.  There is a huge coastline with shallow continental shelf along most of the Eastern seaboard and Gulf of Mexico, so placing numerous spheres is quite possible.   It makes intermittent wind energy very reliable, available on demand.

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California  

EPA To Curb CO2 Emissions from Power Plants

Subtitle: Will the California Rule Be Their Guide?

[Update 6/1/2014 7:45 pm:  It appears from news reports (WSJ among others) that a 30 percent reduction is the new requirement. -- end update. ]

The news has been heavy lately (see link from WSJ article) with the upcoming announcement by the US EPA of a new regulation that will limit carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants. The ostensible goal is to stop global warming, on the premise that increased CO2 in the atmosphere causes the global average mean temperature to increase also.   The so-called science behind the CO2-causes-warming is badly flawed, indeed it is Bad Science (BS).   Much has been written about the BS, some of that writing here on SLB, e.g.

Warmists Are Wrong, Cooling Is Coming  see link
From Global Warmist to Skeptic - My Journey see link
Science is Not Settled see link 
Chemical Engineer Takes on Global Warming see link
Questions for Teens on Global Warming see link

I have also written previously on CO2 regulations from US EPA:

EPA Declares GHGs a Danger see link
EPA CO2 Endangerment Finding see link
Texas v US EPA Over CO2 Endangerment Finding see link

As the WSJ article linked above states, there will be many legal challenges to the regulation, and those challenges could take years to resolve. 

California Rule on CO2 from Power Plants

The US EPA new rules may be similar, or even identical, to those passed in California in 2007.  California's rule limits CO2 emissions from power plants such that only a combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant can comply, unless carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology is applied.   The California law, which was Senate Bill 1368 (Perata), limits CO2 emissions to 1,100 pounds CO2 per MWh of electricity produced. 

Hope for Coal Plants

Coal-fired plants have a double dilemma: the cycle efficiency is lower than from a CCGT, and the fuel has much more CO2 emissions for each million Btu burned, compared to natural gas.   The hope, and it is a very strong hope, is an economic process to capture CO2 from the furnace stack, and prevent that CO2 from entering the atmosphere.  

One such process has been demonstrated, and has a commercial-scale plant under construction with startup slated for 2014.  That process is by Skyonic Corp, an Austin,  Texas-based company founded by chemical engineer Joe Jones, with a patented process to convert CO2 in stack gases to sodium bicarbonate.  The bicarbonate can be sold as a powder.  Skyonic can be viewed online at this link. 

The sales phone must be ringing off the hook at Skyonic's office.  Or, their server is probably full with emailed inquiries.  

I have reviewed the Skyonic patent, their published literature and press announcements, seen the videos, and am happy to state that this technology is based on sound engineering principles.  It works.  The economics also appear solid, as the company claims a three-year payback period on the investment.    Private investors also agree the technology and economics are sound, and put their money into the company.  Disclosure: I have zero financial interest in Skyonic.  

Conclusion

We do indeed live in interesting times.  One of the most interesting parts is that chemical engineers are riding to the rescue.  

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California