Finland Nuclear Plant Delayed Yet Again

Subtitle: Four Year Construction Time More Than Tripled

The 1,600 MWe nuclear power plant under construction in Olkiluoto, Finland, is now delayed so much that first power production is not expected until sometime in 2018.  That is 9 years later than the original schedule, with a 13 year project construction time.  See link to the Finnish utility's website, TVO, and the announcement.  

This is yet more evidence that the nuclear power industry cannot deliver what they promise: the plant is not only years and years behind schedule, it is billions of Euros over budget.  

This plant has been the subject of previous SLB articles, see here, here, here, and here. 

This plant is designed for 1,600 MWe output, in an attempt to attain lower costs from economy of scale.  Larger plants can have lower production costs, and in many industries these economies are achieved.   But, with nuclear power plants, this does not seem to be the case.  Any economy of scale is surely obliterated by the increased financing costs on construction loans over a 13 year (2018-2005) construction period, plus escalations from inflation for materials, services, and labor.   These concepts are explored in some detail in Part Six of Truth About Nuclear Power (see link). 

The truth about the Finland reactor is that four more years are required, at least are now estimated as required, before startup.  Four years is a long time, and many more mistakes and problems can occur.  The plant may very well not see first production in 2018, but will likely be delayed much more.  

The reality is that, even after 50 years or more of design, development, actual experience, fine-tuning, and making best efforts around the world, nuclear power (as of 2011 per EIA statistics, see TANP part 11) provides only 11.7 percent of all power world-wide.   The only technologies smaller than nuclear’s share are oil (4.8 percent) and a catch-all category (4.5 percent) that includes wind, solar, geothermal, and various other renewable power.   One would expect that nuclear, if it were truly a superior technology economically and safe, would have easily surpassed coal, natural gas, and hydroelectric power (41, 22, and 16 percent approximately, respectively).

Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 
Marina del Rey, California

Copyright (c) 2014 by Roger Sowell  -- All rights reserved

Finland Nuclear Plant by Areva Years Late and Billions Over Budget

Subtitle:

The poster-child for the nuclear renaissance was supposed to be the French-based Areva nuclear reactor - a pressurized water reactor known as EPR (European Pressurized water Reactor), one of which is under construction in Finland.   It is a massive plant, to produce 1,600 MWe in a single reactor.  As noted in Truth About Nuclear Power series, see link these plants must be huge to take advantage of economy of scale to have any hope of being economically attractive.  The jump from 1,000 to 1600 MW should produce a plant with lower unit costs - for one thing, only one reactor is required.  

But, a curious thing about the Areva design:  it has 4 steam generators.   Thus, the economy of scale does not fully apply.  

In addition, an article recently published describes the possible fraud, or deliberate deception, by the reactor vendor and partner Siemens.  The article states:  see link

"During the time of the Olkiluoto agreement Areva and Siemens (Areva’s former German joint venture nuclear partner) assured TVO that they had the required expertise to see the enterprise through to the end. On hindsight, TVO has speculated that Siemens and Areva minimised their difficulties and covered up their shortcomings to get the deal."

The plant is now at least 6 years behind schedule, probably 7 years, and approximately €3 to 4 billion over budget.  

For the US nuclear proponents, who insist that plants cost too much due to interference by US regulatory agencies, environmental groups and their lawsuits, it is interesting that none of those issues are at play in Finland.  

For more on the unreasonably high cost of nuclear power, see link. 

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.
Marina del Rey, California. 

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part Nine

Subtitle: Nuclear power plants require long construction schedules

Up until now, the Truth About Nuclear Power series has discussed the costs of operating and constructing the plants, and the impact on scarce water resources.  It has been shown that nuclear power plants cost far too much to construct, use far too much water, cannot compete in today’s electricity market, and if they were the sole source of electricity on a grid, power prices would escalate to unacceptably high levels.   

This article discusses one of the reasons nuclear plants cost so much, and debunks one of the favorite talking points of the nuclear advocates.  The advocates are fond of saying that nuclear plants would not cost so much if only the lawyers would step aside and let the plants be built without lawsuits.   In fact, frivolous lawsuits are now barred for new nuclear power construction in the US.  However, costly delays are occurring, and will occur in the future for the usual set of construction delay issues.  Delays cost money, and the longer the delay, the more money is spent by one of the parties to the construction. 

Examples of construction delays include, but are not limited to, tearing out and re-working faulty construction, equipment suppliers providing late or defective items, serious adverse weather, unforeseen site conditions, and redesign for new NRC requirements.  Also, delays can be caused by worker slowdowns, lawsuits for allowable causes, owner-contractor disputes, faulty design that requires corrections, acts of God or the enemy (force majeur), improper scheduling by the contractor, inadequate workforce staffing or untrained workforce (learning on the job), poor supervision, and others.

As one example, nuclear power plants have many critical welds.  The critical welds must be performed by qualified welders, who are paid a premium.  Also, the critical welds are required to be x-rayed to ensure the welds meet quality control specifications and will be sufficiently strong.  It takes time, and costs money to x-ray and inspect all those critical welds.  It is well-known that the South Texas Nuclear Plant had many faulty critical welds that failed x-ray inspection and had to be welded again until they were right. 

Another example, again from the South Texas Nuclear Plant, of faulty design that required correction is the mis-match on the drawings for two halves of the plant.  The piping and other items that were to connect across the match-line were off by a noticeable amount.  The work was delayed while the engineering firm re-engineered and re-issued the proper drawings.  Delays caused by faulty rebar for concrete have been an issue at the Vogtle plant under construction in Georgia, USA.   Other delays at Vogtle include design changes, and delivery of equipment.  Vogtle is now reported to be 21 months behind schedule.  That number will surely increase as more time passes.    See link for list of delays and cost over-runs at Vogtle.  

Delays occur in other countries, also.  As an example, the Finland plant being installed by Areva had delays with the concrete.  Apparently, the concrete was not to the required specification.  That project is also years behind schedule. 

Even without delays, nuclear plants require longer to construct due to the inherent danger of nuclear power (discussed in Part Five) and the three levels of containment required by the NRC.  In short, there are many more items of equipment required to contain the deadly radioactivity if and when an accident occurs.   More items of equipment require longer construction times.  Also, more testing is required before startup, more inspection as the construction progresses, all of which take time. 

Conclusion

Nuclear power plants require long construction schedules, made longer by delays that have nothing to do with lawsuits to impede progress.

Previous articles in the Truth About Nuclear Power series are found at the following links.  Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven -- All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – No Benefits from Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Part Nine - this article

Part Ten - Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands

Part Thirteen - Nuclear Plants Are Heavily Subsidized

Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete

Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules

Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks

Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term

Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things

Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion

Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen

Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga

Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion

Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process

Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream

Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California

The Truth About Nuclear Power – Part Eight

Subtitle: No Benefits From Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants

Are there any benefits from small, modular nuclear power plants?    As background, this series on nuclear power has shown that large, “cathedral” nuclear power plants of 1,000 MWe or greater cost as much as $10 billion each to construct.  The high capital costs require a high power sales price, making the new generation of nuclear power plants uneconomic.  See Part Two,  Part Three, and  Part Six for particulars.   This article explores the costs that can be expected if smaller, modular nuclear power plants are installed.  There is a contingent of nuclear power proponents that insists that costs per kW can be reduced by building smaller plants, more of them, and building them in controlled factory conditions.   But, are those assertions true?

Modular Small Nuclear Plant
source: Energy.gov

The short answer is, No.  Supposedly, the benefits are shorter construction times, less inflation, less interest on loans, all of which lead to lower costs.  But, loss of economy of scale overwhelms such benefits.  Consider 1200 MWe vs 600, 400, 300, and note that Dept of Energy defines Small Modular Reactors as 300 MW or less.  Each of the smaller size plants must be delivered much more quickly to achieve any savings in materials inflation and interest on construction loans.    A shorter construction period very likely cannot be done due to fabrication and delivery of large items: the reactor, steam generators, turbines, and pumps. 

There is, perhaps, a case for some capital savings for a smaller plant if only one steam generator can do the job instead of two or more.  For example, the 1600 MW plant under construction in Finland has four steam generators for its one reactor.  The recently-closed plants in California at San Onofre each produced a bit more than 1000 MW, and each reactor has two steam generators.   Those steam generators, at approximately 500 MW per steam generator, caused problems that led to the plant shutting down.  Therefore, a 600 MW plant with one steam generator probably cannot be done, or at least, no one would take that risk.  But, a 400 MW plant could have one reactor and one steam generator and still remain within the proven size of approximately 400 to 500 MW per steam generator.  That single bit of savings, however, would not be enough to overcome the cost increase per kW created by the loss of economy of scale.

The initial premise is that a 1,000 MWe nuclear plant would cost $4,000 per KW as its overnight cost (the cost to construct if it could all be built in one month, or “overnight”), and materials and labor escalation or inflation over six years increases the cost by $3,000 per kW, and finally, interest on the construction loan increases the cost by another $3,000 per KW.  The total is then $10,000 per kW.    The sources for these costs is explained in detail in Part Three.   (Note, EIA shows 2013 overnight costs for a new nuclear plant as $5,530 per kW).  See Table 2 from  this link. 

Costs for a smaller plant can be expected to follow the “Point 6” power rule for economy of scale, such that the cost of Unit B is found by the formula 

Cost B = Cost A x (Size B / Size A) ^0.6.   

An example illustrates using overnight costs only, where Size B is 400 MW, Size A is 1200 MW, and Cost A is $4,800.  Then,

Cost B = $4,800 x (400/1200)^0.6  = $2,483 per kW overnight cost.

Then, for a total power output of 1200 MW, three of the 400 MW plants are required.   The total overnight costs for the three plants is then 3 x 2483, or $7,449 per kW.    The goal here is to have a final cost less than $12,000, which is the single-plant size of 1200 MW times the cost per kW of 10,000.   With the overnight cost already at $7,450 (rounded slightly, which is fine using such rough numbers), one is left with only 4,550 available for inflation and escalation, plus interest.   If we make the very rough allocation of escalation or inflation is the same as interest on the loan, that then results in each category being half of 4,550, or 2,275.   

Then, we can compute the number of years that the modular plant must require for construction, at inflation of 5 percent per year.   Calculations show that approximately 5.5 years at 5 percent per year yields the desired result.  To save any on the final costs, then, the modular plants must be built in less than 5.5 years.   Stated another way, savings are realized only if the plant can be brought online in 3 or 4 years from notice to proceed. 

The question is, then, can it be done?  Once again, the nuclear industry is scrambling, trying to find a way to justify itself.   Small, modern design, modular-constructed nuclear power plants have never been built in the US, indeed, they are not even approved by the NRC.   The first projects would suffer all the problems of first-of-a-kind projects, and likely have no cost reductions at all. 

The same analysis can be performed for smaller plants, such as 300 MW, where four plants would be required to produce 1200 MW of power, and 200 MW, where six plants would be required.  The results are as follows.  The 300 MW plants must be constructed in 4 years to have zero savings, with any savings produced only if construction time is 2 or 3 years.  The 200 MW plants must be constructed in 2.1 years to have zero savings over the cathedral design.    It seems highly unlikely that small, modular plants can be built on such short timescales.  

The analysis is dependent on the inflation or escalation rate for equipment, labor, and services over the life of the project.  If the inflation rate is higher, as many forecasters predict must be the case, then the situation is worse.  The amount of time required to build the plant and yield a cost savings will be less and less as the inflation rate increases.

Conclusion

There are no benefits to the smaller, modular nuclear power plants that some nuclear power proponents advocate.   The loss of economy of scale requires much shorter construction times for any savings to be had. 

Update: 4/17/14 - Modular reactor developer cuts development, funding by 90 percent due to lack of customers and lack of investors.  (Imagine that...)  "Babcock & Wilcox will slash its spending on the mPower small modular reactor project, having failed to find customers or investors."  also, from same article:   "In February this year (2014) Westinghouse announced it would scale back its development of its 225 MWe small modular reactor design, having lost out in the DoE competition."  see link from World Nuclear News, 4/14/14  -- end update

Update 2-   4/19/14: - Navy-style small reactors are mentioned by nuclear advocates as proof that smaller reactors are viable.  Those reactors do indeed function for the purpose.  However, the issue is one of cost and the price require for electric power on a grid powered by nuclear reactors.  The US Navy has many nuclear powered ships and submarines that work very well.  Those reactors are not designed like commercial power plants.  Also, the economy of scale applies here.  It appears that the largest of the military reactors are approximately 165 MWe, however the USS Ronald Reagan, a new aircraft carrier, has two nuclear reactors each producing just under 100 MW of shaft power.   Such small reactors would require very high-priced electricity.   -- end update 2

Previous articles in The Truth About Nuclear Power can be found at the following links. 

Part One – Nuclear Power Plants Cannot Compete

Part Two – Preposterous Power Pricing if Nuclear Power Proponents Prevail

Part Three – Nuclear Power Plants Cost Far Too Much to Construct

Part Four – Nuclear Power Plants Use Far More Fresh Water

Part Five – Cannot Simply Turn Off a Nuclear Power Plant

Part Six –  Nuclear Plants are Huge to Reduce Costs

Part Seven --  All Nuclear Grid Will Sell Less Power

Part Eight – this article

Part Nine -- Nuclear Plants Require Long Construction Schedules

Part Ten - Nuclear Plants Require Costly Upgrades After 20 to 30 Years

Part Eleven - Following France in Nuclear Is Not The Way To Go

Part Twelve - Nuclear Plants Cannot Provide Cheap Power on Small Islands
Part Thirteen - Nuclear Plants Are Heavily Subsidized
Part Fourteen - A Few More Reasons Nuclear Cannot Compete
Part Fifteen - Nuclear Safety Compromised by Bending the Rules
Part Sixteen - Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks
Part Seventeen - Storing Spent Fuel is Hazardous for Short or Long Term
Part Eighteen - Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe

Part Nineteen - Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things
Part Twenty - Chernobyl Meltdown and Explosion
Part Twenty One - Three Mile Island Unit 2 Meltdown 1979
Part Twenty Two - Fukushima The Disaster That Could Not Happen
Part Twenty Three - San Onofre Shutdown Saga
Part Twenty Four - St. Lucie Ominous Tube Wear

Part Twenty Five - Price-Anderson Act Protects Nuclear Plants Too Much

Part Twenty Six - Evacuation Plans Required at Nuclear Plants

Part Twenty Seven - Power From Nuclear Fusion
Part Twenty Eight - Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process
Part Twenty Nine - High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream
Part Thirty - Conclusion

Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California

Areva Nuclear Plants Not Safe

The nuclear power industry -design and construction arm - continues to amaze, all the while shooting itself in the foot.

Today's news states that nuclear regulating agencies in three countries - France, Britain, and Finland - ordered Areva "to modify the safety features on its European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) due to insufficient independence between the day-to-day systems and the emergency systems."

That such modifications are necessary is shocking, given that nuclear proponents (nuts) shout from the rooftops that modern nuclear plant designs are safe. They also scream that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was responsible for the cost overruns during the 1970s and 80s, such that if the NRC had left the designs alone, the plants would not have been so expensive. Yet, it appears the US NRC had nothing to do with this safety upgrade. One wonders if the nuclear nuts will be as vocal in denouncing the Europeans who required this safety change.

This is sure to create more expense and delays for the Areva EPR reactor being built in Finland, where the project is already years behind schedule (with no end date in sight), the parties involved are blaming each other, and the cost has escalated by many billions.

It is time for sensible, rational people to realize that the nuclear power industry is much like an alcoholic. How can one tell when an alcoholic is lying? When their lips are moving.