Showing posts with label meltdown. Show all posts
Showing posts with label meltdown. Show all posts

Monday, October 21, 2019

Climate Solutions BS in Houston by AIChE

Subtitle: Still BS - Bad Science, No Solutions Needed

I attended a lunch presentation by Dr. Tom Rehm, 2019 Chair of STS-AIChE on October 18, 2019 on Climate Solutions, in LaPorte, Texas.   (STS is South Texas Section)

The main points are below in bold font, with my comments in parentheses.  These are based on my notes made at the time, and may not perfectly reflect what was said; any inaccuracies are due to what I believe I heard at the time. 

(Preface:  I believe that Tom Rehm is sincere in his beliefs about catastrophic, imminent global warming caused by CO2, however he has stated in public that even if it is not true, it is prudent to do something to prevent it.  (my paraphrase, probably not his exact words).  I suspect he is also sincere in his belief that nuclear power is the planet's saviour, and that all plastic production must end and rather soon.  It is disconcerting that the STS of AIChE has taken this approach, with those beliefs based on very bad science and not on the facts.  However, the chairmanship is for only one year, and Dr. Rehm will soon hand over the chair - January 1, 2010.  It seems, though, that the incoming Chair has similar views.   That is actually ok, though, since the solutions being advanced are not workable, will have outrageous impacts on all of society, require massive government support, and cannot be implemented in less than 5 decades anyway.  By then, the inevitable global cooling will be advanced and more than evident to everyone. -- End Preface) 

The main points:

UHI, urban heat island effect, is due to aerosols that cooled the air until approximately 1980, then cleaner air caused the cities to warm.  Clean air laws were enacted.  
(That is nice to see the effect of man-made aerosols mentioned, as that is one of the several causes of warmer temperatures that have nothing to do with increased CO2 in the atmosphere.  SLB has articles on the non-CO2 causes of warming, see link. )

Population decreased in a few urban areas but temperatures increased, therefore warming is not correlated to population growth. 
(This is an attempt to show that increased temperatures are not related to population growth, however I have asked Tom in the past how does he know the temperature increase in those few locations were not related to drought, El Nino, cleaner air, fewer clouds, more local humidity, and a host of other known causes of warming?   He made no answer then.)

USCRN, United States Climate Reference Network, has more than 100 pristine sites across the US, sites with no urban warming influence for the foreseeable future.   Mentioned Stovepipe Wells, CA (actually in Death Valley), and Alaska.    Showed a slight warming trend for these locations.  
(the misdirection here was to, again, make the point that warming occurs even where population is small.  As before, no mention of non-CO2 causes of warming, El Nino, droughts, etc.) 

Professor Monty Alger of Penn State called Tom to say he was fully behind the Climate Solutions initiative at AIChE.  Alger will be AIChE president for 2020. 
 (see  https://www.che.psu.edu/faculty/alger/ for a bio of Dr. Alger.  The incoming president of national AIChE is equally misguided on the bad science, BS, of man-made global warming.  However, as an academic, it is important for the national AIChE to support and assist the other academics who receive part of their grants and other funding from promoting man-made climate change.  It is obvious that more work for chemical engineers will occur in designing and building the various systems to capture CO2, remove some from the atmosphere.)

Tom said he was instrumental in getting AIChE to change their official stance on Global Warming with the 2019 statement on climate
(The previous statement on climate was essentially, "we don't take a position as the science is not settled," with the new, 2019 statement emphatically stating "Scientific analysis finds that non-natural climate change is occurring and has been strongly influenced by human-caused releases of greenhouse gases. . . . Adverse climate change poses threats to all of us, both individually and as a society. These threats fall squarely in the realm of the chemical engineer. . ."  It is certainly dismaying that so many in our society could be so badly fooled by the BS, the bad science.   What the current statement should say is "Some very bad scientific analysis finds that".... the causation should have mentioned the multiple known causes of warmer temperature, none of which are related to increased greenhouse gases.) 

Mentioned Hofmeister’s book “Why We Hate the Oil Companies.”  Former president, Shell Oil. 
(Not much to say here, having not read the book.  I suspect the theme is that oil companies have been hiding very bad facts for decades, have conspired to deceive the public and elected officials, the usual such things.   It is quite instructive that Shell is mentioned, as they are notorious for having lied to the Securities Exchange Commission about the extent of their oil reserves, and were fined for doing that.  Shell would do well in an era where oil is minimized in favor of natural gas consumption.  That appears to be a primary goal of those who espouse climate solutions. )

Said presenter Stephanie Thomas is a geologist.   Matthew Berg won best presentation award for SPTC in Sugar Land, 2019.
(I sat through both Thomas' and Berg's presentations at that conference.  Dr. Thomas is listed as having a PhD in Earth Sciences, not Geology.  Dr. Berg has a PhD in Hydrology.   I wrote on SLB on Dr. Thomas' presentation, see link.    I have not yet written an article on Dr. Berg's presentation, but it can be summarized as "flooding is getting worse, and global warming is the cause."  He claimed, with a straight face, that local temperatures are melting railroad rails.  Then, showed a slide of a distorted rail juncture.  I laughed at that one.)

Wants the world to be CO2-neutral by year 2030, and to do that we must make no more plastics.
(this one is quite incredible; I shook my head in disbelief.  The modern world depends far too much on plastics to stop production.  The disruption, increased costs, increased disease and illness, and increased energy consumption all are insurmountable factors that will make this one never happen.   For just a few examples, how will hospitals and medical practices function without plastic?  What will food packaging be made from, at what cost in product purity and increased discards, if not plastic?  What will sanitation piping be made from?  How will transportation vehicles maintain their current low weights (or mass) that allows excellent fuel economy?  This one is, to use the vernacular, a doozy.)

Renewables cannot do the job; 100 percent renewables is impossible.  Cited Austin, Texas as having grid stability problems at 20 percent renewables on the local grid.   Said that the local grid and amount of renewables is the critical issue.  
(on this minor point, we agree at least in part.  SLB has articles on the 100 Percent Renewables issue, I agree that the world will not likely ever be run entirely by renewables.   Where Rehm is wrong, though, is on the claim that 20 percent renewables causes instability on local grids.  The fact is that many locations in the US have much more than 20 percent renewable power that makes electricity.  The issue is not with the renewables, but with the flexibility of the other generating systems.  )

Mentioned the cost for renewables is prohibitively high, and the low capacity factor, 25 percent for solar and wind combined in Texas is a major obstacle
(this is a common talking point by the anti-renewables, pro-nuclear crowd.  The fact is, the renewable sources of wind and solar are very competitive in the areas where the wind is good and the solar energy is strong.  However, the economics of solar panels in high latitudes will continue to be very bad for many decades.  Solar does well, though, in sunny areas (not cloudy) in locations between 30 degrees north and south of the equator.  Wind is the most attractive generating source in many, many areas as thoroughly documented by the US Department of Energy and their annual Wind Technologies Market Reports.)

One solution is nuclear, with new designs as Professor Tsvetkov proposes.  Said nuclear has zero emissions,   New designs will not use water as the moderator.  
(Tsvetkov clarified that zero-emissions view in his earlier 2019 speech to AIChE, it is not true for the entire nuclear cycle.  see link to SLB article on Gen IV nuclear and Tsvetkov's presentation.  Gen IV nuclear plants are unproven, most have not been built, a few prototypes were abandoned as hopeless.  The increased safety and reduced costs claims are not true at all.  Nuclear is never the solution; it costs far too much and is far too dangerous. ) 

Favors a carbon tax as paramount importance
(A carbon tax, or tax on companies that produce CO2 in their operations, is favored by one segment and opposed by another.  Those in favor are typically oil and gas companies, the opposition are coal companies.  Burning coal produces much more CO2 per unit of energy released, typically 2 - 3 times as much as does burning natural gas.  So, a carbon tax is a perfect way to run coal companies out of business.  Is it any wonder that oil and gas companies favor that?  They get to sell more natural gas, usually as fuel to utilities.)  

Three steps to carbon neutrality: Mitigation, Adaptation, and Resiliency
The points on the slide for this statement included:
-Manufacturing Energy Efficiency - Mitigation
-Electricity Generation /Distribution  - Mitigation
-Transportation - Mitigation
-Urban Energy Efficiency - Mitigation
-Agricultural Practices - Mitigation
-Land Use Practices - Mitigation, Adaptation, Resiliency
-And, governmental policy solutions. 

(He did not discuss these points in detail, except for the next paragraph on Regenerative Agriculture.  My own experience over 40 years of engineering consulting and energy work as an employee in chemical manufacturing shows that none of the above are cost-effective, except for Transportation with electric battery-powered vehicles.  If one favors the Efficient Market Theory, radical changes must make any market more inefficient and thus more costly to operate.  The prospects of increased energy efficiency due to another world energy price shock, like the 1970s had, is virtually zero.  Oil is no longer subject to price increases, and in fact OPEC is in disarray and oil prices are decreasing.  There is a world-wide glut of natural gas, driving its prices down, and coal is on the decline except in a few isolated countries (India, China).  That leaves only a government-mandated carbon tax to force such decreased energy usage.  )

Favors Regenerative Agriculture – soil must increase carbon content to remove CO2 from the air. 
(with farming already a very slim profit endeavor, the costs to include carbon sequestration in soil must be subsidized to prevent bankruptcies.  This may be where the carbon tax comes in; a wealth transfer from CO2 producers to the farmers.  More on Regen Ag will be published shortly on SLB.  For now, it's just another scheme to transfer wealth and run the oil companies out of business.)

Electricity generation options he favors are nuclear and biomass.   Said nuclear has the best safety record of all types when calculated on fatalities per TWh/y produced.   
(I wonder if that includes the entire uranium mining and fuel preparation cycle, plant construction, generation, decommissioning, and spent fuel storage for centuries.  SLB has articles on the dubious safety record of nuclear power plants, see link to "Nuclear Radiation Injures People and Other Living Things,"  and link to "Near Misses on Meltdowns Occur Every 3 Weeks," and link to "US NRC Stops Study of Cancer Risks near Reactors."  As to biomass for power generation, there is too much power needed and not nearly enough biomass to burn.  These facts have been known for decades.  And, it gets worse.  No more biomass is produced each decade, but the power generation needed keeps increasing.)

(Next, Rehm really pushed nuclear, to end the talk) Nuclear is not presently used much due to unjustified public fear.    Said advanced nuclear plants are much safer 
("Unjustified fear" is a buzzword from nuclear proponents.  One must wonder how much fear was justified among the Russians, Europeans, and others when Chernobyl exploded and sent radiation around the planet?  How much fear was justified in Pennsylvania when Three Mile Island melted down and spewed radioactive steam into the skies?  Were the evacuated pregnant women supposed to remain calm, cool, and collected during those horrible few days?  How much fear was justified in Japan during and after the triple reactor meltdowns and explosions at Fukushima?   How much fear is justified among the entire population, now that nuclear plants are being built in third-world countries with earthquakes and other serious threats to the plants' integrity?   How much fear is justified now that cyber-security is a serious threat?  As to advanced nuclear plants being much safer, how could he possibly know?   None have been built except for a few tiny proof-of-concept plants.  SLB has articles on the safety of new nuclear designs, see link to "Thorium MSR No Better Than Uranium Process,"  and link to "High Temperature Gas Reactor Still A Dream" )

Advanced nuclear will recycle existing spent fuel and generate power from the recycled material, reducing toxic radioactive waste by a large amount. 
(Why bother?  Fuel is not the expensive part of running a nuclear plant.  Safety is not improved, either, as a previous article on SLB shows, see link to "Reprocessing Spent Fuel Is Not Safe."  )

Said SMR, small modular reactors, are the answer since they will be very low-cost to build in factories.  
(This is one of the same points made by Tsvetkov in his Gen IV speech to AIChE, and the same rebuttal applies: any cost reduction due to volume production requires millions of units, not hundreds as SMR would have.  Economy of scale overwhelms any production cost reductions.  NB, the wind energy business for WTG (wind turbine generators) has the same issue for blade manufacturing.  The US industry builds and installs approximately 8 GW per year, at an average of 2.4 MW per WTG, thus the average number of WTG installed was 3,333.  Number of blades made was 10,000 for 2018.  Even that 10,000 items does not give low cost, so the industry strives for cost reductions via economy of scale with ever-larger WTG per unit.  Offshore, size went from 2 to 4 to 8 and now 12 MW.   Onshore, size from 1 to 3 and now 5 MW per WTG.  See link to SLB article on SMR and all the many drawbacks, "No Benefits From Smaller Modular Nuclear Plants." )

End of speech.  

In the Q&A portion, I asked this Question:  how much will electricity prices increase if the proposed solutions are implemented?  He admitted it will be a big increase but did not give a number. 

The transition period will require decades, Shell says 50 years, he stated BP and ExxonMobil have similar time frames.  
(how does this square with the earlier statement of carbon-neutral by 2030?  That’s only 11 years away)

Q:  how will SMR reduce costs, when economy of scale is the major factor in nuclear plant costs?  He had no answer for that, either.  

Q:  On USCRN slides that showed a warming, how much of the measured warming was due to CO2 increase, and how much to other factors like cleaner air – he mentioned pollution laws cleaned the air around 1980 and temperatures immediately increased in those locations.   His response was to show a graph purporting to show IR gap in Earth’s radiated energy out to space, with CO2 responsible for the gap.   My rebuttal was, the gap is also exactly where water vapor H2O absorbs, so how do they know it is due to 300 – 400 ppm of CO2, and not due to several percent of water vapor? 

Conclusion

The points made in this speech are typical of the misinformation and Bad Science (BS) of many in the climate alarmism camp.   So much of what they know, just isn't so. (a quote from Ronald Reagan).   The good news is, almost none of this is ever going to happen.  Plastics are here to stay.  Nuclear plants are a dying breed, and the sober review process and high standards at the NRC will prohibit the approval of the Gen IV reactors.   Economics alone will kill off any other reactor designs, such as the NuScale small modular reactor system that is presently undergoing safety review at the NRC.  Low-price wind electricity and natural gas power have doomed nuclear power, which is a very good thing.   Wind energy is a booming business, and is here to stay.  Solar is also booming in those areas of the world, as stated above, not far from the Equator where the sunshine is strong.   The AIChE will likely see the Climate Solutions division, or initiative, whatever it is called, wither away in just a few short years.  

This website will have articles and updates on that, as they occur. 


Roger E. Sowell
Houston, Texas
copyright (c) 2019 by Roger Sowell - all rights reserved




Topics and general links:

Nuclear Power Plants.......here
Climate Change................herehere,  and here
Fresh Water......................here
Engineering......................here  and here
Free Speech.................... here
Renewable Energy...........here  


Wednesday, June 18, 2014

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 22

Subtitle:  Fukushima - The Disaster That Could Not Happen


The Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor meltdowns have been extensively watched and written about.  This article gives my perspective.   The basics are these: the plants were heavily damaged by a larger-than-expected earthquake, at 9.0 magnitude, and a larger-than-expected tsunami of approximately 50 feet height about 40 minutes after the first earthquake.  (the initial shock was followed by hundreds of after-shocks.  

Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, Reactors 1-6 Before Earthquake
source:  ORNL


Some of the after-shocks were major earthquakes themselves, at 7 or greater magnitude.) Meltdowns occurred in 3 reactors, with the extent of the meltdowns yet unknown.  Explosions that destroyed containment buildings occurred in 4 plants.  Radioactive water was dumped into the ocean because operators had no other place to store it.  More radioactive water continues to this day to leak out of cracked foundations, through the porous soil and into the ocean.   Fish caught nearby were ruled unsafe for human consumption due to radioactivity.  Children living near the meltdown plants already have high rates of thyroid cancer, yet thyroid cancer in children is extremely rare.   US sailors on an aircraft carrier developed radiation sickness and other health issues.    This disaster is still unfolding, as even the technology-savvy Japanese struggle with what to do and how to do it.   No matter what nuclear technology is in place, a meltdown will occur when zero power is available for day after day.   That is the fundamental fact of Fukushima Dai-ichi.

The lessons for all of the nuclear industry are clear, and grim:  even the best designers and operators take huge risks when gambling human lives and health against the powers of Nature. 

It should be noted that the Fukushima Dai-ichi reactors are not large, but are medium size.  If a similar meltdown occurs in a modern, large reactor, the devastation would be proportionately greater. 

The nuclear industry advocates continually state the plants are safe; yet disaster after disaster occurs.  Is it time to invoke the insanity clause: when one repeats the same old steps over and over, while expecting different results, this is insanity?  The Big Three meltdowns thus far are Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and now Fukushima.  What plant will be next in the massive meltdown missive?

Facts on events of March 11, 2011

It is important to note a few features of the Fukushima Dai-ichi plants: there are six reactors located right on the coast, they use seawater for cooling, and they are only a few feet above sea level.  An earthquake rated at 9.0 occurred, and reactor units 1, 2, and 3 automatically shut down.  The land movement, or shaking, in the East-West direction was greater than the design.   Unit 4 was already shut down for routine maintenance.  Emergency generators started at all six reactors 1 – 6.    40 minutes later, the 50-foot tsunami hit and all power was lost except for one generator at reactor 6.  The other emergency generators stopped.   The one operating generator was then connected also to reactor 5, and those two reactors (5 and 6) were cooled sufficiently to go into cold shutdown.   Note that the diesel-powered generators were underwater for some time during the multiple tsunami waves.

However, units 1, 2, and 3 reactor cores melted down due to an extended lack of emergency power.  Also, buildings in units 1, 2, 3, and 4 exploded – probably from hydrogen production as the fuel melted.   It is not yet clear exactly why unit 4 exploded, as
Fukushima Dai-ichi Containment Building
After Explosion   source: ORNL
it was not operating at the time of the earthquake.

In addition, the operators were unable to maintain cooling in the spent fuel pool at reactors 1, 2, 3, and 4. 

Subsequently, operators attempted to cool the meltdown reactors’ cores, with little success.  Ultimately, out of desperation, seawater was used.  Seawater is highly corrosive, so metal parts in contact with seawater are ruined.  Afterward, a series of water storage tanks were installed and water was pumped through the melted-down reactors and spent fuel pools and back to the storage tanks. 

Substantial leaks through the ground and into the sea occurred, with radioactive water flowing into the sea.   The earthquakes damaged the foundations sufficiently to provide leakage pathways through the foundations and into the sea.   Note that some nuclear apologist sites claim that the earthquake itself caused no damage.  This is patently untrue.  If no earthquake damage occurred, the foundations would not be cracked and leaking radioactive water into the sea.

It will be years before anyone can open the reactors and determine the extent of the damage due to earthquake and meltdown, just as was the case after the meltdown at Three Mile Island.

 see link to ORNL report

and NRC report: "Recommendations For Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century"  see link

Lessons

What everyone needs to know about nuclear power plants and their designs: designers play the probability game.  Somebody (perhaps an expert) provides the odds of natural disasters of different severities occurring in the next 50 to 60 years, for things such as earthquake, tsunami, dam failure, tornado, volcanic eruption, hurricane and its storm surge, and others.   Typically, a small event is quite common, but the largest events are extremely rare.  To save money, the plant is designed to withstand a given event with an appropriately remote chance of occurrence in the plant’s lifetime.  The plant is not designed to withstand the greatest known event of all-time, especially when the odds of the event occurring during the 50 to 60 year life of the plant are very small.   This is the probability calculus used in designing nuclear power plants.    In the Fukushima Dai-ichi event, the earthquake design was slightly exceeded, however the multiple aftershocks of large magnitude were likely not in the design basis.  The tsunami design was far less than the actual 50-foot tsunami that occurred.  One source states the design was for a 23-foot tsunami.  That then shows that nature flung a wall of water more than 27 feet higher than was expected and planned for in the design. 

The next unexpected design problem was complete isolation from any power for days on end.   The plants are designed for a power failure, with onsite diesel-powered generators to supply power for some hours until grid power is restored.  At Fukushima Dai-ichi, the diesel-powered generators were inoperable after the tsunami.  There was no backup plan in place for grid power loss for days or weeks, plus no diesel-powered generators.   The Japanese management and operators were smart, well-trained, resourceful people, yet even they could not prevent meltdown in the cores without a power source.   What happens when a similar outage occurs in a third-world country?

There are other lessons from Fukushima Dai-ichi.  What about other deprivations, other than grid power and emergency generator power?  What of loss of cooling water – the lake, river, or other source?   Even nuclear plants close to shore, as Fukushima Dai-ichi is, can lose ocean cooling if the land is thrust upward in an earthquake so that the water intakes are now above sea level.   Even if electrical power were restored in time, it is mighty difficult to cool reactor cores without any water.   What about dam break, with flood including mud, debris, rocks, or ice blocks?   Ash rain from volcano?  Crash impact from missile?  Crash impact from a heavy aircraft, even a bomber loaded with bombs?  Multiple mechanical breakdown of critical pumps – e.g. bolts all failing at the same time as happened at Salem 2 in 2014.  Or, the electrical grid disconnected plus diesel generators that will not start due to any malfunction.  

What about sabotage – deliberate destruction of key cooling equipment due to a security breach?  This is a favorite theme of movies, but could it happen?  Hopefully not, with security teams on the alert.

Nuclear advocates falsely insist that the Fukushima Dai-ichi core meltdowns were due to the old, BWR (boiling water reactor) design.  That is false.   Even a modern PWR (pressurized water reactor) design would meltdown without power for several days.   This is a fact that is recognized by NRC and other sober persons.

Foundation cracks and radioactive water leaks, as have occurred at Fukushima Dai-ichi, are being addressed now, three years later.  The plan is to install an ice-dam in the earth surrounding the plant.  The ice will be kept cold by refrigeration units, powered by the grid.  In effect, there will be a giant section of artificial perma-frost underneath the leaking foundations.  One hopes that this works, and that the grid does not fail yet again.   Meanwhile, for three years the cracked foundations have leaked radioactive water into the ocean. 
  
Aftermath

Despite the claims of nuclear proponents, Fukushima radiation clearly has impacted public health, land, air, and ocean with contamination.  The radioactive air plume arrived in just a few days at the US west coast, although the radioactivity was far below danger levels.   Tsunami flotsam arrived in other countries, radioactive water flowed into the ocean, fish, crops, and milk were contaminated.

It is early yet in the life of a nuclear meltdown, but there will be cancers, diabetes, thyroid illness, and mental problems (worry, stress).   There may also be birth defects.   Unlike at Chernobyl, there will likely be no early deaths from radiation sickness.  However, there very well could be early deaths from cancer. 

Japan has made decisions on shutting down other nuclear reactors, instead using other fuels / plants for power – oil, coal, and natural gas.  Recently, some reactors have been restarted.  Nuclear power is very controversial in Japan at this time.   Germany has declared it will not build new reactors, and will shut down existing reactors in a few years’ time.  China has declared it will continue building reactors, as will India. 

Other countries took a long, sober look at their own reactors and preparations for a similar situation: if a long period without power occurs, what would they do?    The US response is to have a few resource centers, with critical equipment being available to any reactor in dire straits.   One hopes the nature of the disaster lends itself to timely delivery of the critical equipment.   

Other new requirements were issued by the NRC.  The NRC issued a long report with about 20 new requirements for the existing fleet and any new construction.   See link.

Conclusion

It appears the world has reached a tipping point, or perhaps is beginning to lose patience with the never-ending lies and deceptions from the nuclear industry.  Before Three Mile Island, the industry insisted the plants were safe.  Even the NRC bought into the “things are safe” mantra, until operator error after a common equipment malfunction (a pump stopped pumping) at Three Mile Island showed the “things are safe” line was totally wrong.  Then, Chernobyl exploded and spewed radiation all around the northern hemisphere – yet the nuclear apologists stated this was an aberration, rogue operators in a badly designed plant were doing an unauthorized test (it had graphite for moderation – basically carbon that can easily burn).   Now, Fukushima Dai-ichi has three reactor cores melted down, with four containment buildings blown apart in four separate explosions, a spent fuel pool that overheated, cracked foundations that allow radioactive water to flow into the ocean, and many children already diagnosed with thyroid cancer.   Their young lives are changed forever.   Even today, nuclear apologists insist that the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster (they don’t call it a disaster, rather the word they use is “incident”) was just an unfortunate natural event that is too rare to ever be concerned about again. 

The truth about nuclear power is this: no design is adequate for what Nature can put forth.  No humans can accurately and confidently run the numbers and predict the odds of a massive natural disaster.   No contingency plan can anticipate every eventuality.  The price we pay as a society, as a human race, is living with the very real, and rational, fear of another meltdown in a reactor near you.  How many more human errors will be made, as equipment breaks down, as natural disasters occur, in combinations that were not planned for?   How much more unsafe are the plants, when the regulatory agency relaxes rule after rule after rule?

This concludes the article on Fukushima: The Disaster That Could Not Happen.   Next, is the San Onofre Shutdown Saga. 

Previous Articles

The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article. 


Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 













Part Twenty Two - this article


Roger E. Sowell, Esq.

Marina del Rey, California 


Friday, June 13, 2014

The Truth About Nuclear Power - Part 21

Subtitle: Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Meltdown 1979

The Three Mile Island accident, TMI, is one of the most heavily written-about nuclear incidents in history.  An internet search returns more than 25 million webpages, or hits using the search term “Three Mile Island.”   More than 14,000 books are listed on a popular internet book selling site.  With that, this article strives to provide a different perspective – a perspective based on principles of safety and process engineering.   For comparison, a search for the Fukushima meltdown produces only 12 million webpages (about half) and only 1500 books on the same book-selling site.  

Three Mile Island nuclear plant consists of two almost-identical units, number 1 and number 2, located on an island in the Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania, about 80 miles west of Philadelphia and 50 miles north of Baltimore. (see photos)  It is very near the heavily populated northeast corridor running from New York City through Philadelphia, Baltimore, and
Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant
Unit 1 (top) and Unit 2 (bottom)
Showing operating cooling towers
at unit 1, idle towers at Unit 2.  Containment
domes can be seen at left center.
credit: from google maps
Washington DC.  The meltdown was caused by a combination of mechanical failure, design flaws, improper training, and human error.  This accident was one of, if not the first wakeup calls to the nuclear industry that the plants are not safe.   Despite the industry’s loud insistence that the plants were safely designed and operated, TMI showed at least a few of the deficiencies.  Those deficiencies existed in most, if not all of the other plants.  The NRC required the existing plants to correct their deficiencies, and all new plants to incorporate the changes to increase safety.  


This accident at TMI showed clearly and emphatically that a meltdown was possible even without the very rare events that caused the problem at Chernobyl, performing an unauthorized test with safety systems disabled, and at Fukushima, where an earthquake was followed immediately by a tsunami, both of which were greater in magnitude than the plant was designed to handle.   

TMI was caused by a routine mechanical failure of a pump.  Nobody can claim that a pump failure is a rare event.   The problem at TMI was made much, much worse by a valve that stuck open.  It is inexcusable that nuclear plant designers, operators, and oversight agencies failed to recognize that valves sometimes stick.   The fact that valves sometimes stick in the open position, sometimes closed, and sometimes in-between is well-known to those in the
Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2 in 1979
Unit 1 is on the left, Unit 2 is on the right
source:  NRC
process industries.   This particular valve was a relief valve.  Relief valves are even more prone to sticking open, a fact that is common knowledge.   Yet, as the facts below demonstrate, TMI operators made blunder after blunder because they believed the relief valve closed by itself – they believed it had not stuck open.  


Nuclear proponents frequently argue that the reason nuclear plants cost so much is due to needless design changes by the NRC during plant construction, and costly retrofits to those plants already in operation.  The argument is invalid.  We would indeed be a stupid society to allow plants to operate with known safety deficiencies such as existed at TMI before the accident.   In fact, if not for the existence of all three required containment systems, deadly nuclear radiation would have spewed all over the northeastern corridor of the United States.   Those three levels of containment are the fuel tube, the reactor vessel, and the containment building.  Ultimately, the fuel tubes failed and melted, the reactor vessel barely contained the melted fuel, and the containment building contained most, but not all, of the gaseous radioactive particles.  

With the passage of time, more than 3 decades now, TMI has faded into the background.  Yet, the lessons from that incident are serious, and point to what we can expect going forward.   

Summary of Events  from NRC website  see link

“The accident began about 4 a.m. on Wednesday, March 28, 1979, when the plant experienced a failure in the secondary, non-nuclear section of the plant (one of two reactors on the site). Either a mechanical or electrical failure prevented the main feedwater pumps from sending water to the steam generators that remove heat from the reactor core. This caused the plant's turbine-generator and then the reactor itself to automatically shut down. Immediately, the pressure in the primary system (the nuclear portion of the plant) began to increase. In order to control that pressure, the pilot-operated relief valve (a valve located at the top of the pressurizer) opened. The valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper levels, but it became stuck open. Instruments in the control room, however, indicated to the plant staff that the valve was closed. As a result, the plant staff was unaware that cooling water was pouring out of the stuck-open valve.  (emphasis added) (design flaw – operators relied on bad information.  Also, when water pours out of a relief valve, there should be an indication – a flow measurement – of that water.  The receiving vessel also should have a level indicator that can be observed as increasing. -- RES )

As coolant flowed from the primary system through the valve, other instruments available to reactor operators provided inadequate information. There was no instrument that showed how much water covered the core. (design flaw)  As a result, plant staff assumed that as long as the pressurizer water level was high, the core was properly covered with water. As alarms rang and warning lights flashed, the operators did not realize that the plant was experiencing a loss-of-coolant accident. They took a series of actions that made conditions worse. The water escaping through the stuck valve reduced primary system pressure so much that the reactor coolant pumps had to be turned off to prevent dangerous vibrations. To prevent the pressurizer from filling up completely, the staff reduced how much emergency cooling water was being pumped in to the primary system. These actions starved the reactor core of coolant, causing it to overheat.

Without the proper water flow, the nuclear fuel overheated to the point at which the zirconium cladding (the long metal tubes that hold the nuclear fuel pellets) ruptured and the fuel pellets began to melt. It was later found that about half of the core melted during the early stages of the accident. Although TMI-2 suffered a severe core meltdown, the most dangerous kind of nuclear power accident, consequences outside the plant were minimal. Unlike the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, TMI-2's containment building remained intact and held almost all of the accident's radioactive material.

Federal and state authorities were initially concerned about the small releases of radioactive gases that were measured off-site by the late morning of March 28 and even more concerned about the potential threat that the reactor posed to the surrounding population. They did not know that the core had melted, but they immediately took steps to try to gain control of the reactor and ensure adequate cooling to the core. The NRC's regional office in King of Prussia, Pa., was notified at 7:45 a.m. on March 28. By 8 a.m., NRC Headquarters in Washington, D.C., was alerted and the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Md., was activated. The regional office promptly dispatched the first team of inspectors to the site and other agencies, such as the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, also mobilized their response teams. Helicopters hired by TMI's owner, General Public Utilities Nuclear, and the Department of Energy were sampling radioactivity in the atmosphere above the plant by midday. A team from the Brookhaven National Laboratory was also sent to assist in radiation monitoring. At 9:15 a.m., the White House was notified and at 11 a.m., all non-essential personnel were ordered off the plant's premises.

By the evening of March 28, the core appeared to be adequately cooled and the reactor appeared to be stable. But new concerns arose by the morning of Friday, March 30. A significant release of radiation from the plant's auxiliary building, performed to relieve pressure on the primary system and avoid curtailing the flow of coolant to the core, caused a great deal of confusion and consternation. In an atmosphere of growing uncertainty about the condition of the plant, the governor of Pennsylvania, Richard L. Thornburgh, consulted with the NRC about evacuating the population near the plant. Eventually, he and NRC Chairman Joseph Hendrie agreed that it would be prudent for those members of society most vulnerable to radiation to evacuate the area. Thornburgh announced that he was advising pregnant women and pre-school-age children within a five-mile radius of the plant to leave the area.

Within a short time, chemical reactions in the melting fuel created a large hydrogen bubble in the dome of the pressure vessel, the container that holds the reactor core. NRC officials worried the hydrogen bubble might burn or even explode and rupture the pressure vessel. In that event, the core would fall into the containment building and perhaps cause a breach of containment. The hydrogen bubble was a source of intense scrutiny and great anxiety, both among government authorities and the population, throughout the day on Saturday, March 31. The crisis ended when experts determined on Sunday, April 1, that the bubble could not burn or explode because of the absence of oxygen in the pressure vessel. Further, by that time, the utility had succeeded in greatly reducing the size of the bubble. “ (this was an acceptable conclusion.  Basic chemistry shows that the hydrogen was formed by catalytic and heat-driven reactions from hot zirconium in the fuel tubes with water; basically water (H2O) was split into hydrogen and oxygen.  The hydrogen formed a gas, but the oxygen combined with the zirconium to form ZrO2, zirconium dioxide. )

Also, see the Report of the President's Commission on Three Mile Island see link 

Also "Three Mile Island; A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public," by Mitchell Rogovin and George T. Frampton, NUREG/CR-1250  see link

Commentary

Plant operators on shift that night were all ex-navy nuclear submarine.  Yet, with all their vaunted training, they made one critical mistake after another.  

A nuclear reactor core requires continued cooling even after a shutdown – it requires days to cool the tons of nuclear material in the core down to a long-term safe temperature.  Circulating water, with the water externally cooled is the means of cooling the core.  

Each time an incident occurs in a nuclear plant, the industry advocates insist the plants are safe.  They insist that the event was an anomaly, it cannot happen elsewhere.   Yet, another accident happens. 

It is significant in the TMI meltdown saga that industry experts had witnessed a similar minor loss of coolant accident at a different plant only a year or so earlier.  No meltdown occurred, but a sharp analyst noted that such an incident could easily result in a meltdown.  A written warning was sent to the NRC, but nothing came of it.  In short, the “dots” were collected, but nobody connected the “dots.”

In this case, a cooling water pump failed.  This particular pump was located on the steam-generator side.  It is important to know that there are three primary water circulating loops in a pressurized-water nuclear plant such as the design at TMI.  The first loop is of radioactive water, this circulates through the core at very high pressure, and releases its heat in the steam generator.  The water in the first loop remains a liquid at all times under normal operation. The second loop, the one with the pump failure at TMI, has non-radioactive water at high pressure that is turned to steam in the steam generator.  This steam then spins the turbine.  Exhaust steam from the turbine is condensed back to water in the condenser.  The condensate is then pumped as liquid water back to the steam generator.  It was the pump for the second loop, sending water to the steam generator that failed at TMI.    The third water loop is the cooling water, usually from a cooling tower but sometimes from the ocean or a lake or river.  The third water loop circulates cool water through the condenser, and other areas of the plant that require cooling. 

Damage to the reactor vessel was extensive.  A 1998 report shows that 45 percent of the fuel – 62 metric tonnes --  melted.  It is important to note that TMI unit 2 was not a large reactor by today’s standards.  It produced only about 900 MWe.  More modern plants produce 1200 MWe, and some are designed for 1600 MWe.   This means that approximately twice as much core material exists in the largest designs.   It is questionable (doubtful?) that a larger reactor would withstand a similar core meltdown.  The reason for this is the reactor vessels are made in the form of a vertical cylinder with a closed head at top and bottom.  The diameter is only a bit larger (approximately 40 percent greater) for double the volume.    TMI 2 Vessel Investigation Project Integration Report, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, June 1998. (note: this report was 19 years after the accident)  

See link

Almost 1 million gallons of radioactive water accumulated in storage tanks and in the bottom of the containment building (700,000 gallons were reported).  

Upon eventual opening the reactor and removing the melted mess, the still-radioactive fuel was shipped across the entire US – from Pennsylvania to Idaho – for treatment and disposal.  It must have been a comfort to all those citizens along the route to know that radioactive, melted core material from TMI was passing by their homes.  

One final note: the TMI meltdown occurred during the showing of one of the most-watched movies ever made on nuclear plants, The China Syndrome, starring Jack Lemmon and the infamous Jane Fonda.  

Conclusion

The Three Mile Island meltdown, due to a minor loss of coolant accident, was not caused by a rare event such as an earthquake, tsunami, or other natural disaster as happened at Fukushima.  It was not caused by plant operators who violated a planned test as happened at Chernobyl.   TMI meltdown was caused by a combination of bad design, a normal equipment failure, a stuck valve that should have been recognized immediately but was not (even by the vaunted former-Navy submarine nuclear operators), improper training, misinterpretation of available data, and general confusion.    In the TMI meltdown, operators had perfectly good equipment ready to inject water into the reactor to prevent a meltdown.  Instead, they stopped the water flow long enough for the meltdown to occur.   Only by sheer good luck was the water flow re-started when it was.  

The reactor wall and bottom head were badly damaged by the melted core, and only good luck intervened to provide adequate cooling to the core in time to prevent a breach of the reactor itself.  Had a reactor breach happened, melted core material would have flowed onto the containment building floor, and vast quantities of explosive hydrogen gas would have mixed with air in the containment building.  The hydrogen most likely would have exploded with devastating consequences, exactly like the explosions at Fukushima 30 or so years later. 

Modern reactors continue to have mechanical failures, electrical failures, security breaches, and emergency core shutdowns, as documented in article 16 of TANP (see link below).  The major incidents amounted to 70 events in just the past four years – a rate of one every 3 weeks.  Minor incidents number in the hundreds each year.   It would not take much for a similar combination of operator confusion, lack of training, system replacement with different characteristics, and bad luck this time to have a much worse nuclear nightmare: a complete meltdown and reactor wall breach.    It would not create the China Syndrome, but the results would be devastating. 

Previous Articles

The Truth About Nuclear Power emphasizes the economic and safety aspects by showing that (one) modern nuclear power plants are uneconomic to operate compared to natural gas and wind energy, (two) they produce preposterous pricing if they are the sole power source for a grid, (three) they cost far too much to construct, (four) use far more water for cooling, 4 times as much, than better alternatives, (five) nuclear fuel makes them difficult to shut down and requires very costly safeguards, (six) they are built to huge scale of 1,000 to 1,600 MWe or greater to attempt to reduce costs via economy of scale, (seven) an all-nuclear grid will lose customers to self-generation, (eight) smaller and modular nuclear plants have no benefits due to reverse economy of scale, (nine) large-scale plants have very long construction schedules even without lawsuits that delay construction, (ten) nuclear plants do not reach 50 or 60 years life because they require costly upgrades after 20 to 30 years that do not always perform as designed, (eleven) France has 85 percent of its electricity produced via nuclear power but it is subsidized, is still almost twice as expensive as prices in the US, and is only viable due to exporting power at night rather than throttling back the plants during low demand, (twelve) nuclear plants cannot provide cheap power on small islands, (thirteen) US nuclear plants are heavily subsidized but still cannot compete, (fourteen), projects are cancelled due to unfavorable economics, reactor vendors are desperate for sales, nuclear advocates tout low operating costs and ignore capital costs, nuclear utilities never ask for a rate decrease when building a new nuclear plant, and high nuclear costs are buried in a large customer base, (fifteen) safety regulations are routinely relaxed to allow the plants to continue operating without spending the funds to bring them into compliance, (sixteen) many, many near-misses occur each year in nuclear power, approximately one every 3 weeks, (seventeen) safety issues with short term, and long-term, storage of spent fuel, (eighteen)  safety hazards of spent fuel reprocessing, (nineteen) health effects on people and other living things, (twenty) nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, (twenty-one) nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, (twenty-two)  nuclear meltdowns at Fukushima, (twenty-three) near-disaster at San Onofre, (twenty-four) the looming disaster at St. Lucie, (twenty-five)  the inherently unsafe characteristics of nuclear power plants required government shielding from liability, or subsidy, for the costs of a nuclear accident via the Price-Anderson Act, and (twenty-six) the serious public impacts of large-scale population evacuation and relocation after a major incident, or "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" in the language used by the Price-Anderson Act.  Additional articles will include (twenty-seven) the future of nuclear fusion, (twenty-eight) future of thorium reactors, (twenty-nine) future of high-temperature gas nuclear reactors, and (thirty), a concluding chapter with a world-wide economic analysis of nuclear reactors and why countries build them.  Links to each article in TANP series are included at the end of this article. 


Additional articles will be linked as they are published. 













Part Twenty One - this article




Roger E. Sowell, Esq. 
Marina del Rey, California